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ABSTRACT 
When implemented within a favourable legislative framework, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) can 
produce domestic growth-enhancing spillovers in host countries. Other potential positive effects 
include the provision of investment capital, the creation of local employment and the transfer of 
sophisticated technology or advanced knowledge. African nations in particular have been historically 
reliant on externally-provided funds. Prevailing low income levels, marginal savings rates and the 
absence of functioning financial markets necessary to provide local start-up capital continue to keep 
Africa reliant on foreign inflows. Considering China’s increasing financial commitments to Sub-
Saharan Africa (SSA) over the last decade, this study examines the state of current Sino-African 
investment relationships.  
Specific attention is paid to the outcomes of this strategic bilateral alliance in order to determine 
whether or not a mutually beneficial investment relationship has evolved. The distinct nature and 
structure of, the motivation behind and the most significant determinants of Chinese FDI to SSA are 
all analysed in accordance with traditional FDI theories. A case study approach is used to establish 
whether China’s contemporary interest in SSA differs from historical investments and to also 
investigate country-specific commonalities and differences.   
Of particular relevance to SSA are resource-backed Chinese loans that finance major infrastructure 
projects in host nations. Interestingly, a lot of the Sino-African investment packages resemble similar 
deals struck between China and Japan in the 1970s. The results of this study indicate that China’s 
investment motives seem more diverse than initially expected. Resource-seeking, profit-seeking and 
market access-seeking reasons appear to be the most important motives. After establishing the Top-
Ten recipients of Chinese FDI in SSA, these nations are then classified into three major categories: 
resource-, oil- or agricultural-rich nations. Undiversified resource- or oil-rich economies are found to 
have secured the largest shares of Chinese FDI.  
This study suggests that China’s contemporary “African Safari” is an unconventional way of providing 
financial assistance. Rather than solely supplying FDI, China finances a diverse mix of instruments, 
the most important being concessional loans, export credits, zero-interest loans and the 
establishment of Special Economic Zones. A profound difference to traditional Western investment 
packages is China’s non-interference approach. Accordingly, Beijing not only refrains from 
intervening in host countries’ domestic affairs but also refuses to attach formal conditionalties to its 
loans. China’s “financial safari” into Africa has produced many positive as well as negative effects in 
host countries. Nevertheless, it would seem that the positive effects outweigh the negative and 
China’s FDI could contribute to sustainable development in SSA.  
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CHAPTER ONE: 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1. CONTEXT OF THE RESEARCH  
Although positive and negative spillover effects are widely recognised, the impact of Foreign 
Direct Investment (FDI) on developing countries remains particularly controversial. The most 
commonly accepted benchmark definition classifies FDI as strategic long-term investments into 
an indigenous company pursued by a foreign investor who resides in a different country than the 
receiving entity. In order to secure a lasting interest in the indigenous firm, at least ten percent of 
ownership control is transferred to the profit-seeking foreign investor (OECD, 2008a: 64). 
Portfolio investments, on the other hand, are not included in FDI flows considering investors’ 
short-term interest in high turn-over securities (Moosa, 2002: 1).  
While many mainstream economists do not consider FDI to be an unfair zero-sum game 
(UNCTAD, 1999), others argue that positive remunerations in recipient (host) countries are only 
marginal compared to those enjoyed by the investing (home) country. Most FDI literature tends 
to address two major issues. Firstly, researchers attempt to investigate the relationship between 
FDI and its growth-enhancing effects on the overall host economy. Secondly, accepting a 
positive relationship between FDI and economic growth, other researchers endeavour to identify 
the most important FDI determinants for potential host countries (Borensztein et al., 1998; De 
Mello, 1997; Helleiner, 1998: 6; Herzer, 2009; Lim, 2001; Lipsey, 2004). Although a definite 
relationship between FDI and positive spillover effects in host countries cannot be established, 
most researchers concur on the positive correlation between FDI, economic growth and 
development. Especially in developing countries that encourage favourable investment policy 
frameworks, FDI has proven to spur the development of local businesses, boost international 
trade and to also benefit domestic economic growth through the transfer of superior 
technologies, advanced skills or sophisticated knowledge (OECD, 2008b: 64).  
One developing region that has been historically reliant on FDI inflows is the African continent. 
Failure to provide the necessary tools for domestic capital formation has placed major 
restrictions on Africa’s sustainable economic development (Collier and Pattillo, 2000: 365). As 
observed in most Sub-Saharan African countries, low domestic saving rates, marginal income 
levels and the lack of well-functioning financial markets have starved the continent of greatly 
needed domestic start-up capital (Asiedu, 2006: 107). In an attempt to overcome these regional 
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short-comings, FDI is utilised as a key medium to spur domestic development and to 
simultaneously enhance economic growth in Africa.    
Despite efforts to lure large shares of global FDI inflows, African countries not only lag behind 
most other developing nations, but incoming flows are also distributed highly unevenly between 
recipient nations (Morris and Aziz, 2011: 401). Resource-abundant nations, such as Angola, 
Nigeria or Sudan, currently receive the largest share of global FDI coming into Africa (Alden, 
2005; Asiedu 2002, 2006; Dunning, 2003; Musila and Sigue, 2006; NIC, 2005; Prichard, 2009). 
The World Investment Report 2011 (UNCTAD, 2011: 67) also states that joint business 
ventures struck between African firms and foreign investors are profoundly limited by financial 
and technical constraints. Hence, foreign capital inflows do not necessarily imply positive 
spillover effects in Sub-Sahara Africa (SSA).  
An ongoing phenomenon in international capital movements is China’s transformation from 
being a net receiver of inward FDI (IFDI) to becoming a major global FDI supplier. Empirical 
findings indicate that compared to other developing regions in Latin America or East Asia, 
Africa only receives a marginal amount of Chinese OFDI (China Development Bank, 2011). 
Recent scholarly work has observed that the most lucrative determinants of FDI into Africa are 
slightly dissimilar to those of other regions (Asiedu, 2002, 2006). Further research is necessary to 
verify whether regional factors are truly hindering Africa’s attractiveness for FDI or if country 
specific parameters, such as trade restrictions, levels of corruption, market size etc. affect the 
inflow of foreign capital.       
When analysed with traditional FDI theory, China’s changing investment pattern has raised 
fundamental questions about the underlying nature of its FDI motives. The economic 
differences between Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) and China are vast. While Africa is not expected 
to reach any of the eight Millennium Development Goals1, China is currently regarded as the 
second strongest global economic powerhouse (Sparks, 2012). Moreover, whereas Africa is 
home to the most developing nations on a single continent, a booming Chinese economy has 
experienced significant annual economic growth rates of roughly 10.6 percent over the last five 
years (China Analyst, 2012: 14). This has transformed the country into a key participant in the 
global scramble for securing readily accessible raw materials, such as oil, gas, minerals, arable 
land, copper, cobalt and cotton (Alden, 2005: 148; Provost, 2011; Weston, Campbell and 
                                                          
1
 The Millennium Development Goals were adopted by all UN member nations in 2000 with the purpose of 
improving social and economic living conditions amongst the most impoverished regions in the world. Eight 
specific poverty-reducing goals were identified to be reached by 2015 (UN, 2000).   
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Koleski, 2011; Zweig and Jianhai, 2005: 25). In order to support its rapidly growing economy 
which is now facing the challenging demands of urbanisation and industrialisation, China’s 
interest in establishing strategic long-term alliances with reliable suppliers of natural resources 
has steadily increased since the late 1990s (UNCTAD, 2011: 72).  
China’s long-term and short-term energy goals are openly stated in its foreign policies and Africa 
seems to play a very important part in this (Zhao, 2011a). In response to China’s recent “African 
Safari”, supporters of the classical dependency argument stress the one-sided exploitation of 
Africa’s vast natural resources by commodity-hungry Chinese investors. Doriye (2010: 24-27), 
Zafar (2007: 105-108) and Zweig and Jianhai (2005: 33) consider Chinese investments as a mixed 
blessing for regional development. All four scholars agree that the support for vital infrastructure 
projects and developmental assistance targeting the construction of African dams, roads, ports, 
hospitals and schools are positive externalities caused by Chinese FDI. However, they also 
criticise the exploitative nature of Sino-African investment deals as Africa’s own developmental 
needs seem to be neglected by Chinese investors. Accordingly, China is accused of solely 
focusing on their selfish motives by extracting African raw materials, mineral resources, hydro-
carbons or securing arable land to satisfy its peaking domestic needs for oil, energy or food 
security. Assisting in the construction of local African infrastructure projects is thereby perceived 
as a means to keep African nations dependent on Chinese-induced capital inflows.       
Various studies conducted by international organisations, such as the African Development Bank 
(ADB, 2011), Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD, 2008b) or 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD, 2011, 2012) elaborate on 
China’s global hunt for resource security. A valid observation is raised by Morck, Yeung and 
Zhao (2008: 338) who investigate the business structure of the most profitable Chinese 
companies engaged in overseas investment. According to this study, companies involved in the 
fields of resource extraction hold a monopolistic advantage in the key sector industries of their 
investments. This further supports the common a priori assumption that foreign investments 
targeting SSA’s resource-rich nations are indeed non-diversified inflows with one goal only: 
natural resource extraction.      
However, contrary to the popular belief that China’s strategic interest in Africa lies purely in its 
resource abundance, recent research recognises food and energy security, new export markets, 
symbolic diplomacy and the relocation of labour-intensive production to overseas facilities as 
other relevant investment incentives (ADB, 2011; Alden, 2005; Brautigam, 2009; Brautigam and 
Xiaoyang, 2009; Claassen, Loots and Bezuidenhout, 2011; Gammeltoft, 2008; Provost, 2011; 
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The China Analyst, 2012; Wang, Hong, Kafouros and Boateng, 2012; Whitehead and Green, 
2012; Zafar, 2007; Zweig and Jianhai, 2005). Indeed, Sino investment motives seem more 
multifaceted than expected. Entering new markets in response to competitive pressure in the 
domestic Chinese market and the opportunity to move excessive production supplies abroad 
were identified as major reasons for Chinese entities to engage in foreign investments (ADB, 
2011: 40). An article published in The China Analyst (2012: 11) further supports the notion that 
Chinese FDI motives have changed from being primarily resource-extractive to those of securing 
strategic assets, acquiring new market shares and securing ownership positions in foreign brands 
or technologies. Chow (2010: 58) considers China’s vast accumulation of foreign exchange 
reserves (in particular US Dollars) and its gradual liberalisation towards a profit-seeking market 
economy as other important motives for the current increase in overseas investments.   
Although China’s investment motives in SSA seem more diversified than might be expected 
from the aforementioned common a priori assumptions, resource-seeking activities remain at the 
centre of international media coverage. According to the ADB (2011: 19), the current state of 
Sino-African relations is depicted as “commodities-for-infrastructure” exchange. Critical 
questions about the mutual benefits arising from China’s engagement in SSA are therefore raised. 
Appleyard, Field and Cobb (2008: 226) emphasise that FDI is not exclusively pursued for 
economic benefits, but is also motivated by political incentives. Alden (2005: 148) postulates that 
in addition to gaining resource security, Chinese FDI is also used as a vital instrument of exerting 
symbolic diplomacy. Accordingly, Sino-African collaboration should partially be treated as an 
effort to expand China’s influence in international partnerships. China’s political reasons for 
supplying foreign investments, such as assuring diplomatic support from FDI-dependent nations 
in SSA to gain voting rights in the UN or to deny Taiwan’s independence, have been largely 
overlooked in contemporary research. As political reasons appear to offer a crucial link to the 
recent surge in Chinese FDI, they cannot be neglected in a critical analysis of investment 
reasons.  
Regardless of the investment motives, Chinese unconditional2 concessional loans have found 
great support amongst many undemocratic and corrupt African countries over the last decade 
(Weston, Campbell and Koleski, 2011). Compared to traditional Western loans that are attached 
to conditionalities, China prides itself by offering a new, unconventional path of development 
                                                          
2
 In theory, contemporary Chinese loans to Africa do not attach formal conditions. Nevertheless, it will become 
evident throughout this research study that China’s concessional assistance is also tied to certain 
conditionalities in favour of China.  
3
 The limited scope of this thesis does not allow for a detailed explanation of all FDI types but rather focuses on 
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assistance. Beijing’s pledge of non-interference with the recipient nation’s domestic affairs and its 
preference to not impose conditionalities frame the major pillars of recent Sino-African 
investment packages.  
In response to continuous pressure against the lack of transparency on adequate data, a White 
Paper was published by the Chinese government in 2011. Considered to be the first of its kind, 
this report was seen as a direct response to the accusation of China’s natural resource safari in 
Africa. Beijing officially denied all such allegations and emphasised that it extends development 
assistance to over 161 countries in the form of debt-cancellations, bilateral trade agreements or 
infrastructure developments (Provost, 2011). China’s engagement in Africa was hereby declared 
as a mutually beneficial investment relationship based on the principles of respect and friendship. 
Nevertheless, the unconventional approach of Beijing’s FDI policies has triggered growing 
tensions in Western countries which fear the loss of their dominant global position to the 
emerging “Eastern Dragon” (Doriye, 2010; NIC, 2005). Support for “undemocratic and corrupt 
governments”, lack of environmental standards, failure to contract local workers and flooding 
the African market with excessive amounts of Chinese imports all represent popular reproaches 
to Sino-African collaboration. Most importantly, China’s alleged selfish motive to deprive 
African nations of their natural resources is worsening the existing animosity between the 
Eastern and Western hemisphere.  
In a repetition of modern history, Africa seems to be once more caught between resource-
hungry nations. But compared to historic colonialism, this time Africa has an opportunity to 
carefully choose - whether to accept Western investments (such as structural adjustment 
programs imposed by the World Bank that have failed in the past) or to grant China’s non-
traditional investment agreements a fair chance. Because Africa has been and continues to be 
reliant on FDI, it now faces a challenging crossroad at its present developmental stage to ensure 
that only the right kind of foreign investment will be accepted. Critical analysis of long-term 
outcomes will determine whether the current era of overseas investment symbolises a repeat of 
imperialistic dependency theory or whether it provides new opportunities for autonomous and 
prosperous African development (Southall and Henning, 2009).  
1.2. GOALS OF THE RESEARCH  
Based on the contradictory state of current Sino-African relations, this research seeks to 
determine whether Chinese FDI flows into SSA is truly benefitting host countries or whether the 
bargaining power of receiving countries is diminishing even further by accepting much needed 
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Chinese concessional development assistance. More specifically, the following research question 
presents itself from the broader research context: “Are developing countries in SSA truly 
benefitting from their newly founded strategic alliance with the Chinese government through 
FDI induced spillover effects?”   
1.3. METHODS, PROCEDURES AND TECHNIQUES  
The intended final deliverable for this research study is to compile a critical, comprehensive 
analysis on the nature and structure of recent Chinese FDI flows destined for host nations in 
SSA. To further elucidate the main research question, the following three sub-goals were 
established:  
(1) Identify the Top-Ten recipient nations of Chinese FDI in SSA in order to establish a 
general investment pattern and to also explore the most attractive investment 
determinants.   
(2) Assess if China’s FDI to SSA suits traditional investment motives by employing a case 
study approach of the Top-Ten recipient nations.  
(3) Determine whether Chinese FDI is one-sided in favour of China’s selfish interests or 
whether investment deals are mutually beneficial to both China and its SSA host nations. 
 
In order to address the goals of this research, an extended study of appropriate literature is 
conducted. Firstly, the conceptual framework of FDI with special attention given to relevant 
theories, motives, effects and determinants is created to lay a solid theoretical foundation for this 
study. Secondly, after drawing from those core characteristics of international capital 
movements, selected political documents, economic policies and quantitative economic data are 
reviewed to identify the specific patterns of Chinese FDI in SSA in more detail.   
Findings of the reviewed literature are then complemented with empirical evidence. For this 
purpose, descriptive statistics and a country-specific case study investigating Sub-Saharan-
African’s Top-Ten recipient countries of Chinese OFDI are implemented. While quantitative 
metadata provides the framework for Chapter Three, empirical results are analysed in the 
individual case studies of Chapter Four. Quantitative data is primarily obtained from the Chinese 
Ministry of Commerce in the 2010 Statistical Bulletin of China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment 
publication (MOFCOM, 2010). In conjunction with this publication, data extracted from various 
reports of economic indicators compiled by the United Nations (UN), UNCTAD, ADB and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) are further accessed. The relevant time period under 
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investigation is from 2004 to 2010, although a limited amount of data from 2011 was also 
evaluated.  
1.4. ORGANISATION OF THE RESEARCH  
This research study is organised as follows. After the introduction, Chapter Two commences 
with a comprehensive literature review of FDI classifications, theories, motives, determinants 
and host country effects. Chapter Three then combines initial empirical evidence with an 
extended literature study of the FDI framework applicable to the Sino-African context. Global 
and Chinese FDI flows to SSA are the main focus of this chapter. Chapter Four implements a 
case-study approach to gather and analyse country-specific empirical results. For this purpose, 
ten selected Sub-Saharan African countries are chosen based on data presented in Chapter 
Three. This research study concludes by discussing the most important results emerging from 
the analysis. Policy recommendations are made after critically assessing and synthesising those 
findings.     
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CHAPTER TWO:  
FDI THEORIES AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1. INTRODUCTION  
Chapter Two produces a literature study on major motives, theories, key players, determinants 
and effects of FDI. The second section of this chapter defines and classifies the most important 
conceptual characteristics of FDI in order to create a solid theoretical foundation for subsequent 
discussions. Section 2.3 sets out the different views on investment motives. Similarities and 
differences amongst selected research studies are pooled into a comprehensive debate of reasons 
for engaging in international capital investments.  
After synthesising various FDI theories into appropriate categories based on market structures 
and other economic factors, Section 2.4 then identifies major key players for each category and 
elaborates on their main theoretical features. The gradual trend of describing international capital 
movements as an institutional phenomenon instead of explaining the actual process itself (as 
done in traditional FDI theory) will also be captured. Even though a clear separation of motives, 
determinants and theories is impossible due to the complex nature of capital investments, this 
section reviews the most important theoretical frameworks on FDI in a market structure-based 
taxonomy. The following Section 2.5 reviews a number of relevant studies that identify the most 
significant FDI determinants. An overview of desirable host country qualities that seem most 
successful in attracting FDI will be generated by discussing commonalities and disparities 
between selected studies.  
Appraising positive and negative host country effects of international capital movements 
provides the last theoretical aspect of this chapter in Section 2.6. While most researchers confirm 
a growth-enhancing relationship between FDI and economic development, empirical studies fail 
to reach consensus on whether the immediate effects of foreign capital inflows have positive or 
negative repercussions. Lastly, in order to conclude the theoretical framework of FDI, 
disadvantages and advantages of FDI occurring in host countries are also presented. It is 
cautioned that FDI literature manifests various multi-disciplinary characteristics. Hence, certain 
features of FDI may appear in more than one section.  
2.2. FDI DEFINITIONS, TYPES AND CLASSIFICATIONS  
From the perspective of accounting transactions, Duce and Espana (2003) classify FDI flows 
either as Balance of Payments entries or as International Investment Positions, both of which are 
consistent with FDI classifications established by the IMF. Whereas the Balance of Payments 
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classification regards FDI as a “statistical statement that systemically summarises the economic 
transactions of an economy with the rest of the world for a specific time span”, the International 
Investment Position views FDI as “the value of stock of each financial asset and liability for a 
specific date as defined in the Balance of Payments” (Duce and Espana, 2003: 1).  
The most commonly accepted international benchmark definition classifies FDI as strategic 
long-term capital investments into an entity undertaken by an investor who is located in a 
country different to that of the receiving firm. When securing a lasting interest in the indigenous 
firm, at least ten percent of ownership control is transferred to the profit-seeking foreign 
investor (OECD 2008a: 64). Moosa (2002: 265) defines FDI as a transitional process whereby 
residents of one country acquire ownership of assets for the purpose of controlling the activities 
of a foreign firm. In cases where positive spillover effects exist, financial capital and advanced 
technology as well as sophisticated management, marketing or accounting skills will be 
transferred to the recipient country.   
Portfolio investments, on the other hand, are not included in FDI flows. Considering investors’ 
short-term interest in volatile, high turn-over securities, portfolio investments do not qualify as 
FDI transactions and are not investigated in this research study therefore.   
On the subject of FDI terminology, different words are used interchangeably to describe both 
involved parties, namely suppliers and receivers. Throughout this thesis, producers are labelled as 
home countries, investing countries, FDI producers or suppliers. Likewise, FDI receivers are 
referred to as host countries, beneficiaries, indigenous entities or recipient nations. From the 
perspective of FDI-consuming countries in SSA, flows are considered as inwardly directed 
Foreign Direct Investment (IFDI) and China is perceived as the producer of outwardly directed 
Foreign Direct Investment (OFDI) flows. In addition, the terms FDI, international investments, 
direct investment, capital flows and foreign investments are also used interchangeably 
throughout this research study.  
FDI can be generated through various means. Investments in pre-existing facilities, joint 
ventures, mergers and acquisitions (M&As), Greenfield Investments and Brownfield 
Investments are all examples of market-entry models3 promoted by FDI activities. Preference 
has been traditionally given to Greenfield Investments as market-entry method in developing 
economies (Agosin, 2004: 4-5). The modernisation and rationalisation of operations as well as 
                                                          
3
 The limited scope of this thesis does not allow for a detailed explanation of all FDI types but rather focuses on 
Greenfield Investments since they have the most relevance for developing nations.  
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the transfer of technology are positive externalities derived from Greenfield Investments. More 
than two-thirds of the total value of all flows into developing countries are generated by 
Greenfield Investment projects (UNCTAD, 2011: 34). According to Bertrand (2004: 2-4), 
Greenfield Investments are defined as the formation of a new subsidiary in the host nation that 
is financed by a foreign investor. Disputes arise about the length of the investment period after 
which a transaction can be officially classified as a Greenfield Investment. As a threshold for 
Greenfield Investments, Bertrand (2004) suggests a minimum period of four to five years after 
the initial investment.  
Another FDI taxonomy can be constructed from the viewpoint of ownership. As an increasing 
amount of FDI transactions are undertaken by multinational companies rather than individuals, a 
definition of MNEs (multinational enterprises) is necessary. Caves (1982: 1-4, 31) defines a MNE 
as “an enterprise that controls and manages production establishments and plants located in at 
least two countries”. Possessions of intangible assets in the form of technology, knowledge or 
marketing are the major drivers in expanding operations to foreign markets - although the 
underlying profit-seeking goal  remains applicable. Hence, the vital link between FDI and MNEs 
is the equity capital transfer from the home firm to its foreign subsidiaries. But compared to 
FDI, the theorems behind MNEs draw on a more complex international business framework, in 
particular the theory of internalisation. Because MNEs’ prominent role in modern economics is a 
vast topic in itself, a detailed discussion of MNEs lies beyond the scope of this thesis. 
2.3. FDI MOTIVES 
Different types of FDI are naturally related to unique investment motives. Amongst the various 
FDI types, the only two constant characteristics comprise of the investor’s prospects for profits 
and the modification in ownership rights. Applying the assumptions of rationality and 
information asymmetry to FDI transactions, investors always aim to maximise profits (Appleyard 
et al., 2008: 230) - a capitalistic-driven approach indeed! Consequently, foreign companies 
promising the highest rates of return to initial investments are preferred by investors.  
Buckley and Casson (1976) categorise FDI into horizontal (see 2.3.1), vertical (see 2.3.2) and 
conglomerate FDI (see 2.3.6). In a study analysing the consequences of OFDI on economic 
growth, Herzer (2009) also identifies three different types of investment, namely horizontal, 
vertical and technology-sourcing FDI (see 2.3.4). A comparable taxonomy introduced by Musila 
and Sigue (2006) confirms market-seeking (horizontal) and export-seeking motives as dominant 
FDI motives but also incorporated investors interests in extracting natural resources (see 2.3.3) 
into the argument. Complementing previous research, Dunning (2003) classifies investments as 
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market-seeking (see 2.3.1), efficiency-seeking (see 2.3.2), natural-resources seeking (see 2.3.3) or 
strategic asset-seeking (see 2.3.4) based on his Eclectic Paradigm theory (Dunning, 2003: 282).  
Addressing all categories mentioned above, Dunning’s (2003) taxonomy is used in chronological 
order for the following discussion. For the sake of convenience, the distinct characteristic of 
each investment motives category is then summarised in Table 2.1 (see page 13). Regardless of 
the minor conceptual difference in FDI motives, market-seeking FDI is equally labelled as 
horizontal FDI while efficiency-seeking FDI (export-oriented) is also referred to as vertical FDI.  
2.3.1. Horizontal (Market-Seeking) FDI 
When multiple production plants of a company produce identical goods at each branch in 
response to disruptive trade barriers (such as tariffs or high transportation costs), horizontal FDI 
was implemented in host countries (Buckley and Casson, 1976: 21). Because such disruptive 
trade barriers prevent the investing company from exporting their products to overseas markets 
(in host nations), they prefer to establish local production facilities in  host nations. According to 
Herzer (2009), horizontally-driven FDI is mainly motivated by market-seeking reasons. In the 
short-run, exports are hereby substituted by the local production of identical goods in host 
nations which will simultaneously experience an increase in competitiveness within that specific 
market segment of. Lim (2001:11) agrees that in case of a sufficiently large market size, 
horizontally-driven investment motives represent a perfect export substitution. He emphasises 
cost-reductive benefits and an increase in competitiveness as major incentives for pursuing 
market-seeking FDI (Lim, 2001: 11).   
2.3.2. Vertical (Efficiency-Seeking) FDI  
As opposed to horizontal FDI which is assimilated with a company’s effort to increase its 
inferior market share, vertical FDI exploits the existence of price-level differences between host 
and home nations in order to increase output through an export-intensive approach. Firms 
pursuing this type of foreign investment relocate part of their production facilities in such host 
countries that offer cheap labour or other cheap production costs (Lim, 2001: 11). According to 
Buckley and Casson (1976: 20), firms engage in vertical FDI by outsourcing various sequential 
stages of producing intermediate goods, in particular technological items, to multiple 
international locations.  
Value-added activities are performed at a cost advantage in the foreign countries before 
intermediate products are eventually exported back to the home country. By moving value-added 
steps of the production chain into lower-cost countries, the company’s final products can be sold 
at a lower price in the home market compared to homogeneous articles of home country 
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competitors which are locally produced. Herzer (2009) further argues that although domestic 
output in the home country decreases in the short-run, intermediate goods imported from host 
nations will increase at a cost advantage in the long-run. In line with market-seeking FDI, an 
overall increase in efficiency is also a positive spillover effect inherited in efficiency-seeking FDI.   
2.3.3. Extractive-Seeking FDI 
A special case of vertically-oriented FDI represent investments directed at countries blessed with 
abundant raw materials or primary commodities (Lim, 2001: 9). Throughout history, the main 
incentive to engage in extractive-seeking FDI was to secure scarce natural resources. This is 
particularly applicable to developing nations where resources are plentiful (Dunning, 2003: 285). 
If prestige resources are held in the hands of national governments, FDI appears less dependent 
on fluctuations of macroeconomic variables, such as market-size or labour cost. Governments 
are less dependent on efficiently-run business practises and might continue to invest in host 
countries despite accruing losses from such foreign operations. Resource-rich nations in 
particular tend to strictly regulate ownership rights and control pertaining to their extractive 
companies.  
Dunning (1979: 281-282) denotes extractive-seeking investment motives as twofold. Firstly, 
foreign companies extract natural resources from host nations because they are readily available 
in abundance. Following the principles of supply and demand, a high supply of resources in host 
countries will logically depress the price payable by the consuming (home) nations. Secondly, in 
response to a local shortage of natural resources needed for domestic production, investing 
entities might extract natural inputs from overseas (host) locations. Mills (2010: 352) demands 
special consideration for commodities-motivated FDI because natural resources are regarded as 
rent-producing assets which differ compared to regular assets.    
2.3.4. Asset-Seeking FDI  
Due to the gradual alteration in traditional investment destinations, Gammeltoft (2008: 4) 
introduces a new class of FDI motives, namely asset-seeking FDI. Foreign investments to 
developed countries targeting Research and Development (R&D), branding, operational know-
how in the managerial and marketing areas or technology all fall into this category. Rather than 
focusing on country- or company-specific attributes, asset-seeking FDI emphasises the 
development stage of a country as the main investment criteria. Compared to efficiency- and 
market-seeking FDI which is mostly directed towards developing countries, asset-seeking FDI 
predominantly targets the more sophisticated assets of developed nations (Gammeltoft 2008: 4).     
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2.3.5. Technology-Sourcing FDI  
A sub-component of asset-seeking FDI is technology-seeking FDI. This type of FDI occurs 
when a company acquires a foreign entity’s superior technological knowledge. Technological 
advances can be transferred back to the source nation either by a direct purchase of technology 
from the parent company or by establishing specific R&D facilities in the foreign country. 
However, increases in productivity and growth of the local (host country) firm only arise if those 
newly obtained skills are exploited by the principle of scale economies (Herzer, 2009: 478-479). 
For example, an African firm interested in gaining superior technological advantages could join a 
venture with an advanced US company. Cost reduction and increased efficiency might occur.  
2.3.6. Conglomerate FDI  
Another category of FDI motives, that of agglomeration or conglomerate FDI, also emerges in 
the literature. Conglomerate FDI combines the theoretical characteristics of both horizontal 
(efficiency-seeking) and vertical (market-seeking) FDI when clustered together at the same 
location (Lim, 2001: 11; Moosa, 2002: 5). Buckley and Casson (1976: 21) posit that conglomerate 
clustering is more prevalent amongst companies that exhibit fewer multinational characteristics. 
Table 2.1: Main FDI types and their dominant features  
FDI types Main motivation      Dominant features  
 HORIZONTAL FDI   
Market-seeking Expand market share  
 
 Attempt to overcome trade barriers in 
host countries using export-substitution  
 Production of identical goods as in home 
country 
 VERTICAL FDI   
Efficiency-seeking Reduce production costs 
 
 Vertical integration of production chain 
 Cheaper labour and production cost of 
intermediate goods  
 Export of goods back to source country 
 
 
Extractive-seeking   Acquire natural resources  Extract abundant resources in host 
country at cost advantage 
 Commodities are exported back to 
source country 
- 
Asset-seeking 
 
Technology-sourcing 
 
 
Agglomerate                        
Acquire strategic asset 
 
Increase efficiency 
 
CONGLOMERATE  FDI 
 
Increase efficiency and 
expand market size 
 Derive knowledge benefits from asset  
 
 Acquire superior technology 
 Gain comparative advantage 
 
 
 Locational clustering of vertical and 
horizontal features 
 
Source: Author’s own table  
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2.4. FDI THEORIES  
A vast body of literature describing the theoretical framework of FDI concepts exists. However,  
not a single model but rather multiple different theories have jointly been accepted to best 
address the ever-changing set of political, social and economic variables that ultimately influence 
the core characteristics of FDI. Although his model received wide approval amongst researchers, 
Dunning (2001: 176) also stresses the idea that no single uniform FDI theory can be conceded.  
Due to the complex nature of motives, determinants, underlying core principles behind FDI and 
simply because different types of FDI involve heterogeneous determinants, a rich collection of 
FDI literature has evolved over the last century.   
According to Loots (2001: 10), the key issue addressed in all theoretical FDI frameworks is the 
reason why foreign entities chose to relocate production processes abroad rather than using the 
available internal mechanisms of exporting, licensing or franchising. From a broader perspective, 
FDI theories can be grouped into macroeconomic or microeconomic models. Unlike 
microeconomic theories which incorporate firm specific-variables, macroeconomic models 
analyse country-specific factors that affect the flow of international funds.  
Moosa (2002: 23), who based his ideas on Agarwal’s (1980) survey, classifies FDI theories into 
the following four categories: (1) Perfect Markets, (2) Imperfect Markets, (3) Other Theories and (4) 
Theories based on other categories. Despite the fact that many other categorisations exist, Moosa’s 
taxonomy appears to be the most logical as it simultaneously incorporates economic variables 
and market-structure characteristics. For the purpose of this research study, variations to 
Moosa’s categories are made in some instances to analyse and discuss the most relevant theories 
only. At the same time, this thesis does not provide a complete assessment of all FDI theories.  
Even though natural resource-seeking FDI continues to dominate other types of foreign capital 
inflows to developing countries, the theories presented in the following sections do not 
distinguish between the economic development stage of source (home) or recipient (host) 
countries. In other words, all such theories are to some extent applicable for developed, 
transitioning or developing countries. As developing countries (both China and nations in SSA) 
constitute the centre of this research study, Chapters Three and Four will address theoretical 
issues from a standpoint of developing countries.  
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2.4.1. Perfect Market Theories of FDI4 
2.4.1.1. Competitive and Comparative Advantage Theories  
Some of the earliest attempts in explaining the nature of international trade in a perfectly 
competitive market environment are found in classical comparative advantage literature. More 
specifically, Ricardo’s comparative advantage theory (1817) and Heckscher-Ohlin’s (1933) factor 
endowment theory were the first of their kind to explain international trade. However, Hosseini 
(2005: 530) points out that Ricardo’s comparative advantage completely disregards the existence 
of international capital flows. Only labour is considered a relevant variable of production in the 
comparative advantage theorem. Neglecting the concept of international factor mobility, factor 
endowment theory also failed to explain international production comprehensively.   
Both theories consequently posses no explanatory power to address the conceptual idea of FDI 
flows. Meanwhile, the first vague attempts to include previously ignored capital flows in 
international trade theory were made via the Differential Rates of Return Hypothesis and 
Portfolio Diversification Hypothesis. The main variable analysed in both theories is the interest 
rate, also referred to as the rate of return. As already addressed in Section 2.3., one of the core 
assumptions of FDI is its rent-seeking motives.  
2.4.1.2. Differential Rates of Return Hypothesis 
The Differential Rates of Return Hypothesis states that capital investments have historically 
flowed from countries portraying low rates of returns to countries with higher rates. Rates of 
return in both countries will eventually reach an equilibrium level after the transacted capital 
transfer. The major shortcoming of this theory is the lack of risk considerations inherent in 
capital transfers. Empirical studies have further shown that capital inflows do not necessarily 
occur at the same time as capital outflows as predicted by this theory. Hence, international 
capital cross-transfers which refer to the simultaneous movement of capital inflows and outflows 
are not captured by the Differential Rates of Return Hypothesis (Hosseini, 2005: 531; Moosa, 
2002: 24).  
                                                          
4 Perfect competition assumes that prices are determined by the interaction of supply and demand from 
an infinite number of producers and consumers. Furthermore, no transaction cost is attached when 
accessing product information. Homogeneous products are freely traded amongst market participants as 
no entry, exit or trade barriers, such as tariffs or quotas, exist. On a national level, perfect market 
conditions encourage the free trade of goods and services. Perfect markets rarely exist due to the nature 
of restrictive global market conditions (Estrin, Laidler and Dietrich, 2008).    
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2.4.1.3. Portfolio Diversification Hypothesis 
With respect to FDI flows, investors choose recipient nations based on two factors: the possible 
rate of return earned from the investment and the perceived risk involved in the investment. 
Portfolio Diversification Hypothesis represents an extension of the Differential Rates of Return 
Hypothesis. Capital flows are not risk neutral anymore, but are now appraised by the investor’s 
rate of risk aversion. This assumption strongly relies on Markowitz’ modern Portfolio Theory 
(1959) which assumes that risk-averse investors prefer to minimise their risk while selecting 
portfolios with the most promising returns. Hence, risk is now a quantifiable variable that can be 
reduced by diversifying investment options.  
2.4.1.4. Shortcomings of Perfect Market Theories 
Considered to be pioneers of describing international cross-border capital flows, Perfect Market 
Theories dismissed the following five issues. Firstly, because purely competitive markets only 
rarely exists in reality (if at all), their deficiencies enabled theories elaborating the need for 
imperfect market conditions to evolve. Trade barrier and protectionist as well as mercantilist 
trade practices have diminished the premise for an environment where goods and services can be 
openly transferred. Secondly, the failure to acknowledge risk and rate of return as relevant FDI 
determinants invited researchers to develop more advanced FDI concepts that deal with a variety 
of FDI determinants. For example, uncertainty in expected rates of return was not accounted for 
in Perfect Market Theories.  
Thirdly, neither the Differential Rates of Return Hypothesis nor the Portfolio Diversification 
Hypothesis include the transfer of technological or managerial skills as part of FDI, but rather 
exclusively focus on the transfer of capital. Fourthly, global variations in economical, political or 
social conditions cannot be captured by Perfect Market Theories because they are static models. 
Lastly, and most importantly, such static models do not capture the central ideas behind 
ownership control changes occurring after the investment took place. Consequently, dynamic 
models could be an answer to the static unresponsiveness to change.  
2.4.2. Imperfect Market Theories of FDI5  
                                                          
5
 Imperfect markets refer to conditions contrasting a perfectly competitive environment. In such 
circumstances, monopolistic or oligopolistic structures arise. Other features of imperfect markets are trade 
barriers, entry and exit barriers, heterogeneous products, restrictive access to information and that market 
prices are dicated by the dominant company (Estrin et al., 2008).  
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Drawing his support from the limitations of perfect markets, Hymer6 (1960) was the first scholar 
to develop a theoretical FDI framework based on market imperfections. Empirical findings of 
his Industrial Organisation Hypothesis (1960) formed the cornerstone for the Product Cycle 
Theory introduced by Vernon (1966),  Dunning’s (1979) Eclectic Paradigm Theory and 
Knickerbocker’s (1973) Oligopolistic Reaction Theory, all of which are included under the 
category of Imperfect Market Theories.   
2.4.2.1. Industrial Organisation Hypothesis of Monopolistic Advantage  
Initially composed for his PhD dissertation, Hymer’s Industrial Organisation Hypothesis (1960) 
was the first of its kind to simultaneously relate market structures and firm-specific advantages to 
FDI flows (Moosa, 2002: 29). According to Hosseini (2005: 232), there are two major 
motivations for FDI flows in Hymer’s theory. Both the reduction of competition between firms 
and Multinational Entities’ (MNE) profit-making incentive to maximise rent-seeking activities 
from firm specific-advantages produce FDI flows. Hymer’s theory focuses on the 
microeconomic firm-specific characteristics of FDI in monopolistic market conditions. A special 
role in his theory is given to intra-industry flows moving cross-sectionally between homogeneous 
industries of two countries.   
According to Hymer, international firms seeking investment in a foreign market will be naturally 
discriminated against by local customers, government and indigenous firms. All local institutions 
hold legal, political, economic and communication advantages over the foreign entity. Higher 
production costs faced by the foreign entity are also inevitable as a premium for acquiring 
information in host countries is charged. Therefore, an international firm will only invest abroad 
if it is in possession of certain firm-specific advantages (assets). Such assets are required to 
compensate for the higher cost incurred by unfavourable local treatment in host nations. Unless 
the benefits of investing abroad through a rent-earning asset are higher than the accrued net cost 
in the host country, FDI will not be implemented (Hymer, 1976: 34-43). Calvet (1981: 44) 
additionally notes that in this theory, FDI flows originate as a direct result of monopolistic or 
oligopolistic market structure imperfections which result in an internationally transferable 
advantage (asset) to the investing firm.       
In a later study, Kindleberger (1969: 14) identifies superior brand naming, special marketing 
skills, sophisticated technology, access to prestige funding sources, economies of scale and access 
                                                          
6
 Although Hymer’s Industrialisation Organisation theory initially evolved as part of his PHD dissertation in 
1960, the reference used in this study is his book “The International Operations of National Firms: A Study of 
Foreign Direct Investment” published in 1976. The years 1960 and 1976 are therefore used interchangeably.  
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to raw materials as firm-specific advantages. FDI thereby resembles a transitioning equilibrium 
force that encourages capital inflows as a medium to bypass market imperfections. Only when 
rates of returns in both countries are balanced do international capital flows come to a halt 
(Calvet, 1981: 44). Caves (1982) expanded on Hymer’s monopolistic advantage theory in his 
scholarly work by analysing the rising influence of MNEs. Rather than focusing on firm-specific 
advantages created by monopolies, Caves investigated advantages that were mainly reflected in 
R&D activities of oligopolistic industry sectors.   
Although Hymer and Kindleberger were the first scholars to investigate the relationship between 
firm-specific characteristics and FDI theories, country-specific variables as well as the concept of 
export substitutions as an alternative to FDI transactions were disregarded. Both scholars’ 
theoretical frameworks were crucial for the development of other FDI theories following below.  
2.4.2.2.  The Product Cycle Theory  
Taking a different approach to previous FDI theories, Vernon (1966) examined international 
investment strategies of US-based manufacturing companies in his work on the Product Cycle. 
As opposed to emphasising firm-specific or locational advantages, Vernon based his theory on 
the timing of international expansion. FDI is hereby identified as a natural stage of every firm’s 
evolutionary process whereby monopolistic advantages are combined with locational and time-
specific advantages. According to Vernon, companies only engage in FDI at a very specific stage 
during the three-phased product cycle. The three respective stages are labelled innovation, 
maturity and standardisation. Additionally, uncertainties and economies of scale are introduced 
into this cyclical model. Vernon’s theory seeks to identify why companies that produce labour-
intensive and high income goods expand their markets overseas.   
The initial production phase describes the development of an innovative and price inelastic 
heterogeneous product in the domestic home market. Because of the product’s inefficiencies, 
only local inputs of the home country are utilised in the production process. Adequate feedback 
from local customers and higher responsiveness to their demands will eventually resolve the 
product’s shortcomings on a local level. When entering the second stage (maturity) of the cycle, 
the degree of standardisation, efficiency and international demand for the product in developed 
countries increases. The company now begins to export its products in order to expand market 
shares in other advanced countries. Supplementing export strategies as a means to satisfy the 
product’s demand in the host country, FDI may also be utilised to invest in overseas production 
facilities in other developed countries (Vernon, 1966: 190-198).  
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Once the final phase is reached, the production process has now become fully standardised. 
Competition from other companies producing an identical product occurs. Based on the 
principles of scale economies, cheaper labour or production costs may favour developing 
countries as a more ideal production location. The innovating firm will therefore shift its 
production overseas. New production facilities in developing countries will be established with 
the help of FDI capital. Exports from the developed (home) country are eventually substituted 
with imports from developing (host) countries. As a result, firms will usually spend money on 
R&D activities to develop a new product capable of replacing the “outsourced” one. Ongoing 
R&D is necessary to ensure sufficient profits. Once considered a net exporter, the innovating 
firm gradually becomes a net importer of its own product. Hence, FDI plays an important role in 
financing the production facilities in host countries when the product has reached the state of 
complete standardisation.  
One advantage of Vernon’s Product Cycle Theory is its dynamic structure capable of modelling 
the change in time-independent variables. Vernon also identified the specific timing when a firm 
decides to engage in FDI, an aspect previously ignored by most other FDI theories.  According 
to Moosa (2002: 39), FDI in Vernon’s model is only introduced when transitioning from the 
maturity to the standardisation phase of the product cycle. While lower labour or manufacturing 
costs are the most prevailing advantages in such countries, increased competition and cost 
pressure are the main incentives for a firm to engage in FDI (Vernon, 1966: 202-206). 
2.4.2.3. The Internalisation Theory  
The Internalisation Theory was jointly developed by Buckley and Casson (1976) as part of their 
analysis on the growing global importance of MNEs. Within this theory, FDI is the preferred 
method of international expansion compared to the other internal production mechanisms 
licensing and exporting. According to Buckley and Casson (1976: 33-36), negative externalities 
prevalent in imperfect market (monopolistic) conditions induce the formation of internal 
markets for intermediate products. Instead of letting external market forces control those 
activities inefficiently, internal market structures are created by securing ownership control of 
several interdependent business activities.  
Ultimately, MNEs are created when internalisation processes of local markets are extended 
across national borders. Transferring imperfect market conditions to internal markets not only 
provides a mechanism to avoid undesired imperfect markets externalities, but also leads to the 
creation of MNEs. Internalisation processes only come to an end when benefits and costs of 
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internalisation have reached an equilibrium state. FDI thereby represents the internalisation of 
market transactions by MNEs which are trying to bypass negative externalities induced by 
market failures. Consequently, FDI not only reduces the uncertainties of volatile price markets, 
but also decreases time-lags, communication costs (such as bargaining), knowledge inefficiencies 
and the costs of marketing public goods (Buckley and Casson, 1979: 36-40).  
Markets for human capital, knowledge and marketing or management skills render the greatest 
incentives for internalisation (Buckley and Casson, 1979: 39; Moosa, 2002: 32, 56). The 
internalisation process of knowledge undertaken via FDI-induced patents, copyrights or 
trademarks is accompanied by two desirable long-term spillover effects, namely growth and 
enhanced productivity. Because knowledge is characterised as a public good in the internalisation 
theory, companies have greater incentives to internalise their knowledge advantages than those 
of any other assets.  
In a study on the behavioural pattern of MENs, Calvet (1981: 48) indicated that Internalisation 
Theory took an initial approach in describing FDI within an institutional context. For the first 
time, more emphasis was placed on the FDI producing entity rather than on the FDI transaction 
itself. Hence, Buckley and Casson (1976) were the first scholars who comprehensively addressed 
the motives for MNEs’ overseas investments. Nevertheless, their theory was unable to explain 
country-specific reasons, such as why MNEs would invest in certain countries but avoid 
investments in others.  
2.4.2.4. The Eclectic Paradigm of Dunning  
Dunning’s (1979, 2001) Eclectic Paradigm theory seeks to expand most classical theories in 
response to the changing investment motives of MNEs. FDIs traditionally pursued for 
horizontal (market-seeking) or vertical (efficiency-seeking) motives are now replaced with 
incentives of product specialisation and scale economies (Dunning, 1979: 272). Besides drawing 
upon Hymer’s (1960) Industrial Organisation Hypothesis and Buckley and Casson’s (1976) 
Internalisation Theory, Dunning also incorporates location-specific advantages of international 
markets in order to justify why entities engage in FDI. Dunning criticises that previous FDI 
theories ignored the international movement of factors other than that of capital. Internalisation 
processes of markets were also not addressed (Dunning, 1979: 272). Dunning further postulates 
that for a firm to invest abroad, the following three prerequisites must be satisfied: ownership 
advantage, internalisation advantage and locational advantage. Thus, his theory is often referred 
to as the O-L-I theory of advantages.  
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Ownership advantages, such as firm size, managerial or organisational knowledge, superior 
technology, access to natural resources and the presence of capital all include the home firm’s 
temporary possession of rent-producing assets unavailable to local producers.  Transferred 
internally, ownership advantages cannot exist permanently due to the obstacles faced in securing 
such advantages. Internalisation advantages entail the internal transfer of a company’s firm-
specific (ownership) comparative advantages which resemble the counterpart to external market 
mechanisms, such as licensing or exports. Locational production advantages include non-
transferrable host country-specific comparative advantages, such as open markets, liberal trade 
policies, large market sizes, labour costs, sophisticated capital markets and limited government 
intervention (Dunning, 1979: 275-28). 
FDI will only occur if a company can exploit all three advantages simultaneously. If held in 
isolation, not one of the O-L-I advantages is powerful enough to compensate for the lack of the 
other two. Moreover, ownership, internalisation and location advantages vary significantly across 
industry segments, countries or firms. Correspondingly, the amount of FDI received in host 
nations depends on the strength of the combined advantages. Countries and firms with labour- 
cost benefits or abundant supplies of natural resources generally attract larger amounts of FDI 
than countries lacking such qualities. In general, for FDI to be produced, the net competitive 
advantages of foreign entities must exceed the level of indigenous companyies’ advantages 
(Dunning, 1979: 288-89). 
In later work on his O-L-I theorem, Dunning (2001) acknowledges that his model might be 
more appropriate to describe the determinants of FDI as opposed to developing a predictive 
theory of cross-border investment. He also defended previous criticism of the interdependence 
of O-L-I variables by suggesting a combinational approach. The optimal FDI level is attracted by 
combining the benefits of possessing rent-generating assets (ownership advantage) with 
geographically inherited benefits (locational advantage). Dunning (2001) also observes that an 
ascending amount of FDI can be ascribed towards the impact of MNEs’ activities in the global 
economy. So long as O-L-I advantages are privately owned and standardisation of technology, 
products and production processes have not been reached universally, most FDI activities will 
continue to be carried out by MNEs as key investors (Dunning, 2001: 176).  
2.4.2.5. The Investment Development Path  
Criticism of Dunning’s O-L-I model denotes its static nature. Because ownership, internalisation 
and location advantages are constantly adjusting to prevailing economic market conditions, they 
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should be dynamic in lieu of static variables. An effort to adjust the O-L-I paradigm to recent 
international production patterns was undertaken by Dunning (2001) and Narula and Dunning 
(2000, 2010) in their proposal for a modified Investment Development Path model. According 
to Dunning (2001: 180), country-specific O-L-I factors alternate depending on the country’s 
current developmental stage. Similarly, O-L-I factors are applicable to both foreign entities 
interested in investing in host countries as well as local host country firms in search for overseas 
market niches. The multi-level interaction between foreign firms, domestic entities and the 
country’s investment decisions is also investigated (Dunning, 2001: 180). Dunning 
simultaneously illustrates the reasons and the effects of such a dynamic cycle in this modified 
model. When analysed with FDI motives (Section 2.3), this falls under the asset-seeking category.  
In the pre-industrialisation stage of a country’s development, no investment occurs because 
location and ownership advantages are lacking. When the country advances to a more 
sophisticated business climate characterised by favourable government trade policies and 
efficient infrastructure systems, FDI will increase. Investment incentives offered by the host 
country will alter when a more advanced development phase is reached. At this point of the 
development path, Dunning (2001) recognises the positive spillover effects of intensifying 
competition between indigenous and foreign firms. This will ultimately increase the competitive 
advantage (ownership advantages) of the indigenous entity. Variations in outward- and inward- 
directed FDI mark the final stage of the Investment Development Path. Alternatively to 
exploiting ownership advantages, FDI is now primarily conducted to expand markets or invest in 
pre-existing assets (Dunning, 2001: 181).  
The transition of countries through distinct development phases removes the static limitations of 
Dunning’s previous O-L-I paradigm. Combining multiple classical FDI theories into one 
comprehensive model makes it superior to plenty of other research. Dunning explicitly assessed 
the importance of firm-specific advantages within the international production process, a 
variable that has commonly been ignored. Rather than evaluating ownership, internalisation or 
locational advantages in isolation, Dunning’s mutual inclusion of all three endogenous variables 
into a single model has established him as one of the most important scholars in the field of 
FDI. Modifications of the Investment Development Path were made by Narula and Dunning 
(2010). New trends in globalisation which have inflicted upon the operations of MNEs were 
captured in the modified model. Because of the limited scope of this thesis, a more thorough 
analysis of the modified Investment Development Path cannot be included.  
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2.4.2.6. Oligopolistic Reaction Hypothesis 
A more behaviouristic approach to companies’ overseas investment motives was taken by 
Knickerbocker (1973) in his Oligopolistic Reaction Hypothesis. Oligopolistic reaction refers to 
the mutual interdependence of companies that are operating within an oligopolistic market 
structure in which individual firms react and counter-react in accordance with their competitor’s 
actions. The higher the degree of oligopolisation in a particular industry, the higher the level of 
firm’s interdependence will be. One firm’s loss represents another firm’s gain. A visual 
representation could be symbolised by a game of chess - the anticipation of the opponent’s 
moves creates an individual strategy on how to best respond to such moves (Knickerbocker, 
1973: 5).  
When defensive strategies are balanced out with aggressive actions, an oligopolistic equilibrium is 
said to have been reached. Knickerbocker stresses the importance of achieving such an 
equilibrium state. In this case, all members of the oligopolistic community can benefit from 
mutually agreed upon decisions instead of having to worry about how an individual firm’s 
behaviour might affect each member on an individual basis. The connecting link between the 
theoretical concept of oligopolistic reaction and FDI constitutes the matching of a firm’s FDI 
flows by its competitors. Not only is the majority of FDI clustered into oligopolistic industries, 
but companies in such industries also align their investments (Knickerbocker, 1973: 9). In order 
to retain competitive market positions, a firm’s outflowing investments substantially influence 
other firms to engage in FDI transactions. Preferably, equilibrium is reached at the end of this 
process. A high level of industry concentration, as measured by a small amount of competing 
firms, will produce a higher level of counter-active behaviour and more FDI flows as a result 
(Knickerbocker, 1973: 30). 
As individual companies are simultaneously affected by aggregated market activities, the optimal 
level of FDI investments is produced only when all market participants coordinate their FDI 
flows. Matching a rival firm’s FDIs serves the purpose of minimising risk as both companies 
would eventually reach an equilibrium state with the equal amount of costs and risks. Although 
Knickerbocker’s (1973: 6) theory could not explain why specific industries are preferred by 
foreign investors, it does offer an important argument in the ongoing debate about FDI theories. 
The bandwagon effect of his theory, which stresses the importance of groupthink and group 
behaviour, accurately explains why competitor’s behaviour instead of country-specific factors 
ultimately influences investors’ decisions.  
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2.4.3. Other Theories of FDI 
Moosa (2001) lists four other theories in this category but only one, Kojima’s Hypothesis, is 
found to have relevance for this research study. The other three theories, namely the Internal 
Financing Hypothesis, the Currency Areas Hypothesis and the Effect of the Exchange Rate 
Hypothesis as well as the Hypothesis of Diversification with Barriers to International Capital 
Flows are not explored in any detail because they approach foreign investments from a more 
advanced financially-influenced background that exceeds the boundaries and requirements of 
this research study.  
2.4.3.1. Kojima’s Hypothesis 
Based on the combination of international trade features and FDI theories, Kojima (1982) 
suggests a macroeconomic approach to explain Japanese FDI inflows. In this dynamic neo-
classical model, FDI flows proceed from countries with marginal comparative advantages to host 
countries with superior comparative advantages. Comparative advantages entail cost efficiencies, 
while FDI-seeking advantages incorporate the areas of technology, managerial skills and capital 
(Kojima, 1982: 3).  
Kojima distinguishes two forms of FDI: trade-oriented and anti-trade-oriented investments. 
According to Moosa (2002: 49), trade-oriented FDI is beneficial to both countries because it 
creates a rising demand for goods in home countries and simultaneously increases the supply of 
exports in host countries. Kojima (1982: 3) further appraises FDI’s role in complementing trade 
instead of providing a perfect substitute for international trade. Anti-trade-oriented FDI, on the 
other hand, does not attain a balancing level of production cost in both countries. No positive 
spillover effects are observed with anti-trade-oriented FDI flows. Consequently, countries are 
advised to either pursue trade-oriented FDIs or to utilise exporting strategies (Kojima, 1982: 3).  
The major shortcomings of Kojima’s Hypothesis are as follows. Firstly, Kojima’s theory focuses 
explicitly on macroeconomic conditions which are more applicable to Japan or other similar 
economies. Secondly, firm-specific FDI determinants are completely ignored in this model. 
Kojima further suggests that FDIs are one-directional flows. Only FDI-induced flows from 
developed countries which seek to exploit cheap labour costs or the availability of natural 
resources in LDCs are acknowledged. Intra-developing countries’ FDI flows are not accounted 
for. Nevertheless, Kojima’s macroeconomic approach to integrate international trade with FDI 
theory has added a valuable source of information to the existing body of FDI literature.  
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2.4.4. Theories Based on other Variables   
In addition to explicitly emphasising micro- and macroeconomic variables in FDI theory, other 
approaches have evolved. Moosa (2002: 50) classifies political risk, country risk, tax policies, 
trade barriers and government regulations as other relevant FDI variables, although for the sake 
of this research study, these determinants do not seem significant enough to establish an entirely 
new class of FDI variables. Instead, they are explored in more depth in a comprehensive 
discussion of FDI determinants presented in Section 2.5.  
As addressed by Hosseini (2005: 533), other relevant variables in FDI-related research are the 
concepts of information asymmetry and public goods. Both concepts focus on the public 
ownership rights of knowledge which may create moral hazard and adverse selection7 as part of 
the information asymmetry dilemma.   
Another recent trend in economics is the notion of behavioural influences. In order to describe 
FDI flows more accurately, behavioural economists advise to incorporate a more complex and 
multi-faceted mix of political, cultural and economic variables into a single dynamic model 
(Hosseini, 2005: 534). However, such untraditional determinants lie outside the scope of this 
thesis and will not be elaborated on. 
2.5. FDI DETERMINANTS  
Narula and Dunning (2000: 142) postulate that host countries’ competition to attract prestigious 
foreign capital has intensified. Since different types of FDIs are naturally attracted by 
heterogeneous determinants, time-specific, country-specific, firm-specific and sector-specific 
characteristics must all be examined on an individual basis for a thorough analysis (Lim, 2001: 
12). Furthermore, while some FDI determinants are established in line with sound economic 
theory, others are suggested instinctively (Kok and Ersoy, 2009: 108). It is crucial to emphasis 
again that an overlap in FDI determinants, motives, effects and the general theoretical 
framework exists. None can exist without the others. A clear-cut line between the taxonomies 
outlined above cannot be drawn. Accordingly, findings of the most important FDI determinants 
for developing countries are elaborated upon after selected studies have been reviewed and 
synthesised accordingly in the next section. Table 2.2 represents a visual tool to briefly 
summarise the reviewed studies of this section. Market size seems to be the most important 
determinant, followed by an open economy, interest rates and GDP growth rate. Preliminary 
                                                          
7
 The concepts of moral hazard and adverse selection are attributed to the problem of information asymmetry. 
Adverse selection occurs when information is only partially supplied in a market environment. Moral hazard 
refers to a situation in which specific actions are not revealed to the trading partners (Estrin et al., 2008: 502).     
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assumptions presume that economic variables appear to have the most influence on an investor’s 
decision as to which foreign (host) country to invest in.  
Table 2.2: Summary of reviewed studies on FDI determinants 
Researcher(s)  Purpose of the Study General Findings Major Determinants 
Sethi et al. (2002) Explain changing trends 
in determinants and FDI 
motives 
FDI now flows into 
developing countries for 
market or efficiency- 
seeking motives  
Large population, low 
GNP, cultural distance 
Lim (2001) Find determinants of FDI 
and positive spillovers 
effects  
Economic indicators most 
important  
Market size, free trade 
zones, infrastructure 
quality, political and 
economic stability 
Chakrabarti (2001) Find meaningful FDI 
determinants based on the  
robustness of economic 
theory 
Previous econometric 
studies lack robustness, 
independent variables are 
not chosen based on 
sound economic theory 
Market size, openness, 
wages, growth rate, trade 
barriers, exchange rate 
Kahai (2006)  Establish traditional and 
non-traditional 
determinants of FDI in 
developing countries  
Objectively measured 
non- traditional variables 
as important as traditional 
economic variables 
Market size, GDP 
growth, infrastructure 
quality, labour costs 
(traditional); economic 
freedom, corruption, 
trade regulations (non-
traditional)  
Moosa & Cardak (2006) Using extreme bound 
analysis to identify the 
most robust FDI  
determinants  
Limited set of 
independent variables 
produces more reliable 
results based on sound 
theory 
Openness of economy, 
infrastructure quality,  
country risk  
Büthe & Milner (2005) Examine whether trade 
agreements influence the 
amount of FDI flows  
Membership in trade 
agreements increases FDI 
inflows  
Preferential trade 
agreements 
Kok & Ersoy (2009)  Identify FDI determinants 
in developing countries 
Economic indicators are 
most influential  
Tax incentives, gross 
capital formation, 
communication, GDP 
growth, market size  
Bevan & Estrin (2004)  Identify FDI determinants 
in European transition 
economies  
Economic indicators are 
most influential  
Labour cost, gravity 
factors, market size 
proximity  
Wint & Williams (2002)  Identity FDI determinants 
in developing countries  
Economic indicators most 
important 
Per Capita income, 
literacy rates, interest 
rates  
De Mello (1997)  Determine relationship 
between growth and FDI 
in developing countries  
Economic indicators most 
important  
Market size, labour cost, 
interest rates and 
exchange rates  
 
Source: Author’s own table  
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2.5.1. Changes in Destination towards Developing Countries   
As Sethi et al. (2002: 693) note in a paper analysing the changing nature of FDI flows, investment 
motives and geographical attractiveness of flows can change over time. Host countries’ 
institutional and strategic indicators in particular are vulnerable macroeconomic factors that can 
alter FDI flows. Considering that the USA was the biggest contributor of FDI flows at the time, 
this study focuses on American FDI flows to Western Europe and Asia (Sethi et al., 2002: 689). 
Findings confirm a change in the destination of traditional flows from developed recipient 
countries to developing recipient countries. Both market and efficiency seeking motives account 
for the locational alterations of host countries. Mainly the quest for cheaper production costs can 
be attributed for this locational change. According to Sethi et al. (2002: 698), the most important 
FDI determinants in host countries are strategic institutional factors, more specifically a high 
population size, large market size, low GNP, and differences in culture.   
A study compiled by Kahai (2006) also reports a changing pattern in FDI motives. Previously 
undertaken for market-seeking or efficiency-seeking purposes, institutional and cultural factors 
now also seem to attract FDI flows. According to Kahai (2006: 470), most FDI research 
neglected non-traditional FDI determinants. He therefore suggests two independent categories 
of determinants for his model, namely traditional variables and non-traditional variables. 
Traditional quantifiable economic variables include market size, purchasing power, GDP, labour 
cost, inflation and the availability of natural resources. Non-traditional variables, on the other 
hand, consist of objectively measured political, cultural and social factors of the host country. 
Variables affecting the transaction cost of a business also constitute part of the non-traditional 
category. Using a linear least squares regression, Kahai (2006) concludes that the traditional 
economic variables market size, GDP growth, infrastructure quality and labour costs are 
consistent with economic theory. Non-traditional variables, such as economic freedom, 
corruption and trade regulations surprisingly also appear to be significant FDI determinants. As 
a result, host countries imposing strict policies to reduce the transaction costs of doing business 
are more attractive destinations to foreign investors compared to those countries neglecting non-
traditional variables (Kahai, 2006: 43-50). 
2.5.2. Economic Indicators 
Amongst all selected studies under review, economic indicators proved to be the most effective 
variables in attracting international investment capital. An IMF paper by Lim (2001: 17-18) on 
the determinants and positive effects of FDI identified market size as the most important 
economic determinant of FDI. Agglomeration effects, availability of infrastructure, positive 
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investment climates with little trade barriers and cheap labour costs are also of importance. 
Countries with unstable governments or less developed economies in general tend to attract less 
FDI. While Sachs (2010: 33) distinguishes a country’s economic growth rate as the dominant 
FDI attractor, De Mello (1997: 6) denotes market size, costs of production, labour costs, 
exchange rates and interest rates as the most relevant FDI determinants.       
A panel-regression study examining the most lucrative FDI determinants in developing countries 
was performed by Kok and Ersoy (2009). Results reveal that especially economic indicators are 
highly influential in attracting FDI. In this study, favourable tax incentives, communication (as 
measured by the amount of telephones in a country), market size, GDP per capita growth and 
gross capital formation appear to be most lucrative in securing foreign capital (Kok and Ersoy, 
2009: 105-112). 
Bevan and Estrin (2004: 778-785) also acknowledge that economic indicators dominate other 
kinds of FDI attractors. Their empirical work on FDI inflows into European transitioning 
economies identified labour costs, market size and proximity as the most vital determinants. 
Particularly in developing countries, institutional factors, political risk and the stability of 
macroeconomic variables (such as growth rates, inflation or exchange rates) seem to secure large 
shares of FDI. Wint and Williams (2002: 36) developed another set of FDI determinants 
applicable to developing nations. According to this survey, predominantly the economic 
variables per capita income and the interest rate emerged as most successful IFDI determinants.   
2.5.3. Trade Openness 
The relationship between trade openness and FDI flows into developing countries was analysed 
in a study conducted by Büthe and Milner (2008). Overall, trade liberalisation in the form of 
international trade agreements (GATT/ WTO) and membership of preferential trade agreements 
show a positive effect on the amount of received FDI. Membership of trade agreements grants a 
mechanism to monitor and ensure the compliance of regulative trade laws. In addition to that, 
trade agreements impose high informational costs on members breaching their commitments. 
For all those reasons, a positive relationship between the degree of trade openness and the 
amount of FDI received was observed by Büthe and Milner (2008: 1-8, 23).  
2.5.4. Political Indicators  
Political indicators and the nature of countries’ legal environment represent another meaningful 
set of FDI determinants. In a study examining the role of host countries’ political frameworks, 
Globerman and Shapiro (2002) expressed that a stable political environment not only increases 
the amount of FDI, but also ensures that local businesses can develop and thrive appropriately. 
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Positive governance is hereby recognised by transparent public institutions, a functioning law 
system protecting individual and property rights, unrestrictive trade policies and a low corruption 
index. Out of those, free trade policies and transparent non-corruptive laws are most favourable 
in attracting FDI flows. According to the empirical results of this study, host nations that are 
ranked highly in human capital investments are also considered as better choices for investors. It 
is cautioned though that investments in human capital are not directly related to good political 
governance (Globerman and Shapiro, 2002).  
2.4.5. Importance of Robustness of Econometric Results  
Many researchers, for example Chakrabarti (2001) or Moosa and Cardak (2006), have dismissed 
the poor quality of many econometric studies which are flawed by the lack of sound economic 
theory. Based on mis-specifed independent variables, such studies produce unreliable results 
which remain highly sensitive to minor model modifications. Because the theoretical frameworks 
on FDI determinants, motives or effects overlap, many researchers fail to determine the most 
robust independent FDI variables (determinants). Quite often, purely intuitive variables as 
opposed to those based on sound economic theory are falsely included in econometric models 
(Moosa and Cardak, 2006: 200).    
Moosa and Cardak (2006) choose a unique technique in developing an appropriate model for 
FDI determinants. In order to achieve the most robust results, they use extreme bound analysis 
to run a cross-sectional regression of 138 countries. A very limited set of independent variables is 
used to explain the levels of foreign capital investments into host countries. The most important 
FDI determinants that evolved from this study are the openness of the economy measured by 
exports, the quality of infrastructure represented through telephone lines per 1000 inhabitants 
and the overall country risk. Contrary to other studies, Moosa and Cardak (2006) disregard the 
variables GDP growth rate, energy usage and domestic investments as significant FDI 
determinants.  
An advanced econometric approach in search of influential FDI determinants was performed by 
Chakrabarti (2001) in a cross-country regression analysis. He based his model on a sample pool 
of 135 countries from the year 1994 and a selected list of economic variables. Consistent with 
the other studies, a positive relationship between market size and FDI evolved. A striking 
difference to other studies is found in the influence of controversial macroeconomic variables, 
such as taxes, wages, openness of the economy, exchange rates, trade barriers and GDP growth, 
all of which are highly responsive to the slightest variation in initial data. This study classifies 
wages, net exports, the economic growth rate, taxes, trade barriers and the exchange rate as most 
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important FDI determinants. However, Chakrabarti (2001) also cautions that all results need to 
be carefully interpreted since not all variables are based on sound economic theory.  
2.6. FDI EFFECTS IN HOST COUNTRIES  
No consensus on the adverse cyclical effects of FDI has been reached amongst researchers. 
Many empirical studies acknowledge both positive and negative externalities as results of 
foreign capital inflows. The magnitude of spillover effects greatly varies depending on the type 
of FDI pursued by investors. Extractive-seeking FDI undertaken for the purpose of securing 
scarce natural resources imposes different externalities than market-seeking, efficiency-seeking 
or technology-sourced FDI. In general, FDI-induced benefits are a direct observable result of 
spillover effects. Therefore, unless positive spillover effects exist, no benefits can be attributed 
to FDI flows (Driffield and Love, 2005: 59). This section explicitly focuses on FDI’s host 
country effects only. Home country effects are therefore ignored.   
2.6.1. Overall Effect of FDI on Economic Growth and Development  
Many scholars agree that FDI yields positive long-term benefits and growth-stimulating 
economic effects in recipient nations (Borensztein et al., 1998; De Mello, 1997; Helleiner, 1998: 
6; Herzer, 2009; Lim, 2001; Lipsey, 2004). The OECD (2006) takes the following stance on the 
positive effects of international capital movements:  
“Foreign direct investment (FDI) is a key element in international economic integration. FDI 
creates direct, stable and long-lasting links between economies. It encourages the transfer of 
technology and know-how between countries, and allows the host economy to promote its 
products more widely in international markets. Finally, FDI is an additional source of funding 
for investment and, under the right policy environment; it can be an important vehicle for 
enterprise development.”  
Most crucially, the importance of FDI flows to developing countries can be attributed to the 
positive externalities as well as economic growth enhancements (UNCTAD, 1999). Due to the 
lack of domestic start-up capital in developing countries, FDI provides one of the cheapest and 
most efficient form of acquiring advanced technological, managerial and organisational 
knowledge (Narula and Dunning, 2000: 149-150).  
2.6.2. Positive Effects of FDI  
In a study on outward-driven FDI, Herzer (2009: 479) reports that positive externalities in both 
host and home countries are directly caused by foreign capital inflows. FDI projects generally 
provide investment capital to enable local business start-ups or to support pre-existing 
businesses. The threat of increased competition imposed by foreign firms amplifies local 
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competiveness and efficiency. A decrease in the cost of production naturally follows. Finally, 
FDI enables advancements in the fields of technology, managerial or marketing skills in the long-
run (Helleiner, 1998: 17-18).  
2.6.2.1. Technology 
Technological spillovers are one of FDI’s most consistent positive externalities. Caves pointed 
out (1982: 224) that the rapid global expansion of MNEs has been responsible for a higher 
technology transfer rate in recipient countries than licensing had achieved in the past. Previously, 
during the economically restricted pre-globalisation period, the traditional mechanism of 
licensing was cheaper, less risky and more feasible compared to expanding businesses abroad 
through FDI projects. Kojima’s (1982) study on the Japanese economy (see section 2.4.3.1) also 
established a positive relationship between FDI and technology transfers to host countries. 
Initially, simple labour-intensive technology should be demanded by host countries before more 
advanced capital-intensive technology can be transferred once the host country has absorbed 
technological linkages from the initial investment (Kojima, 1982). 
Lim (2001) supports the argument of technological-induced advantages. Both Lim (2001: 3) and 
Kojima (1982: 5-8) agree that technological spillovers in host countries occur by the acquisition 
of superior knowledge in the form of workers’ training, increases in local competitiveness and 
the enhancement of industry-wide production efficiency in response to increased competition. 
The magnitude of spillover effects hereby depends on the recipient countries’ capability to 
absorb technological advancements. (Lim, 2001: 4).  
2.6.2.2. Knowledge 
Globalisation and trade liberalisation over the last few decades have transformed the global 
economy from a predominantly industrialised society to a knowledge-seeking society. Knowledge 
transfer across national borders is a positive side-product of FDI transactions. Currently, a large 
amount of MNEs’ FDI is held responsible for the unrestricted internal transfer of sophisticated 
knowledge from headquarters to the foreign (host country) subsidiaries (Aharoni, 2010: 41-45). 
International knowledge transfer emerges in the fields of technology, marketing and accounting.  
2.6.2.3. Increase in Efficiency and Productivity   
Contrary to popular arguments, the goal of foreign capital investments should be to spur 
domestic entrepreneurial activities in host nations and not to merely transfer financial capital 
(Lipsey, 2004: 335). Apart from acquiring financial interests in a foreign company, the interest in 
and transfer of strategic assets to foreign subsidiaries is also of great importance. Lipsey (2004: 
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353) further emphasises that the higher the degree of a company’s foreign ownership in host 
countries, the more likely the demand for higher skilled labourers. Employing more skilled and 
educated workers might reduce production cost and time. Likewise, increases in the host 
country’s efficiency and productivity emerge as indirect results of knowledge transfer. Once the 
level of human capital has been raised through FDI linkages in host countries, competition in the 
domestic market will now benefit local producers and consumers as long as the improved 
efficiency processes are implemented (Blomström and Kokko, 2003: 10).  
2.6.3. Negative Effects of FDI in Host Countries  
Musila and Sigue (2006: 579) report that extractive-driven FDI “bears a high social cost in the 
form of exploitation of economic rent, negative externalities in the form of pollution, and the 
exacerbation of inequality through dualistic economic structures”. This argument is strengthened 
by Chitrakar (1994: 70-76) who identifies the additional costs imposed on host economies as the 
major setback of FDI. In respect thereof, additional costs are comprised of subsidies and tax 
incentives offered to the foreign firm, reduction of domestic profits in response to the foreign 
firm’s competition and the possible deterioration of the host country’s terms of trade. The 
danger of capital flight might also arise. Blomström and Kokko (2003: 19) stress that the 
magnitude of positive spillover effects, if any, ultimately depends on the host country’s ability to 
absorb sophisticated knowledge or technological know-how. The larger the gap between home 
and host countries, the more likely it is for host countries to not fully absorb spillover effects.  
2.6.3.1. Short-Term Employment 
Caves (1982: 131) postulates that FDI might lead to temporary decreases in short-term 
employment levels while simultaneously lowering the level of real wages. In general, FDI 
supplied via M&As is more prone to intensify local unemployment compared to Greenfield 
Investments since the latter have proven to create more domestic employment opportunities. 
Driffield and Love (2005: 56) further caution that as a result of increased globalisation, the 
majority of FDI capital will be provided by a few elite and powerful MNEs which might then 
establish monopolistic advantages in their respective investment sectors. Considering that only a 
selective group of the population benefits from such advantages in host nations, the trickle-down 
mechanism responsible to evenly distribute this newly gained wealth will eventually break down.   
2.6.3.2. Inadequate Knowledge Transfer 
Negative FDI externalities are also inherent in the quality of knowledge transfer. Even though 
knowledge transfer from home to host countries can produce positive spillovers, Amsden (2007) 
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exhorts that such advantages are diminished by the transfer of unsophisticated or outdated 
knowledge8. Accordingly, investing firms are very selective and only transfer their least valuable 
knowledge abroad (Amsden, 2007: 293-303). Educational spillovers in host countries are not 
only constrained to “beginner-levels R&D”, but also benefit just a small elite group. As a result, 
host countries usually continue to remain dependent on foreign investors without ever catching 
up to their level of sophistication. This is even more apparent in resource-driven economies 
where the only kind of inflowing FDI benefits extractive industries. Complementing her 
reasoning, Amsden (2007: 305) warns that multinational firms often exert market and political 
power that oppress host countries’ own development in the long-run.        
2.6.3.3. Crowding-In versus Crowding-Out Effects  
According to Agosin (2008), FDI can produce the following three outcomes in recipient 
countries: crowding-in, crowding-out or a neutral effect. If FDIs enable an increase in domestic 
investment capital which would have been absent otherwise, positive host country effects on 
economic growth, such as the introduction of new capital goods, are possible. On the other 
hand, no benefits in host nations will be realised if foreign capital is an identical replacement for 
an industry sector already serviced by domestic producers. In this case, host countries’ local 
production will become “crowded out” by the more advantaged foreign investor. Neutral effects 
present themselves as an equilibrium state. Incurred costs and received benefits of FDI-induced 
activities in host nations appear balanced.     
Agosin (2008: 1-4) denotes bankruptcy or the replacement of local firms by foreign competitors 
as negative FDI crowding-out effects. Outward FDI investments undertaken between 1971 and 
2000 generally created such negative or neutral crowding-out effects. In fact, the negative 
implications of crowding-out only occur under imperfect market conditions - which are 
applicable in most developing countries (Amsden, 2007: 291).   
2.6.3.4. The Dutch Disease  
An interesting point relating to unhealthy export structures of non-renewable natural resources is 
raised by Fletcher (2010). If extractive-seeking FDI is undertaken in resource-abundant host 
countries, such host countries may jeopardise sustainable long-term growth when focusing on 
only improving the immediate living standards (Fletcher, 2010: 54). Resource-rich nations 
                                                          
8
 Strong protection of Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) and Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPS) could be another reason for inadequate knowledge transfer, especially in the light of recent 
World Trade Organisation agreements. See Chang (2001) for a discussion on both concepts.  
CHAPTER TWO: FDI THEORIES AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
34 
 
thereby become dependent on the revenue of commodity exports or expected dividends from 
joint ventures in mining companies.  
Although commodity revenues secure local profits, they could also lead to deindustrialisation 
because most resource-rich host nations will eventually neglect all other segments of their 
economy except for the primary sector (UN Conference, 2011b: 1). In addition to that, surges in 
commodity revenues often inflate the host country’s exchange rate. Hence, non-resource sectors 
become even less competitive because the appreciated currency increases the prices of exports. 
As a result, economic disturbances in host countries are caused since cheap imports come with a 
trade-off for expensive exports (Zafar, 2007: 108). Finally, as most resource-extraction facilities 
are owned by a small elite, rents derived from commodities do not benefit the whole host 
country but rather only a few beneficiaries. These common problems prevalent in resource-rich 
countries are also known as the Dutch Disease in the literature.   
2.6.4. Effects of FDI-Producing Developing Home Countries  
FDIs originating in developing countries offer a fairly new phenomenon. Due to limited 
research, the full implications of host countries’ OFDI have not been fully investigated yet. 
Benefits of this FDI type might not take the same form or intensity as FDI sourced in developed 
countries. Critics argue that developing countries which supply FDI fail to provide sophisticated 
technology, knowledge or sufficient financial capital. Hufbauer and Adler (2010: 415) find that 
even though developing countries are more willing to share their technological know-how, the 
magnitude of positive spillovers is only marginal compared to more sophisticated technologies 
transferred by developed countries. Disadvantages are also found in the potential for job 
creation. As almost 75 percent of OFDI from developing countries is supplied by M&As, job 
losses in the host country might occur after the foreign takeover in line with downsizing 
activities (Hufbauer and Adler, 2010: 417).  
On the other hand, supporters claim that home developing countries (FDI producers) have 
more common attributes to other host developing nations (FDI receivers). Consequently, FDI-
producing developing nations hold a distinct advantage over developed nations since they are 
faced with similar problems as the receiving nations (Gammeltoft, 2008: 3). Development state-
specific similarities between home and host developing countries could become an important 
determinant of FDI in the future.   
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2.7. CONCLUSIONS  
FDI theories have historically evolved for a number of different reasons but can generally be 
categorised based on market structure. Perfect market theories, imperfect market theories and 
theories based on other variables were the preferred categories used for this research paper. 
Over time, researchers became aware that not only investment motives, but also the specific 
timing of when to engage in FDI transactions matters. While country-specific, firm-specific and 
asset-specific attributes were found to be significant on an individual basis, more recent work on 
FDI combines multiple factors into one dynamic comprehensive theory.  
Contemporary theories capture the recent transition from describing the actual FDI transaction 
towards taking an institutional approach of the firm itself. Hymer’s (1960) Industrial 
Organisation Hypothesis, Vernon’s Product Cycle (1966) and Buckley and Cassons’ 
Internalisation Theory (1976) represent important classical attempts to explain FDI engagement 
in host countries.  
In response to a more close-knitted global economy, MNEs’ significance as supplier of foreign 
investment capital has been incorporated in more recent research. International Business theory 
is hereby blended with traditional FDI theory. Until today, Dunning’s (1979) Eclectic Paradigm 
is regarded as the most significant contribution to FDI theories. His O-L-I theory successfully 
combines both classical theories based on market imperfections and contemporary market 
characteristics which are influenced by the spread of MNEs. In general, FDI is only undertaken 
if a firm’s ownership, internalisation and locational advantages are simultaneously fulfilled. 
Although Dunning’s O-L-I theory relies on a solid theoretical base, the implications of scholarly 
work in the field of behavioural economics or information asymmetry could create a more 
multifaceted model of foreign investments in the future.  
While the theoretical framework of FDI theories constantly changes in response to the most 
current economic, political and institutional factors, FDI motives have traditionally remained 
constant. Supplementing profit-seeking motives, market- and natural resource-seeking motives 
appear to be the most consistent investment motives over time. Extractive-seeking FDI, in 
particular via Greenfield Investment projects, is the most significant form of overseas expansion 
dealt with in this thesis.  
Regardless of the reasons for which FDI is pursued, scholars disagree on a homogeneous set of 
FDI determinants applicable to all regions of the world. Country- and company-specific 
determinants as well as economic and political stability are normally required to generate an 
attractive investment climate in host countries. Discrepancies prevail in respect to the distinct 
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effects of FDI observed in host countries. Only FDI’s overall growth-enhancing long-term 
benefits can be verified by scholars. Positive FDI externalities might take on the form of 
technological advancements, knowledge transfers or a boost in workers’ wages. On the other 
hand, the crowding-out of local firms, capital flight, increased pollution, poor working 
conditions, or the uneven distribution of benefits are all well documented negative FDI 
spillovers.  
After reviewing and analysing FDI terminology, motives, theories, determinants and host 
country effects in this chapter, the solid theoretical framework for this thesis has been 
established. In the next chapter, general FDI theories will be narrowed down to specific 
countries. From now on, China is considered as home country or FDI investor, while SSA 
nations are labelled as recipient nations or host countries. Applying the general FDI concept to a 
specific geographical region allows preliminary conclusions to be drawn about whether 
traditional FDI theories hold in the case of China’s overseas investment in SSA nations. 
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CHAPTER THREE:   
GLOBAL FDI TRENDS AND CHINESE FDI TO SSA 
3.1. INTRODUCTION  
FDI destined to African recipient nations provides some of the necessary start-up capital with 
the prospect of spurring economic development. As discussed in the previous chapter, foreign 
capital inflows should (in theory) encourage economic diversification away from resource-
extractive sectors, create local employment and transfer advanced knowledge or technology. 
Particularly applicable to developing host countries, Kojima (1982: 6) points out that FDI 
“should play the role of a tutor” through the transfer of advanced technology, marketing skills, 
management skills and more efficient production processes. Indeed, prevailingly weak saving 
rates, low income levels and inadequate financial markets have enslaved Africa to become 
dependent on foreign external financing (Collier and Pattillo, 2000; Dahl, 2002: 5). A report 
published by the World Bank (2012a) states that 80 percent of all Sub-Sahara African nations 
applied regulatory incentives to attract more foreign capital - another indicator of how crucial 
FDI has become to Africa as a whole.  
Chapter Three aims to identify global FDI trends. In order to analyse the nature, motives and 
types of foreign investment Africa has attracted over the last decade, the most recent 
publications on FDI are reviewed. Sections 3.2 and 3.3 briefly address the current economic 
environment of China and SSA respectively. Analysing the present conditions in both regions is 
seen as an initial attempt to identify attributes that might either encourage or hinder FDI flows. 
The fourth section of this chapter considers general FDI trends in Africa and also raises the 
question of whether FDI attractors in Africa are different to those of other region. Breaking 
down investment flows into its sectoral and locational components helps to generate an overall 
picture of global foreign investment trends. The World Investment Report (UNCTAD, 2012) 
constitutes the major source of this data. After establishing overall global investment trends, 
Section 3.5 discusses the nature, motives and sectoral breakdown of Chinese flows relevant for 
the case of SSA. Comparisons to FDI theories presented in Chapter Two are made in order 
reach preliminary conclusions about whether Chinese flows to SSA are pursued for the same 
traditional investment motives.  
3.2. CHINA’S ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT  
Currently, Beijing still runs a largely closed state-planned economy. As a developing country 
itself, China has traversed through a phase of impressive economic growth to become the 
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manufacturing factory of the world. Since the turn of the millennium, it has become the largest 
global manufacturer. This is mainly attributed to China’s need for supplying jobs for its large 
domestic population (Mills, 2010: 44). 2009 saw China claiming the number one position in 
global exports. On average, Chinese income per capita grew by eight and nine percent during the 
1980s and 1990s respectively (Kaplinsky, 2006: 986). Industries not affected by import quotas, 
such as footwear, games or toys account for China’s major export markets. Over two-thirds of 
such exports were destined for the US and Japan.  
Not only did its domestic economy begin to prosper, but Beijing also played a crucial role in 
bailing out struggling Westerns companies and governments that were affected by the global 
financial crisis (Nolan and Zhang, 2010: 97). According to The World Factbook (CIA, 2012), 
China’s population in 2012 is approximately 1,343,000,000 - the most populated country in the 
world. A booming Chinese economy has experienced economic growth rates of roughly 10.6 
percent per annum over the last five years (China Analyst, 2012: 14). But despite the prosperous 
economic growth in recent years, China remains the largest developing country in the world.  
Moreover, the combination of China’s booming economy, surging export revenues and large 
accumulations of US foreign exchange are pressuring global market prices. Global inflation rates 
rose while interest rates declined in the mid-2000s (Goldstein, Pinaud, Reisen and Chen, 2006: 
111). Global commodity and food prices also steadily increased in the mid-2000s as a result of 
China’s aggressive natural resource-seeking strategy, while shortages in shipping freight are 
attributed towards its export-driven economy (NIC, 2005: 2; Kaplinsky, 2006: 986-993). Beijing’s 
pressing need for commodities, environmental pressure as well as rising labour and production 
costs represent the biggest threats to the Chinese economy at the time of writing.  
Concerns from the West about Beijing’s state-controlled economic success are soaring. Critics 
affirm that China’s economic performance is skewed by its undervalued currency which 
maintains a competitive advantage for its exports and has also helped gain control of global 
commodity supplies (Pereira and De Castro Neves, 2011: 6). In 2010, the Chinese Renminbi was 
estimated to be between 20 to 40 percent below its normal market value (Mills, 2010: 347). 
Nevertheless, a closer look at China’s economic affairs might paint a more realistic picture. 
Gradually opening up its state-controlled economy for the sake of attracting foreign investment 
has successfully lifted millions of Chinese people out of poverty. Trade liberalisation, the 
availability of low-cost labourers, a large market size, a disciplined work ethic and a strong 
savings culture all contributed towards China’s economic miracle.   
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China’s membership of the newly developing group of BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and 
South Africa) economies benefited its ascending position in the global economy. BRICS was 
founded with the intention to challenge the global dominance of the G-7 economies by 
committing to political, commercial and cultural cooperation between member nations. The 
growing importance of BRICS was highlighted during the financial crisis in 2009. Not only were 
the BRICS nations less severely affected by the crisis, but also allocated plenty of capital to 
rescue many struggling developed nations (Pereira and De Castro Neves, 2011: 1).  
In preparation for China’s membership to the WTO, Beijing slowly opened its economy. 
Initially, outward FDI in the light of industrial processing trade sectors, namely textiles, 
machinery or electrical equipment was promoted. Chinese raw materials or intermediate goods 
were used to complete the production process in foreign host countries’ facilities (Oyeranti, 
Babatunde, Ogunkola and Bankole, 2010: 24). In 2002, Beijing announced its new “Going 
Global” foreign policy. Instead of relying on export mechanisms to enter the global economy, 
foreign investments were now strongly encouraged. Reasons for this global expansion strategy 
are twofold. Firstly, Beijing aims to establish strong and reputable Chinese brands capable of 
competing in international markets. Secondly, supplying OFDI to more sophisticated recipient 
nations, especially in Europe or the US, was seen as a convenient way to improve the 
technological and service skills of Chinese companies (Oyeranti et al., 2010: 24).  
However, the influence of the ruling Communistic Party is profoundly visible in every aspect of 
the Chinese society. Most companies remain partially if not wholly owned by the state. State-
imposed five year plans setting out the country’s economic goals are still in place. Economic and 
political affairs continue to be strategically regulated by state-owned institutions. Nevertheless, 
gradual liberalisation reforms not only witnessed China to remain a preferred investment 
location for foreign investors but to now also becoming a major global investor. 
One investment region that has become of particular interest to China over the last two decades 
is Africa. Established in 2000, the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) was founded 
in Beijing with the aim to better channel and promote friendship, corporation, economic 
development and mutually beneficial long-term stability between China and 44 African nations 
(FOCAC 2012). In order to evaluate the effectiveness of reforms and programs, conferences 
have been held every three years. Since the Forum’s founding, China has granted debt 
cancelation, concessional loans and low-interest loans promoting small-size African 
entrepreneurs. Additionally, China offered training courses, medical care, preferential tariffs for 
certain African exports entering China and also established special economic zones in selected 
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African countries. It would therefore seem as if most African nations have so far benefitted from 
the variety of programs provided by FOCAC. For example, at the last Forum held in Egypt in 
2009, China pledged $10 billion in concessional loans to African countries and $1 billion in 
special loans for small-scale African entrepreneurs (FOCAC, 2012; China Briefing, 2009).  
3.3. SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA’S ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT  
Even long after colonialism, SSA continues to remain dependent on resource-driven exports. 
Between 1995 and 2008, 73 percent of all exports from this region were motivated by mining 
activities (World Economic Forum, 2011: 4). Zafar (2007: 110) strengthens this argument, 
claiming that over 75 percent of African exports were generated by commodities, natural 
resources or oil. Numerous SSA nations thereby indirectly benefitted from the Chinese- created 
commodity boom which has enriched many resource-abundant nations over the last few years 
(Zafar, 2007: 110). The boom was only short-lived as commodity prices and the demand for 
African commodities from a global perspective declined significantly after the financial crisis of 
2008 (Melber, 2009: 56). However, the demand has slowly recovered in post-crisis years.  
This continuous dependency of Africa’s economic growth on natural resources does not 
promote sustainable long-term development but rather encourages cyclical fluctuations based on 
China’s commodity demand. Some researchers even go so far as to blame Africa’s resource 
abundance as its greatest curse, especially because resource-dependent economies are more 
vulnerable to authoritarian government that will not only control the country politically, but also 
economically (Mills, 2010: 170, 241). All the negative implications of the Dutch Disease, 
including an appreciating currency causing expensive exports, crowding-out of local industries, 
failure to diversify local economies or the enrichment of local elites apply in the case of Africa 
(see Section 2.6.3.4.) 
Most manufacturing sectors in SSA, contributing less than 10 percent towards respective 
countries’ GDPs on average, remain underdeveloped and incapable of competing in the global 
business environment (Sparks, 2012). In other words, most countries in SSA failed to establish 
diversified economies and low-value added activities continue to be the dominant economic 
drivers. In general, Africa’s comparative advantages either lie in the extraction of unprocessed 
commodities or in the agricultural sectors as land is abundant. Competitive advantages are 
therefore found in low-cost or low-skilled manufacturing (Goldstein et al., 2006: 113). Skilled 
labour is still scarce - most jobs remain blue-collar in nature. Widespread corruption, lack of 
legislative transparency and authoritarian leadership practises nurture unstable political 
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environments that further exacerbate the underdeveloped economic state of many African 
nations. Rupiya and Southall (2009: 171) acknowledge that the African continent hosts the 
largest amount of UN peace-keeping operation- another indicator of the fragile state of many 
African nations.  
Other research affirms that Africa’s lack of production diversification is largely caused by 
marginal investments in human capital, inadequate infrastructure, conflict- or war-prone 
countries, unfavourable institutional environments and regulatory challenges (World Economic 
Forum, 2011: 13). Compared to the rest of the world, Africa has the most developing nations on 
a single continent. While economic growth worldwide is still suffering from the aftermath of the 
global financial crisis of 2008, Africa has recovered marginally better than other regions.  
The improving trade relations with BRICS countries increased overall growth in SSA to 
moderate levels. In general, Africa’s participation in international trade is still relatively low 
compared to global levels (Sparks, 2012). Although African GDP growth between 2001 to 2010 
occurred at an annual rate of 5.2 percent, Africa only accounted for a meagre 2 percent of global 
trade in 2009 (Mills, 2010: 137; World Economic Forum, 2011: xi). South Africa alone 
contributed more than half of this figure with the other SSA economies lagging behind.  
Through its going-global policy implemented in the last decade, China has become Africa’s 
biggest trading and investment partner since 2001. In 2009, it surpassed the United States as 
Africa’s most important trading ally (Wonacott, 2009). According to the FOCAC (2011), during 
the period of 2000-2009, Sino-African bilateral trade and Chinese investment into Africa grew 
from $10.6 billion to $91.07 billion and from $220 million to $1.4 billion in nominal terms 
respectively. African commodity exports of minerals or fuels portray one direction of Sino-
African trade relations; while cheap Chinese consumer goods, textile products and machinery but 
also a growing amount of weapons to Africa depict the other side of the relationship. During the 
same period, Chinese-sponsored infrastructure projects in Africa increased more than twenty-
fold from $1.1 billion to $28.1 billion.   
Although China’s growing demand for natural resources brought vital commodity revenues to 
resource-rich African nations, global exports from Africa dropped by 31 percent due to the 
global financial crisis of 2008. Minerals, energy and oil exports formed the largest shares of 
export products to China in 2010, with oil accounting for 13 percent of all African exports to 
China (FOCAC, 2011). Non-commodity exports to China also increased as a result of 
preferential tax and tariff agreements. Fertiliser, electronics, textiles, garments, woodwork, base 
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metals, wine, cocoa beans, coffee, olive oil and machine parts comprise Africa’s major non-
commodity export products (FOCAC, 2011).   
Low income levels, marginal saving rates and the immediate effects of the HIV epidemic all 
constitute the geographical challenges Africa is still facing in present days. UN Conference 
(2011d: 2) notes in a report that domestic resource mobilisation in most African nations is 
weakened by transfer pricing and inappropriate tax laws that prevent the efficient collection of 
revenues. As a result, resource-rich nations in particular adopted preferential tax incentives in 
order to attract more foreign investment (Sparks, 2012). In such regions, FDI still substitutes 
domestic capital as the most important source of gross fixed capital formation. For example, 
according to the African Economic Outlook (2012), global FDI inflows to Angola accounted for 
316, 201 and 222 percent of gross fixed capital formation in 2008, 2009 and 2010 respectively. 
This implies that at least half (2009-2010) and even more than 3 times (2010) the amount of 
capital invested in Angola’s physical assets (factories, stores, offices, buildings etc.) was supplied 
by foreign investors. The absence of domestic investment capital could indicate a disturbed 
economic system in relevant host nations as they continue to heavily rely on foreign capital.  
A World Bank publication (2006) emphasises “a persistently negative saving rate implies that a 
country is on an unsustainable path and consumption must fall in the future. SSA is actually the 
only region that has constantly exhibited negative genuine savings rate since the mid-1970s.” In 
order to escape this unsustainable trap, numerous African countries implemented various 
economic reforms which addressed the issues of inflationary pressures, budget deficits, fiscal 
policies a crowding-out effects within the last decade (World Economic Forum, 2011: xiii). Quite 
often, the public sector also became partially privatised. So far, results are showing promising 
effects as African economic growth rates in the near future are projected to be some of the 
highest worldwide. At the time of writing, seven of the ten fastest growing global economies are 
situated in Africa (UNCTAD, 2012). Interestingly, the largest income streams are generated by 
the sectors of banking, manufacturing, retail, telecommunication and wholesale (French, 2012) - 
and not by extractive-intensive segments. Thus, if utilised appropriately, a boost in externally 
supplied foreign capital could lift millions of Africans out of poverty.   
3.4. GLOBAL FDI FLOWS  
3.4.1. Sectoral and Locational Breakdown of Global FDI Flows   
Capital inflows to Africa are not a newly emerging trend but have been recorded for over 500 
years. For example, the slave trade, colonialism or neo-colonialism all brought foreign capital to 
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the African continent; some more directly than others (Satgar, 2009: 35). Over the last decade, 
global FDI generally increased although flows were partially reduced by the onset of the global 
financial crisis (2007-2009). Despite the ongoing European debt-crisis and the aftermath of the 
earlier financial crisis in 2008, 2011 saw global FDI rise by 16 percent (UNCTAD, 2012). The 
location of traditional FDI recipient countries also diverged from developed nations to 
developing and transitioning countries which by the early 2000s accumulated more than half of 
total inflows (Dunning, 2003). According to Table 3.1, the latter reached a historic high of $777 
billion inflows, with developing economies securing approximately 45 percent of inflows and 
transitioning economies accounting for roughly 6 percent of total global inflows in 2011. 
Developed countries which traditionally received the largest amount of FDI by far accounted for 
49 percent of global flows in 2011 (see Table 3.1).   
Table 3.1: Global FDI flows between 2009-2011 by regions, in current $ billion and percent 
 
Source: UNCTAD (2012: 38)  
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On a regional scale, developing nations in Asia and nations in Latin American and the Caribbean 
which secured approximately 28 and 14 percent on inflows, exhibited the most promising FDI 
growth rate in 2011 (UNCTAD, 2012). Capital invested in Africa and Least Developing 
Countries (LCDs), on the contrary, fell by 11 percent compared to 2009. Table 3.1 reveals that 
only roughly 3 percent of all global inflows were destined to African recipient countries. FDI 
inflows in 2012 were projected to reach moderate levels. As a result of declining growth 
prospects in Asia, transitioning economies and resource-rich African nations were expected to 
the experience the fastest increase in FDI inflows (UNCTAD, 2012).  
With respect to market-entry forms of FDI, the level of global Greenfield Investments in 2011 
remained on a slightly negative downward trend. Global M&As, on the other hand, increased 
significantly by 53 percent (UNCTAD, 2012). Greenfield Investments still constitute the 
preferred method of FDI in developing and transitioning nations worldwide, with two-thirds of 
all Greenfield projects being conducted in those regions. Extractive, chemicals, utilities, 
transportation and communication industries in developing nations secured the highest share of 
foreign investment via Greenfield Investments.  
Reflecting the slow recovery from economic turmoil, all sectors of the global economy except 
manufacturing experienced growing FDI inflows in 2011. Table 3.2 shows that while the primary 
and service sectors slightly increased their share of global FDI, the share of investment in the 
manufacturing sector declined in 2011 but rose in monetary terms (UNCTAD, 2012).  
Table 3.2: Sectoral distribution of FDI projects between 2005 to 2011, in current $ billion and 
percent 
 
Source: UNCTAD (2012: 9)  
Aggregate figures for all market-entry methods of FDI show that in 2011, the manufacturing 
sector received the largest shares of FDI investment with 46 percent followed by services and 
the primary sector accounting for 40 and 14 percent respectively (UNCTAD, 2012). Only one 
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sub- sector within the primary sectors, namely commodity-seeking activities, received FDI flows. 
This confirms the continuous investment potential of natural resource-rich countries which have 
traditionally received the largest amount of inward flows.    
3.4.2. Sectoral and Locational Breakdown of Global FDI flows to Africa 
Despite the positive growth in global FDI, Africa continued to experience declining FDI inflows 
for the third consecutive year in 2011. Political turmoil in Northern Africa and reduction of 
flows from developing countries reduced overall flows in 2011. Nevertheless, SSA countries 
succeeded in attracting a historic $37 billion (UNCTAD, 2012). An alternative dataset extracted 
from the African Economic Outlook (2012) confirms Sub-Saharan Africa’s success in attracting 
more FDI than in previous years. Compared to UNCTAD (2012) data, flows to SSA peaked in 
2008 at roughly $45 billion (see Figures 3.1 and 3.2). Extractive industries in resource-rich SSA 
are the largest recipients of Greenfield-implemented FDI projects, followed by growing flows 
into the banking, retail and telecommunication sectors. 
Figure 3.1: Global FDI flows to Africa between 2000 to 2012 by location, in current $ billion 
Source: African Economic Outlook (2012)    
Note:    The notations 2011(e) and 2012(f) indicate investment projections for the respective years.    
 
According to the World Investment Report (UNCATD, 2012), the largest African recipients of 
FDI in 2011 (with each nation receiving more than $3 billion) were Angola, Nigeria, South 
Africa and Ghana; followed by Congo, Algeria, Morocco, Mozambique and Zambia each 
accounting for $2 to $2.9 billion. Between $1 and $1.9 billion of FDI was flowing to Sudan, 
Chad, Congo, Guinea, Tunisia, Tanzania and Niger. Madagascar, Namibia, Uganda, Equatorial 
Guinea, Gabon, Botswana and Liberia each received between $0.5 to $0.9 billion of funds; while 
$0.1 to $0.4 billion flowed to each of Zimbabwe, Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire, Kenya, Senegal, 
Mauritius, Ethiopia, Mali, Seychelles, Benin, Central, African Republic, Rwanda and Somalia. 
Only marginal flows (less than $0.1 billion) were obtained by Swaziland, Cape Verde, Djibouti, 
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Malawi, Togo, Lesotho, Sierra Leone, Mauritania, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Eritrea, São Tomé 
and Principe, Burkina Faso, Comoros and Burundi (UNCTAD, 2012).  
The top receiving African host nations only have one commonality: all are producers of oil, 
commodities or precious natural resources. Goldstein et al. (2006: 76) substantiate this view by 
attributing 50 to 80 per cent (country-dependent) of all FDI to Africa towards commodity or 
resource-intensive industries. According to the African Economic Outlook (2012), oil exporting 
countries attracted more FDI inflows than non-oil exporting countries (see Figure 3.2 below). In 
line with global trends discussed in the previous section, pre-crisis FDI inflows to resource-rich 
(oil in this instance) countries in SSA peaked at 2008 to a historic level of over $40 billion (refer 
back to Figure 3.1).However, at that stage, only $5 billion (eight percent) of all FDI inflows to 
SSA were directed at non-oil producing nations.  
Figure 3.2: Global FDI flows to oil-rich SSA nations between 2000 to 2012, in current $ billion 
Source : African Economic Outlook (2012) 
Note:  The notations 2011(e) and 2012(f) indicate investment projections for the respective years.    
 
According to this data, preliminary a priori assumptions that resource-rich countries attract the 
largest share of FDI can be formed. However, Sparks (2012) argues that recent FDI trends are 
gradually transitioning from that notion as the economic sectors of agriculture, manufacturing 
and service industries have received recent attention from foreign investors. This could suggest 
the beginning of economic diversification away from resource-extractive industries.   
With respect to entry-methods of African inward FDI flows, investments in M&As slowed down 
over the last two years (see Table A.2 in Appendix), marking the effects of the ongoing global 
recession that impeded overall foreign investments. While African Greenfield Investments in the 
manufacturing and service sector also decreased, Greenfield Investments in the primary sector 
increased during 2010-2011 (refer to Table A.3 in Appendix). Table 3.3 below illustrates that the 
ten largest global Greenfield Investment projects in LDCs are all driven by commodity-seeking 
motives. Nine out of those ten projects are located in Africa, and seven are in Southern Africa. 
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Complementing the data presented in the previous section of this chapter, this further supports 
the claim that the main interest in Africa lies in its vast potential to provide precious natural 
resources. Naturally resource-rich countries in SSA are expected to become the fastest growing 
FDI recipients (UNCTAD, 2012).  
Table 3.3: LDCs’ ten largest Greenfield Investment projects in 2011 
 
Source: UNCTAD (2012: 69)   
Another way of measuring the thriving importance of FDI flows is by analysing data on external 
financing. FDI constitutes a key medium of gross fixed capital formation, especially in resource-
abundant SSA countries. According to Mills, (2010: 139), Official Development Assistance 
(ODA) was still the largest source of external financing in Africa less than a decade ago. Yet, 
recent surges in FDI directed to SSA nations have changed that composition. For the first time 
since 2005, FDI to Africa has now officially overtaken ODA as the major form of external 
financing (Sparks, 2012). This suggests that in addition to supplying natural resources to global 
investors, African nations have also implemented favourable investment environments to attract 
more foreign capital.  
Figure A.4 and Table A.4 (see Appendix) provide a visual depiction of Africa’s External Global 
Financing Flows (as percentage of GDP) and a table listing global FDI inflows to Africa between 
2005-2010. Both sources were extracted from the African Economic Outlook (2012). 
Corresponding to that data, Table 3.4 following below groups the Top-Ten receiving host 
countries in SSA according to their degree of economic diversity and their main exports 
extracted from Table A.8 (see Appendix). When analysing these data sets altogether, it can be 
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validated from Table 3.4 that more than half of all global FDI to Africa indeed targets ten 
resource-rich9 Sub-Saharan African nations. Hence, this data also confirms the findings of the 
World Investment Report (UNCTAD, 2012) that resource-abundant countries in Southern 
Africa, in particular the oil-producing nations of Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo 
(DRC), Nigeria and Sudan managed to secure the largest shares of global FDI. 
Table 3.4: Top-Ten recipient nations of global FDI in SSA between 2005 to 2010, in percent   
 
 
Source: Author’s own table created with data extracted from MOFCOM (2010) and African Economic 
Outlook (2012) 
Note:  “Exports” is a measure of export diversification and simply indicates the number of products that
 account for over 75 percent of exports (African Economic Outlook, 2012). The higher the number of 
 products, the more diversified is the country’s economy. Based on the “The Three Major Export 
 Products” identified in each nation, the “Main FDI Motives” were categorised by the author as either 
 natural resources, oil, agricultural products or a combination thereof.  
 
As evident from the combined data in Table 3.4, foreign investment to Africa can be grouped 
into the following three host-country characteristics: natural resources, oil or agriculturally-
motivated FDI. In addition to those three determinants, the main target countries in SSA almost 
exclusively comprise of highly undiversified economies. Oil-producing countries in particular 
resemble the least diversified economies, utilising only one product (oil) to generate export 
revenues. Yet, Table 3.4 also reveals a newly emerging trend. Host countries portraying potential 
for agricultural-related investments, such as Ghana, Madagascar or Uganda; tend to have more 
diversified economies than their resource-rich SSA counterparts which only rely on oil or natural 
resources to obtain export income. South Africa resembles a data outlier as 92 products generate 
export revenues in addition to its comparative advantage found in the financial services sector.  
3.4.3. South-South Flows 
                                                          
9
 Resource-rich here refers to any type of natural resource commodities in the form of minerals, precious 
metals, oil products, fresh food products or agricultural products, such as cotton or fabrics. However, a 
distinction will be made between resources, oil and agricultural products as this thesis progresses.   
Rank Country % 2005-2010 Exports Oil Resources Main 3 Exports Products Main FDI Motives
1 Angola  19% 1 x - Oi l Resources
2 Nigeria  11.60% 1 x - Oi l , Natural  Gas Resources
3 South Africa  8.25% 92 - x Platimun, Gold, Iron Resources
4 Sudan 4.51% 1 x - Oi l Resources
5 Congo 3.88% 1 x - Oi l Resources
6 DRC 2.20% 6 - x Copper, Cobalt, Cathodes Resources
7 Ghana 2.10% 9 - x Cocoa, Magnes ium Resources  + Agricultura l  
8 Zambia 1.48% 3 - x Copper, Unrefined Copper Resources
9 Madagascar 1.26% 32 - - Cotton products , Vani l la , Seafood Agricultura l
10 Uganda 1.25% 13 - x Coffee, Tobacco, Fish Agricultura l
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Compared to traditional North-North flows that have dominated global FDI, over the last 
decade significant increases in South-South investments are observed. North-North flows are 
defined as FDI flowing from developed home to developed host nations, whereas South-South 
flows are produced and received by developing nations. This changing pattern is mainly 
attributed to the economic slow-down of northern economies, liberalising economic reforms in 
developing countries, the rise in international trade agreements and an overall boost in 
investment capital available to developing countries (Aykut and Ratha, 2003).  
In 2003, developing countries accounted for more than one third of foreign investment flows to 
other developing nations (UNCTAD, 2004: 3). In accordance with North-North investments, 
South-South flows follow the same cyclical patterns and are also attracted by similar factors as 
discussed in Chapter 2 (see Section 2.3 and 2.5). Compared to traditional flows, most South-
South flows focus on infrastructure or resource-related projects realised through M&As 
(Gammeltoft, 2008: 11).  
South-South cooperation, particularly amongst BRICS nations, is slowly challenging the 
dominant position of G-8 economies (Pereira and De Castro Neves, 2011: 1). African countries 
are benefitting from the growing South-South collaboration because it increases their combined 
political power, provides the required capital to stimulate domestic development and further 
strengthens African unity. Similar to Chinese outflows or global FDI, funds supplied by 
Southern investors predominantly target the infrastructure, manufacturing or extractive sector of 
resource-rich SSA host nations. Even though the share of South-South FDI is not as large as 
that of developed source nations, emerging Southern countries have already displaced many 
developed countries as supplier of alternative external financing- mainly via export credits 
(Sparks, 2012).  
3.4.4. Determinants of FDI Flows to Africa 
Plenty of scholarly work on African-specific FDI determinants has been conducted whereby 
various macroeconomic or microeconomic variables as well as country- and industry-specific 
characteristics are tested. Although Section 2.5 has already reviewed a number of theoretical FDI 
frameworks related to FDI determinants, researchers argue that some determinants in Africa 
differ to those of other regions. Therefore, this section expands the findings of Section 2.5 by 
investigating Africa-specific FDI attractors.  
A study conducted for the Namibian Economic Policy Research Unit by Dahl (2002) established 
significant economic and political determinants applicable to FDI inflows to the Southern 
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African Development Community (SADC). Dahl tests whether good performance in the eight 
economic variables economic growth, literacy rate, foreign trade, regional grouping, cost of 
labour, GDP, competitiveness and external debt, are positively correlated to the amount of FDI 
received. Political variables are also tested for their causational effects on FDI flows. Political 
and economic indicators include budget deficits, corporate tax levels, country risk ratings, 
inflation rates, levels of privatisation, special FDI laws, multilateral agreements, bilateral 
agreements, double taxation treaties and development assistance. An existing positive 
relationship between the amount of FDI received and the established political or economic 
indicators could not be confirmed by empirical evidence (Dahl, 2002: 9-20). Instead, the 
availability of resources was identified as an important attractor for FDI.   
In another study that seeks to explain why Africa fails to attract the same amount of FDI 
compared to other developing regions, Ahmed, Arezki and Funke (2005) investigate various 
determinants and various components of FDI directed at developing countries. This study 
groups determinants into six broad categories, namely macroeconomic performance, quality of 
institutions, investment environment, infrastructure and resources, financial development and 
global factors. The agglomeration effect of FDI’s locational clustering, as characterised by a 
country’s historical track record of attracting FDI, is also taken into consideration. Estimating a 
dynamic panel model, Ahmed et al. (2005: 23) confirm previous findings that most domestic 
(pull) factors, such as high growth, trade openness, good infrastructure and a high institutional 
quality, are crucial determinants for FDI in developing countries. Complementing other research, 
capital controls and a stable domestic currency were also regarded as significant determinants.  
Morris and Aziz (2011) also investigate why host nations in SSA lag behind other competing 
countries. Conclusions drawn from this study further concur with the general notion that 
Africa’s FDI determinants vary (Asiedu, 2002, 2006; Musila and Sigue, 2006). Compared to most 
other studies which address macroeconomic variables, this study examines firm-specific 
determinants. Firm-specific variables are expressed as the average of “the ease of doing business 
index”. Morris and Aziz (2011: 407) conclude that Sub-Saharan Africa host nations scoring high 
on variables such as starting a business, enforcing contracts, employing workers, registering 
property, paying taxes or trading across borders only received more FDI for limited time 
periods. Credit availability and the protection of investors seems particularly important to 
investors targeting countries in SSA (Morris and Aziz, 2011: 411). However, findings of this 
study are inconclusive as some of the largest FDI recipient nations in SSA, such as Angola, 
Nigeria or Sudan, scored very low on the “ease of doing business” index. Hence, it can be firstly 
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concluded that MNEs might be attracted to factors other than the ‘ease of doing business” 
indicators. Secondly, the notion that sound economic investment environments attract more 
FDI can also be refuted.    
Another research paper by Asiedu (2006: 65-74) highlights the crucial role that natural resources 
and large consumer markets play as FDI determinants since these two variables appear to attract 
the largest share of FDI reaching SSA. Nevertheless, host nations lacking either one still have the 
potential to attract FDI by establishing favourable institutional and legal frameworks, well- 
functioning infrastructure system or by keeping inflation rates at a low level. Corrupt or unstable 
governments, on the contrary, reduce the amount of FDI flows to SSA. Asiedu (2006: 70) 
emphasises that uncontrollable exogenous factors, such as the availability of natural resources or 
being a land-locked country, do not explicitly affect the amount of FDI received. Instead, 
implementing sound legal and economic policies are perceived as controllable tools able to 
enhance an attractive investment environment. Therefore, in contrast to Morris and Aziz’ (2011) 
study, both economic and political factors are found to be significant FDI determinants.     
Drawing on the findings of Asiedu’s (2006) study, Musila and Sigue’s (2006: 577-593) work 
complemented the argument that the amount of FDI supplied to African countries greatly varies 
in response to specific political and regional-responsive factors. Accordingly, the distribution of 
inflows is unevenly skewed in favour of countries in possession of natural resources or with large 
market sizes. Musila and Sigue (2006: 591) advise recipient countries to align domestic 
regulations and development goals with the investor’s specific motives.  
Asiedu (2002: 112) confirms in yet another independent investigation on African FDI 
determinants that only a few selected determinants actually influence the amount of FDI inflows. 
Trade openness, infrastructure and the rate of return on the initial FDI investment seem 
significant determinants in her research study. Asiedu (2002: 15) also attributes uncontrollable 
geographical variables to the fact that SSA is lagging behind other developing investment 
locations. Similar to her later work (Asiedu, 2006), this research also recognises favourable 
economic conditions as crucial determinants for FDI.  
Since none of the discussed studies provide a satisfactory explanation for why African nations 
receive less FDI than other regions, further research which goes beyond the scope of this thesis 
is required. The reviewed literature suggests that due to its geographical, political and socio-
economic challenges, Africa portrays slightly more diverse FDI determinants. Liberalised 
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economic environments, stable political conditions and FDI-encouraging investment laws appear 
to provide a good climate for FDI. A summary of the reviewed studies follows below.  
Table 3.5: Summary of reviewed studies on Africa-specific IFDI determinants 
Study Purpose of Study Findings Determinants 
Dahl (2002) Identify important 
economic/ political 
determinants of FDI in 
SADC countries  
No positive correlation 
between FDI & economic/ 
political indicators, FDI is 
driven by natural resources  
Economic indicator based 
on eight variables, political 
indicator based on  ten 
variables 
Ahmed, Arezk & Funke 
(2005)  
Identify determinants of 
level and compositions of 
capital flows into 
developing countries 
Domestic pull factors are 
most significant factors  
High growth,    trade 
openness,     good 
infrastructure, a high 
institutional quality  
Morris & Aziz (2011)  Investigate whether ‘ease 
of doing business index’ 
affects FDI 
Inconclusive    relation 
between    ease   of  doing 
business index and amount 
of FDI received  
Starting business, credit 
availability, paying taxes, 
trading across borders, 
registering properties, 
employing workers.   
enforcing contracts 
Asiedu (2006) Investigate the role of 
natural resources, market 
size, government and 
economic policies as FDI 
determinants in SSA 
Availability of natural 
resources and large market 
sizes are the most 
important determinants 
though they are not explicit  
Natural resources, large 
market size, adequate 
infrastructure, minimal 
inflation, efficient legal 
system, good  investment 
framework 
Musila & Sigue (2006)  Investigate the role of legal 
framework and successful 
strategies as FDI 
determinants 
Uneven distribution of FDI 
mainly depending on 
natural resources and 
market size, synchronize 
countries’ individual goals 
with investors motives or 
preferences  
Natural resources, large 
market size, sound 
economic policies, 
favourable investment 
regulations, political 
stability 
Asiedu (2002)  Investigate whether  FDI 
determinants are different 
in Africa than to the rest of 
the world  
Determinants in Africa are 
different, region is less 
favourable to investors 
than others  
Trade openness, good 
infrastructure, rate of 
return on investment  
Source: Author’s own table  
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3.5. CHINESE FDI FLOWS   
3.5.1. Sectoral and Locational Breakdown of Global Chinese OFDI Flows  
On a global level, China has evolved from a dominant recipient of FDI to an important supplier 
of funds. Figure 3.3 displays that when compared to the year 2004, China’s global outward FDI 
(OFDI) has more than tripled in 2008 and maintained an historic all-time peak ever since.   
Figure 3.3: China’s global OFDI glows between 2004 to 2010, in current $ million 
 
Source: MOFCOM (2010) and author’s own calculations  
Figure 3.4: Major suppliers of global OFDI flows in 2010, in $ billion 
 
Source: MOFCOM (2010: 80)  
Note:  Data compiled by the Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China (MOFCOM, 2010) 
 reports that OFDI flows in 2010 amounted to $68.81 billion. 2010 was the most current data set at 
 the time of writing. A massive $60.18 billion or 88 percent of all Chinese OFDI flows target 
 non-financial industries (see Table 3.6 on the following page).    
 
 
In 2010, China was ranked as the world’s fifth largest supplier of foreign investment capital; 
surpassed only by the USA, Germany, France and Hong Kong (MOFCOM, 2010). Figure 3.4 
represents a visual overview of Chinese OFDI in 2010 compared to the world’s leading OFDI 
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suppliers. In that year, China and India were the only developing countries amongst the largest 
global OFDI producers, a phenomenon previously discussed in Sections 3.4.  
Table 3.6: China's global OFDI Flows and Stock in 2010, in $ billion 
 
OFDI Net Flows  OFDI Net Stock  
 
OFDI net flows OFDI net flows % OFDI net stock  OFDI net stock % 
Equity  20.64 30% 59.73 19% 
Reinvested Earnings 24.01 35% 120.7 38% 
Other Investments 24.16 35% 136.78 43% 
TOTAL  68.81 100% 317.21 100% 
Financial OFDI 8.63 12% 55.25 17% 
Non-Financial OFDI 60.18 88% 261.96 83% 
 
Source: MOFCOM (2010) and author’s own calculations  
Note:    FDI flows are defined as “capital provided by a foreign direct investor to a FDI enterprise, or capital 
 received by a foreign investor from a FDI enterprise. The flows comprise equity capital, reinvested 
 earning and intra-company loans”. FDI stocks, on the other hand, are defined as “the value of the 
 share of  their capital and reserves (including retained profits) attributable to the parent enterprise 
 plus the net indebtedness of affiliates to the parent enterprise. (UNCTAD, 2009 cited in Cattaneo, 
 2011: 43).   
 
 
In spite of an overall increase in Chinese flows, Table 3.7 below reveals that China’s global FDI 
flows in 2010 only accounted for 5 percent of total global flows. Chinese OFDI stock is even 
smaller, contributing only 2 percent towards global investment stocks in 2010.  
Table 3.7: China's OFDI Flows and Stock as part of global FDI in 2010, in $ billion 
 
 
OFDI Net Flows  OFDI Net Stock  
FDI FLOWS PER REGION  OFDI net flows OFDI net flows % OFDI net stock  OFDI net stock % 
Non-Chinese Global OFDI 1251.19 95% 20082.79 98% 
China's FDI  68.81 5% 317.21 2% 
TOTAL WORLD  1320 100% 20400 100% 
Source: MOFCOM (2010) and author’s own calculations  
 
 
The sectoral distribution of Chinese global OFDI flows from 2004 to 2010 (see Table A.5 in 
Appendix) reveals unexpected findings. According to this data (MOFCOM, 2010), Chinese 
global OFDI investment between 2004 and 2010 targeted a total of 19 different sectors, 
although significant investments were only recorded in 12 of those sectors. Contrary to 
preliminary assumptions, the Leasing and Business Sector is the largest recipient of Chinese 
OFDI with a massive 36 percent of flows invested during 2004 to 2010. The mining sector 
which has traditionally received the largest share of FDI comes in second with 17 percent, 
followed by Wholesale and Retail Trade with 12 percent and the Banking sector securing 15 
percent. The construction sector received marginal attention by Chinese investors, suggesting 
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that most construction projects are not exclusively funded through FDI. Moreover, Chinese FDI 
outflows in oil-related industries do not appear in this table. The composition of each sector 
cannot be derived from the data sources and no explanation was found as to why the Leasing 
and Business Service Sector is a data outlier. This could be an indicator that China might “hide” 
its oil investments in other sectors, possibly even in the Leasing and Business Service Sector. A 
more thorough discussion on the composition and nature of Chinese FDI flows to SSA follows 
in Section 3.5.3.  
3.5.2. Sectoral and Locational Breakdown of Chinese OFDI Flows to Africa  
In 2010, a comprehensive report on aggregate Chinese FDI data was released by the Ministry of 
Commerce of the People’s Republic of China (MOFCOM). At the time of writing, the 2010 
Statistical Bulletin of China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment lists the most detailed information on 
China’s FDI and was therefore utilised as one of the major data sources throughout Chapter 
Three and Chapter Four. However, data on foreign external assistance must be analysed with 
caution. Standards in reporting methods greatly vary across different regions of the world. Gelb 
(2010) warns that most empirical studies on Chinese FDI to SSA are majorly constrained by 
inaccurate data, which inevitably, reduces their overall value.  
As noted previously, most African nations have promoted aggressive investment incentives to 
attract a more diverse pool of foreign capital. While remaining a top destination for foreign 
capital itself, China now also supplies moderate amounts of FDI to Africa. Despite the current 
media buzz, the amount of Chinese FDI to Africa is relatively small compared to its OFDI to 
the rest of the world (see Tables A.6 and A.7 in the Appendix). Only five percent of China’s total 
overall expenditure of global FDI was directed at Africa (Devonshire-Ellis, 2010). According to 
the author’s own calculation within the investment period of 2005 to 2010, only 3.43 percent of 
Global FDI to Africa was produced by China. Section 4.1, and more specifically Table 4.1 which 
shows Chinese FDI to the Top-Ten SSA recipient countries as percentage of global FDI 
outflows between 2005 to 2010 (see page 76), will elaborate on this in more detail.  
Investments in Africa were almost non-existent between 2004 and 2006. In 2006, Chinese FDI 
to Africa tripled before reaching an all-time record high in 2008. The aftermath of the financial 
crisis in 2008 slowed down global trends and did not spare Africa. Whereas Chinese OFDI flows 
to Africa fell after 2008, global flows to Africa increased again in 2010 and reached a new post-
crisis high in 2011 (UNCTAD, 2012).  
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Figure 3.5 below reveals that over the investment period 2004 to 2010, only five percent of 
Chinese aggregate FDI was flowing to Africa. The largest recipient of Chinese OFDI was Asia 
itself with 65 percent, followed by Latin America and Europe with 17 and 7 percent respectively. 
Africa was only the fourth largest receiver of Chinese FDI (at five percent) followed by North 
America and Oceania which received the smallest investment flows of 3 percent each 
(MOFCOM, 2010). Despite Africa’s continuous increase in FDI inflows experienced between 
2006 to 2010, this growth was off a very small base. Furthermore, the year 2008 must be treated 
as a data outlier due to China’s $5 billion heavy investment deal in South Africa’s Standard Bank.      
Figure 3.5: China's global OFDI flows by geographical regions between 2004 to 2010, in percent 
 
Source: Author’s own calculations with data obtained from MOFCOM (2010)  
During the period 2004 to 2010, 50 African nations benefitted from Chinese OFDI (MOFCOM, 
2010: 83-84). Sub-Saharan African nations in particular have attracted the largest shares of 
Chinese OFDI flows, although 49 percent of flows reaching SSA were secured by South Africa 
alone. This seems to indicate that China does not shy away from untraditional investment 
regions characterised by lower economic growth rates, smaller market sizes, less political stability, 
lower human capital index and inadequate infrastructure quality. Based on those characteristics, 
SSA should be regarded as an untraditional investment region.  
Despite the heavy media coverage about China’s substantial engagement in Angola, merely 1.39 
percent of aggregate Chinese flows to SSA are actually directed at Angola (MOFCOM, 2010). 
Surprisingly, Angola accounts as the bottom receiver amongst the Top-Ten SSA recipient 
nations of Chinese flows (see Table 3.8 below). Although an increase in FDI inflows to Angola 
cannot be disputed, this does not explicitly classifies China’s engagement in Angola as FDI 
transactions. As stated previously, Chinese FDI investments might be “hidden” in other flows.   
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Table 3.8: Top-Ten recipient nations of Chinese FDI in SSA between 2004 to 2010, in percent 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s own table created with data extracted from MOFCOM (2010) and African Economic 
Outlook (2012) 
Note:  “Exports” is a measure of export diversification and simply indicates the number of products that 
account for over 75 percent of exports (African Economic Outlook, 2012). The higher the number of 
products, the more diversified is the country’s economy. Based on the “The Three Major Export  Products” 
identified in each nation, the “Main FDI Motives” were categorised by the author as either natural resources, 
oil, agricultural products or a combination thereof.    
 
 
According to Table 3.8 (which was created by merging Table A.7 and Table A.8 both listed in 
the Appendix), by far the largest recipient of Chinese OFDI in SSA is South Africa, capturing 
almost 50 percent of aggregate African inflows. As mentioned previously, South Africa has to be 
treated as a data outlier amongst all beneficiaries in SSA. Resource or oil-rich nations, such as the 
DRC, Nigeria, Niger, Sudan or Zambia follow respectively. The bottom half of China’s top ten 
OFDI recipients in SSA all portray agricultural potential. In accordance with the global trends 
outlined in the World Investment Report (UNCTAD, 2012), the availability of natural resources, 
oil, other precious commodities or agricultural products appear to be the biggest attractors for 
Chinese investment flows into SSA with the exception of South Africa.  
Analysing Table 3.8 further suggests supportive evidence for the a priori assumption that 
resource-rich nations in SSA are indeed preferred locations for Chinese investors. Angola, 
Nigeria and Sudan which are all amongst the top ten recipients of Chinese OFDI in SSA have 
poorly diversified economies but rather rely on only one export product, namely oil, to secure at 
least 75 percent of all export revenues. In regards to the resource-rich country Niger, the 
commodity uranium secures over 75 percent of export revenues. Amongst the other top 
receivers, Zambia and the DRC exhibit three and six products that account for 75 percent of 
exports respectively. Both countries present with only slightly diversified economies as well. 
 
 
Rank Country 
% 2004-
2010 
Exports Oil Resources Main Three Export Products Main FDI Motives 
1 South Africa 49% 92 - x Platinum, gold, iron Resources + Finance Sector 
2 Nigeria 9.09% 1 x - Oil, natural gas Oil 
3 Zambia 5.23% 3 - x Copper, unrefined copper Resources 
4 DRC 5.05% 6 - x Copper, cobalt, cathodes Resources 
5 Niger 2.97% 1 - x Uranium, light oils Resources 
6 Sudan 2.88% 1 x - Oil  Oil 
7 Ethiopia 1.56% 3 - - Coffee, Sesamum seeds, flowers Agricultural 
8 Kenya 1.40% 48 - - Tea, flowers, coffee Agricultural 
9 Madagascar 1.40% 32 - - Cotton products, vanilla, seafood Agricultural 
10 Angola 1.39% 1 x - Oil Oil  
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Amongst these minimally diversified economies, only natural resources or commodities seem to 
be able to attract FDI inflows.  
In other words, although China does target medium-diversified economies in SSA, most of these 
nations are also resource-abundant. Interestingly, the largest recipient of Chinese OFDI, South 
Africa, has a highly diversified economy of 92 export products accounting for at least 75 percent 
of exports (see Table 3.8). Precious metals, especially platinum and gold, are found in vast 
amounts. But South Africa also represents an exception with its sophisticated financial services 
sector capable of attracting foreign investments. In line with FDI theory, this supports the 
strategic asset-seeking investment motives and proposes that South Africa’s investment 
attractiveness is enhanced by three determinants. Its highly diversified economy but also the 
availability of natural resources and a well-functioning financial industry all contribute towards its 
lucrative investment environment. Table 3.8 further suggests an growing interest in Africa’s 
agriculturally-motivated FDI inflows. Three countries, namely Ethiopia, Kenya and Madagascar 
are amongst the ten largest recipient of Chinese FDI in SSA, primarily for their agricultural 
attractiveness. Interestingly, these “agricultural-nations” have more diversified economies 
compared to all other resource-rich nations, excluding South Africa.  
Preliminary conclusions drawn from this data confirm that Chinese FDI flows to SSA outside of  
South Africa are predominantly motivated by two reasons, namely short-term goals to secure 
access to natural resources or other precious commodities and long-term (agricultural) goals for 
the purpose of food or land security. In accordance with global investment trends discussed in 
Section 3.4, this implies that the major share of Chinese FDI to SSA, excluding South Africa, 
indeed targets the primary sector and extractive industries (UNCTAD, 2012). A more thorough 
discussion of relevant investment motives will follow in Chapter Four where specific Sino-
African investments deals are analysed through an individual case study approach.  
Compared to global FDI flows to Africa between 2005-2010 (see Table A.4 in the Appendix), 
Chinese MOFCOM (2010) data as synthesised in Table 3.8 identifies different countries as Top-
Ten SSA recipient nations. Table 3.9 below identifies the Top-Ten recipient nations of global 
FDI flows reaching Africa between 2005-2010. According to this dataset, Angola, which was the 
bottom recipient of Chinese inflows, secured the largest share of global FDI flows to SSA with 
19 percent. Nigeria and South Africa followed respectively. Recall that based on the Chinese FDI 
dataset, South Africa was the dominant recipient nations securing almost 50 percent of all 
Chinese inflows. Ethiopia and Niger ranked amongst the Top-Ten nations amongst Chinese 
FDI beneficiaries in Africa but do not appear in the highest ranked global inflows. Uganda and 
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Ghana, on the other hand, received significant inflows from global FDI producers but not from 
Chinese investors. Similar to the analysis with Chinese data, the Top-Ten SSA recipient nations 
of global FDIs were also grouped based on to their potential resources. Accordingly, natural 
resources, oil, agricultural potential and an attractive financial sector in the case of South Africa 
were also identified as the main FDI determinants in Sub-Saharan African host nations. Whereas 
Chinese OFDI targets three oil-abundant nations in SSA, global OFDI benefits one additional 
oil-producing country as well as one other nation, namely Ghana, with both agricultural and 
resource-related investment potential.   
Table 3.9: Top-Ten recipient nations of global FDI in SSA between 2005 to 2010, in percent 
Rank Country 
% 2005-
2010 
Exports Oil Resources Main Three Export Products Main FDI Motives 
1 Angola 19% 1 x - Oil Oil 
2 Nigeria 11.60% 1 x - Oil, natural gas Oil  
3 South Africa 8.25% 92 - x Platinum, gold, iron Resources + Finance Sector 
4 Sudan  4.51% 1 x - Oil Oil  
5 Congo 3.88% 1 x - Oil Oil  
6 DRC 2.20% 6 - X Copper, cobalt, cathodes Resources 
7 Ghana 2.10% 9 - X Coca, magnesium Resources + Agricultural 
8 Zambia 1.48% 3 - X Copper, unrefined copper Resources 
9 Madagascar 1.26% 32 - - Cotton products, vanilla, seafood Agricultural 
10 Uganda 1.25% 13 - x Coffee, tobacco, fish  Agricultural  
 
Source: Author’s own table created with data extracted African Economic Outlook (2012) 
Note:  “Exports” is a measure of export diversification and simply indicates the number of products that 
account for over 75 percent of exports (African Economic Outlook, 2012). The higher the number of 
products, the more diversified is the country’s economy. Based on the “The Three Major Export  Products” 
identified in each nation, the “Main FDI Motives” were categorised by the author as either natural resources, 
oil, agricultural products or a combination thereof.    
 
 
3.5.3. Determinants and Motives of Chinese OFDI flows to Sub-Saharan Africa 
3.5.3.1. Determinants of Chinese OFDI    
In comparison to Dunning’s (1979) traditional Eclectic Theory (see Section 2.4.2.4) which 
focuses on utilising existing strategic assets, most modern theories explaining the nature of 
MNEs have focused on gaining access to specific resources or assets by using internalisation 
strategies. Rui and Yip (2008: 183) appraise Chinese FDI to Africa as a combination of 
traditional and modern MNE theories. In accordance with traditional FDI theory, the authors 
argue that Chinese MNEs exploit competitive advantages through niche markets, cheap 
production costs or institutional advantages. Nevertheless, conformity with internalisation theory 
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(see section 2.4.2.3) also exists as Chinese investments only occur upon securing a unique firm-
specific advantage which will eventually be internalised in the process. 
As a result of China’s growing global presence, a number of studies investigating the 
determinants of Chinese OFDI have evolved. Buckley, Clegg, Cross, Liu, Voss and Zheng 
(2007) test whether mainstream FDI theories of market imperfections, ownership advantages 
and institutional factors are relevant determinants of Chinese OFDI or if a special set of 
determinants is necessary in the case of Chinese investments. According to Buckley et al. (2007: 
501), the constraints of China’s capital market imperfections allow for loans to be secured at 
below market rates. Low-cost capital is used to finance overseas projects, especially those 
pursuing asset-seeking or resource-extractive motives. China’s institutional environment as 
characterised by the government’s dominant position on any legislative level significantly 
contributes towards the internalisation of Chinese overseas investment. China’s restrictive 
domestic business environment therefore encourages investors to seek opportunities abroad 
(Buckley et al., 2007: 503; Rui and Yip, 2008: 222). Buckley et al. (2007) identify market size, trade 
liberalising reforms and the availability of natural resources as the major determinants of Chinese 
OFDI.   
Contrary to the findings of The China Analyst (2012), strategic asset-seeking motives are 
insignificant in other studies (Buckley et al., 2007: 510). Moreover, the combination of firm, 
industry and institution-specific factors are other relevant determinants in explaining China’s 
OFDI flows (Wang et al., 2012). This contradicts the narrow-minded traditional view which 
emphasises asset-exploitative motives. Nevertheless, conformities between the established 
determinants and the theory presented in Chapter Two exist as some of the Perfect Market 
Theories of FDI as well as Dunning’s (1979) O-L-I Eclectic Theory seem applicable to Chinese 
FDI (Buckley et al., 2007).  
3.5.4. Motives for Chinese OFDI Flows to Sub-Saharan Africa 
Except for reasons of efficiency, all FDI motives included in section 2.3, namely horizontal, 
extractive, technology and conglomerate-seeking FDI, apply in the case of China. Contrary to 
popular debates, China’s substantial investments in African are not purely undertaken for 
extractive-seeking motives. Indeed, a more careful review of current literature presents a very 
different picture that identifies a variety of multi-faceted motives for China’s expansion into 
Africa. It should also be noted that China’s Sino-African policies have changed over time “from 
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the ideologically-driven solidarity of anti-colonialism and the Cold War to pragmatic, market-
oriented economic engagement” (IRIN, 2006). 
3.5.4.1. China’s Own Experience of IFDI as a Developing Country  
China used to be a large recipient of aid and foreign investment itself. Striking commonalities 
between China’s developmental state in the 1970s and Africa’s current structures exist - both 
were or still are agriculturally-driven economies with a vast amount of mineral resources 
(Brautigam, 2009: 46). Many of China’s current foreign aid and FDI practices, such as the use of 
export credits or resource-backed loans, are actually similar repetitions of struck deals between 
China and Japan in the late 1970s (Brautigam, 2009: 24).  
In order to secure extraction rights in China’s coal and oil reserves, Japan utilised various FDI 
tools from until 1973 onwards. The first legislative contract governing the long-term relationship 
between the two countries was signed in 1978 whereby Japan arranged to export technology, 
plants and material worth $10 billion. China, on the other hand, agreed to repay the Japanese 
investment by deferred coal or crude oil exports (Brautigam, 2009: 46). By the end of 1978, more 
than 74 contracts between Japanese investors and the Chinese government had been signed. 
These governed China’s repayments of coal and oil exports in return for receiving sophisticated 
knowledge and complementary FDI funds for infrastructure projects from Japan. Contracts were 
considered a win-win situation for both countries and created a successful prototype for China’s 
own contemporary FDI practises, including the extensive usage of export-credits and resource-
backed loans. Furthermore, China’s similarities to developing African nations provide a 
distinctive advantage most traditional donors never had (Brautigam, 2009: 46-51).  
3.5.4.2. Extractive-Seeking FDI 
Even so, China’s motives are contradictory in nature. Many scholars agree that China’s main 
interest in African is centred on its hunger to secure the spiralling demand for precious natural 
resources and commodities (Alden, 2005: 148; Buckley et al., 2007; Gammeltoft, 2008: 10; 
Provost, 2011; Zafar, 2007: 108; Zweig and Jianhai, 2005: 25). Opponents of China’s aggressive 
resource strategy go as far as predicting a resource war over African commodities in the near 
future (Michel and Beuret, 2009: 77). Supporters of the classical dependency theory stress the 
one-sided exploitation of Africa’s resources by commodity-hungry Chinese investors who use 
financial incentives as a way of keeping African nations dependent on monetary inflows. 
Opposing views acknowledge the beneficial impacts of China’s OFDI in SSA. An interesting 
point was raised by Obi (2009: 203) who postulates that “what has changed is the increased 
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bargaining power of petro-states to demand more in exchange for access to their oil reserves”. 
Only time will tell whether China’s involvement in Africa presents a new form of imperialism, 
(also referred to as neo-colonialism) that expands the traditional scramble for African 
commodity by foreigners (Melber and Southall, 2009: xx; Zhao, 2011c).  
Indeed, when applying Dunning’s (1979) O-L-I Eclectic Theorem and more specifically the 
locational advantages (see Section 2.4.2.4), the commodity-hungry hypothesis can be supported. 
Since Africa’s main locational advantages still prevail in its resource abundance, it appears only 
natural that the majority of FDI flows to Africa benefit the primary (extractive) sector. A variety 
of different investment motives complement mining-induced inflows (Narula and Dunning, 
2000: 151).  
3.5.4.3. Strategic-Asset-Seeking FDI 
In addition to resource-extractive motivated FDI, China is interested in gaining asset-specific 
advantages from their overseas investments (Rui and Yip, 2008: 221). Strategic asset advantages 
entail absorbing superior technologies, gaining advanced knowledge in international operations 
or acquiring skills in local distribution networks or brand management. An article published in 
The China Analyst (2012: 11) complements the notion that Chinese investors are interested in 
securing strategic assets by acquiring market shares or securing ownership positions in foreign 
brands and technologies. Considering the underdeveloped state of most SSA nations (excluding 
South Africa), asset-seeking motives do not seem to be of relevance here. However, part of 
China’s FDI to South Africa can be attributed to asset-seeking motives. For example, South 
Africa’s sophisticated financial sector offers plenty of opportunities for Chinese investors to 
absorb superior knowledge (Cattaneo, 2011). Section 4.2.1 will address South Africa’s case study 
in more depth.  
3.5.4.4. Politically- Motivated FDI  
Manipulating foreign policies could be regarded as one of the political reasons behind China’s 
engagement in Africa. Researchers agree that Chinese OFDI is gradually starting to challenge the 
still prevailing Western dominance in most developing countries since the provision of financial, 
political and humanitarian support has found great support amongst SSA host nations (Alden, 
2005; Brautigam, 2009; Zweig and Jianhai, 2005). This kind of assistance could be perceived as a 
form of symbolic diplomacy. China thereby agrees to finance African infrastructure projects that 
are simultaneously linked to Chinese political interests. Gaining political support to isolate 
Taiwan or Tibet, securing votes in UN related affairs or exerting growing influence in 
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multilateral organisations, such as the WTO, are currently the top priorities on China’s political 
agenda - all of which are currently supported by almost all Sub-Saharan Africa host nations.  
Although China’s interests in Africa for the sake of gaining political support represents a valid 
reality, “much of the criticism directed toward China in Africa is more an indicator of Western 
fear of being challenged in territory historically considered as its own backyard than motivated by 
genuine concerns for the African development prospects” (Melber, 2009: 62). Irrespective of 
China’s political agenda, other research affirms that “strengthening cooperation with developing 
countries through economic and technical support has become a key part of China's foreign and 
economic policy” (IRIN, 2006) - and Western criticism might therefore not be entirely 
justifiable.   
3.5.4.5. Accumulated Wealth-Related FDI    
China’s relatively high household and corporate savings rate is considered as another investment 
incentive. Morck, Yeung and Zhao (2008: 343) observe that a significant portion of Chinese 
FDI-engaging State-Owned-Enterprises (SOEs) do not pay out dividends to investors. Instead, 
firms’ accumulated retained earnings are used to invest in more lucrative and profitable 
opportunities abroad. Chinese OFDI could therefore be regarded as a profitable method to 
reinvest excessive corporate savings. Not only do the high corporate and household savings rates 
contribute towards an increase in Chinese OFDI activities, but so does the government’s 
accumulation of foreign reserves. Gammeltoft (2008: 10) indicates that a large amount of 
Chinese investments directed at high-priced securities in American and European nations went 
unnoticed without receiving a lot of media attention. Excessive foreign reserves are thereby 
recycled into profitable US securities, supporting the notion that China’s newly acquired wealth 
is another important foreign investment motive (Goldstein, Pinaud, Reisen and Chen, 2006: 16) 
3.5.4.6. Horizontal (Market-Seeking) FDI 
Horizontal-driven (market-seeking) FDI motives also apply in the case of China. Multiple 
sources report the flooding of African markets with cheap low value consumer products that 
would otherwise not have found a customer base in the over-crowded Chinese market (Alden, 
2005: 150; Claassen, Loots and Bezuidenhout, 2011: 4; Zafar, 2007: 111). Most of the Chinese 
consumer goods flooding the African markets are selling for a fourth of the equivalent African 
domestic prices (Michel and Beuret, 2009: 115). Hence, the African continent has been described 
as a sanctuary for “low-cost Chinese motorcycles, electronic goods, and T-shirts, benefiting the 
consumers in the continent” (Zafar, 2007: 105). Although African consumers definitely benefit 
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from those low-priced products, Chinese imports pose a significant threat to domestic 
production in Africa.  
3.5.4.7. Profit-Seeking FDI 
The quest for competitive and profitable business opportunities adds to the motivating factors 
behind China’s “African Safari” (Brautigam, 2009: 15; Whitehead and Green, 2012). Due to the 
restrictive domestic business environment and overcapacity of Chinese firms, inventive 
entrepreneurs have recognised overseas business operations as promising alternatives. Market 
access, competitive pressure in the domestic Chinese market and the opportunity to move 
excessive production abroad are identified as major investment incentives for Chinese entities to 
invest abroad (ADB, 2011: 40). Whereas Western entrepreneurs shy away from Africa’s risky 
investment environment, Chinese investors see opportunity for long-term profits considering 
their willingness to implement experimental approaches instead of focusing on certainties 
(Brautigam, 2009: 16; Michel and Beuret, 2009: 5). Compared to traditional FDI suppliers, 
Chinese investors also appear to be less risk-averse and more flexible with regards to business 
standards (Goldstein et al., 2006: 84).  
3.5.4.8. Agriculturally-Seeking FDI  
Because textile, apparel and food products constitute the majority of Sub-Saharan Africa’s non-
commodity exports to China, agricultural-seeking incentives are also identified as China’s 
possible investment motives (Zafar, 2007: 115). Enhancing food security, securing ownership 
rights to arable land in SSA, setting up agricultural plantations and improving technology are all 
part of China’s long-term goals as spelled out in its mutually-beneficial African policies of 2006.   
(Brautigam, 2009; Brautigam and Xiaoyang, 2009). Chapter Four will further elaborate on 
Chinese agriculturally-motivated FDI in SSA.   
Some researchers argue that China’s agricultural involvement in Africa is a way of relocating 
displaced Chinese farmers who have lost their land as part of China’s urbanisation processes. 
Furthermore, with its rapidly growing population, China will eventually reach the critical point 
where it cannot stay agriculturally self-sufficient. 2003 already saw China becoming a net-food 
importer. As Western donors and aid agencies mostly neglected to invest in Africa’s agricultural 
sector, China’s investment could now become a viable opportunity for local African farmers to 
absorb superior production technology. Increasing efficiency as well as reaching food security 
could be possible positive spillovers from agriculturally-motivated FDI activities (AATF, 2010; 
Edinger and Sandrey, 2010).   
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3.5.5. Nature of Chinese OFDI flows to Sub-Saharan Africa  
Extending assistance to African nations is not a recent phenomenon but has been an on-going 
trend in China’s diplomatic foreign policies since 1949. Brautigam (2009: 34) claims that China 
offered foreign aid to more than 37 African nations during the 1970s - more than most of 
Africa’s former communistic ally, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, ever had.     
Current funding for African host countries is generated from export-credits, concessional loans, 
foreign debts cancellations, grants, zero- interest loans and improving trade relations by 
establishing Special Economic Zones (SEZ). Even though none of those instruments qualify as 
FDI mediums per se, most are included as FDI transactions in official reports. According to the 
IMF (2003), Chinese interest-free loans and all aid grants are supplied by the state-operated 
Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM). While zero-interest loans are only granted to finance 
infrastructure projects in stable and less risky developing African nations, grants are intended to 
benefit social projects regardless of the countries’ riskiness (Grimm, Rank, Schickerling and 
McDonalds, 2011: 10). 
Government loans are offered at slightly below competitive commercial rates with an extended 
loan period of 12 to 15 years followed by an extended grace period compared to traditional loans 
(Brautigam, 2009: 335). Grace periods are usually not offered by Western funding. However, 
only a limited amount of loans extended to African countries are actually subsidised by the 
Chinese government. With respect to FDI instruments, MOFCOM and China’s Eximbank (a 
more detailed discussion of both follows below) are the most important institutions to channel 
funds to Africa. In addition to these bilateral connections, multilateral institutions, such as the 
China Africa Council which collaborates with the UN Development Program, provide additional 
mediums to enhance investments of privately owned Chinese companies in Cameroon, Ghana, 
Mozambique, Nigeria, South Africa and Tanzania (IRIN, 2006).  
Considered to be the first of its kind, a White Paper on foreign aid released by the Chinese 
government in 2011 is the first official record that provides a comprehensive account of China’s 
foreign aid policies. This white paper was composed to refute allegations of China’s resource 
exploitation. Accordingly, 40 percent of all Chinese foreign aid is classified as grants with the 
remaining 60 percent consisting of zero-interest or concessional loans (Provost, 2011). 
Nevertheless, whereas some reports include components of FDI either as financial aid flows, 
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Official Development Assistance (ODA) or Other Official Flows (OOF)10, others list them as 
part of aggregate FDI figures. For example, Chinese institutions might categorise different ODA 
instruments as FDI while Western institution might account ODA as official foreign aid instead 
or vice versa. The following section will address the issue on data inaccuracy in more depth.   
3.5.5.1. Classification of FDI, ODA and OOF 
As acknowledged in Section 3.5.5, caution must be taken when analysing quantitative data on 
Chinese FDI. Inconsistencies in FDI data published from different (country) sources provide the 
major constraint for this research study. Most of China’s development projects cannot 
exclusively be classified as ODA, OOF or FDI according to their definition but are a 
combination of multiple mediums. The limiting nature of available metadata and inconsistencies 
in data computation negatively impacts a compatible comparison of Chinese ODA, FDI or 
OOF (OECD, 2006: 62; Gelb, 2010). Eastern publications not only apply different sets of FDI 
definitions, but also utilise different accounting standards compared to reports complied in the 
Western hemisphere (Gelb, 2010). Furthermore, Sandrey cited in Hartzenberg, Erasmus and Du 
Pisani (2012: 2004) denote that statistics on FDI outflows and inflows do not match up, as 
required by the Balance of Payments accounting standard. The removal of capital controls which 
required FDI transactions to be recorded more frequently also contributes towards data 
inaccuracy (Kaplinsky and Morris, 2009: 5). Despite the heavy critique, Gelb (2010:6) credits 
MOFOMC (2010) data, which was heavily drawn upon in Chapters Three and Four, to be more 
reliable from 2003 onwards.  
Chinese foreign assistance might take the form of technical assistance, medical assistance, food 
relief, project support, debt cancellation, humanitarian assistance, overseas scholarships, military 
support, poverty alleviation projects or loans supporting joint ventures (Brautigam, 2011a: 760; 
Grimm, et al., 2011: 8). Additionally, zero-import tariffs and import duties exemptions for more 
than 180 products from African nations have been approved by the Chinese government since 
2005 (Zafar, 2007: 117). With regards to FDI investments, most Chinese funds are targeting 
large-scale infrastructure projects. Although Beijing perceives the Sino-African cooperation as a 
mutually beneficial investment relationship, construction projects aimed at visible landsite (sport 
stadiums or government buildings for example) do not entail poverty-reducing aspects. Table 
                                                          
10
 For a definition of FDI, refer back to Chapter One. According to the IMF (2003), Official Development 
Assistance (ODA) is defined as external funding provided by governmental agencies with the intension of 
promoting economic development and welfare. ODA instruments have a concessional grant attribute of at 
least 25 percent but exclude export credits. All other financial flows produced by the foreign sector that do not 
qualify as FDI or ODA are categorised as Other Official Flows (OOF). Such flows either finance projects that do 
not have clear developmental goals or grant attributes of less than 25 percent (IMF, 2003). 
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3.10 lists the number of completed Chinese funded projects in Africa in 2009. In numerical 
terms, Chinese aid to Africa between 2000 to 2009 rose tenfold (FOCAC, 2011). Furthermore, 
China promised to increase its assistance to more than double previous levels and to pledge an 
additional $5 billion towards the China-Africa Development Fund (UN Conference, 2011a: 3). 
Table 3.10: Number of completed Chinese projects in Africa by 2009 
 
        Schools Agricultural Industrial Hospitals Sports Conference Others Total 
 
Projects Projects 
 
Venues Centres 
          71 142 145 54 53 62 357 884 
 
Source: FOCAC (2011)  
In terms of cash aid, Beijing does not supply funds that directly supplement government budgets 
and unlike more sophisticated donor nations, Chinese funds are not channelled through a 
specific funding agency. Overseas consulates and embassies distribute the capital in host nations. 
(Brautigam, 2009). Most importantly, in contrast to Western lending approaches, China refrains 
from imposing rigorous economic, humanitarian or political conditions on its foreign finance 
packages. Historical foreign assistance policies from the West (carried out by the World Bank, 
IMF etc.) imposed structural adjustment programs which aimed to enhance growth and 
productivity by liberalising and opening African economies to global trade (Reed, 2001: 12). A 
new approach followed shortly after when international lending institutions tied financial 
assistance to the good governance. The good governance agenda imposed even more interfering 
stipulations on African recipient nations. By contrast, China’s non-interference foreign aid policy 
is argued by some to leave Africa even more vulnerable to future corruption, less transparency in 
commodity-revenues and the neglect of democratic and humanitarian reforms (Zafar, 2007: 106).  
The establishment of Special Economic Zones (SEZs) is another distinctive trade mark of 
China’s own successful development journey towards industrialisation. In an effort to increase its 
attractiveness to foreign investors, China created four SEZs offering preferential tax treatment 
and infrastructure systems in 1979 (Brautigam and Xiaoyang, 2011: 70-72). According to 
Brautigam (2011c), such zones help raise the quality of infrastructure, improve manufacturing 
sectors and overcome institutional challenges within a narrow geographical segment. Offering 
favourable conditions for Chinese investors, similar economic enclaves in Africa are now 
expected to boost export revenues and to create local jobs (Whitehead and Green, 2012). 
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Zones are created, run for profit and serviced by Chinese enterprises with the help of 
governmental subsidies. An open tender system awards the lowest bidding Chinese company the 
right to establish a SEZ at their suggested location. No uniform SEZ model is followed but 
instead, a multi-purpose system focusing on scientific entities, technology parks or 
manufacturing and processing facilities is implemented (Brautigam and Xiaoyang, 2011: 81-72). 
Currently, seven SEZs exist in Algeria, Egypt, Ethiopia, Mauritius, Nigeria (two zones) and 
Zambia. Five additional zones have been already planned for in the future. 
3.5.5.2. China’s Policy Banks   
90 percent of ODA, OOF and FDI funds are channelled through the MOFCOM (Grimm et al., 
2011: 8), making it the most important institution to handle overseas investments. The three 
state-owned policy-banks, namely Agricultural Bank, China Development Bank (CDB) and 
Eximbank (also referred to as Export-Import-Bank), plan and implement the majority of ODA 
and FDI activities (Brautigam 2009: 80). Offering buyer and seller credits in addition to 
concessional loans, Eximbank is regarded as the most influential institution in respect to Sino-
African relations. CDB operates on a domestic level but most recently also began to provide 
non-concessional loans to African nations as manager of the market-based China-Africa 
Development Fund. According to Grimm et al. (2011: 18), this fund supports Chinese 
entrepreneurs who wish to engage in African infrastructure or joint venture projects with 
managerial and financial advice. In 2007, an equivalent of $5 billion was pledged towards this 
equity fund by the Chinese government.  
3.5.5.3. Eximbank of China  
All concessional loans are supplied by the state-owned Eximbank of China. Accordingly, they do 
not qualify as foreign aid but rather as OOF and only partially as FDI transactions. Concessional 
loans are awarded to pursue large-scale infrastructure projects with motives ranging from 
symbolic diplomacy, profits or developmental objectives (Brautigam, 2011a: 755-756). Only 
creditworthy nations or projects that appear profitable in less credit-reputable countries will 
receive funding from Eximbank, regardless of whether or not natural resources are present in 
host countries. Despite being issued by the Eximbank, all concessional loans are subsidised by 
the Chinese Ministry of Commerce for the sole purpose of keeping interest rates competitively 
low. This implies that Eximbank-supplied export credits are much larger and more competitive 
than funds granted by traditional donors. Overall, 97 percent of all Eximbank loans to Africa are 
directed towards government infrastructure projects (Brautigam, 2009: 188).   
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Brautigam (2011a: 758) further notes that with Eximbank’s funding programs, “the finance stays 
in China”. Revenues attained from African resource exports are initially placed into a special 
account which is then used to reimburse the local sub-contracted African construction firms. 
This is indeed an untraditional approach which helps to reduce the embezzlement of funds by 
corrupt African host nations because cash does not exchange hands. Unfortunately, data on the 
transparency of Sino-Africa financing packages could not be located. More research is needed to 
validated the claim that China’s financial engagements in Africa actually do reduce corruption.   
According to China Eximbank’s mission statement, its  
“main mandate is to facilitate the export and import of Chinese mechanical and electronic 
products, complete sets of equipment and new-and high-tech products, assist Chinese companies 
with comparative advantages in their offshore contract projects and outbound investment, and 
promote Sino-foreign relationship and international economic and trade cooperation” (China 
Eximbank, 2012).  
A second instrument supplied by the Eximbank is export-buyer credits. These market interest 
rate loans are only granted to resource-rich African countries, using commodity exports (instead 
of resource concessions) as loan collateral (Brautigam, 2011b: 4). Loans are initially offered to 
Chinese companies which then sub-contract local African companies to complete infrastructure 
projects. In addition to financing infrastructure projects, Eximbank’s sponsored capital could 
also be used to finance the import of Chinese products by African import business. Brautigam 
(2009: 173) suggests classifying export credits as multilateral trade agreements rather than as 
foreign aid funds. Yet another financial tool provided by EximBank is export-seller credits. After 
carefully screening for profitability and riskiness, this selected line of export-seller credits is 
offered to African importers of Chinese goods and services.   
3.5.5.4. External Financing targeting Construction Projects   
Chinese construction firms are on the verge of outbidding lucrative African infrastructure 
project contracts from Western competitors (Chapter 4 discusses the crowding-out effects of 
Chinese OFDI in more detail). In return for building up infrastructure, African host nations are 
expected to provide unconditional political support to China. Construction contracts vary from 
establishing health care facilities, such as hospitals or clinics, to building dams, roads, stadiums, 
embassies or industrial buildings (Brautigam, 2011a: 753 and 2011b: 6). Chinese SOEs in the 
infrastructure sector are less risk-adverse and invest in lower-profit margin projects compared 
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with Western or Indian infrastructure contracts (Rui, 2010). This reduces the costs of 
infrastructure in favour of African host nations.   
Even though Chinese FDI is still very low in contrast to aggregate global Chinese FDI outflows 
(refer back to Section 3.4), Chinese-sponsored construction projects in Africa continue to receive 
a lot of media attention. Highly visible official buildings, such as stadiums or embassies, are 
interpreted as warning signs of how powerful and possibly dangerous China has become to the 
shaking Western world order. Beijing’s annual financial assistance to African infrastructure 
projects doubled from $1 billion in 2001 to 2003, to $2 billion during the years 2004 to 2005 
before spiking at almost $7 billion in 2007 (Oyeranti, Babatunde, Ogunkola and Bankole, 2010: 
50-51). A decrease of almost 50 percent to $4.5 billion was recorded in 2007. More than $3.5 
billion alone was allocated for the construction of hydro-power dams by 2006, while more than 
$4 billion benefitted Africa’s railway system. Oyeranti et al. (2010: 50-51) further note that close 
to $3 billion worth of telecommunication equipment was delivered to Ethiopia, Ghana and 
Sudan between 2001 to 2007.  
Generally, non-OECD members have funded the largest infrastructure projects in Africa. 
Infrastructure development in Africa is crucial to economic growth and the development of 
human capital, both of which have been neglected by traditional OECD aid or FDI funds. A 
UN Conference paper (2011d: 1) estimates that Africa’s deficient state of infrastructure 
decreases industrial production levels by over 40 percent. Ultimately, this results in much higher 
business costs. Mills (2010: 144) independently acknowledged that 20 percent (up to 50 percent 
in landlocked countries) of all foreign earnings in SSA dissipate as a result of transportation 
costs. Devonshire-Ellis (2010) indicates that amongst all countries in the world, the most land-
locked nations are situated in Africa, yet the infrastructure networks here are in particularly poor 
condition.  
Table 3.11: Infrastructure spending needs in Africa in 2011, in $ billion 
Source: UN Conference (2011c: 3)  
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Table 3.12: Current spending on Africa’s infrastructure 2011, in $ billion 
 
Source: UN Conference (2011c: 3)  
 
Contrary to what is often reported in popular media, Tables 3.11 and 3.12 present some evidence 
about the current spending profile on Africa’s infrastructure. 45 percent of all infrastructure 
expenditures are funded by African taxpayers and the public sector, 20 percent by private 
investors and only 13 percent by Official Development Assistance (ODA) or external funders 
(UN Conference, 2011c). In comparison with ODA funds allocated towards all infrastructure 
sectors (transport, electricity and water), funds provided by non-OECD states are mainly 
targeted at the energy and rail sector of resource-rich African nations (UN Conference 2011d: 1, 
2011c: 8). This could be an additional indicator that global as well as Chinese FDI to SSA is 
indeed motivated by the availability of natural resources. Traditional FDI investors generally 
neglected Africa’s infrastructure needs except for those in the industrial mining sector which 
received funding for the construction of roads, railways, stable power and labour supplies to 
operate efficiently (Hönke, 2009: 284). As evident in both tables, Africa’s current spending on 
infrastructure projects merely covers half of what is actually needed. External funding is still 
necessary to compensate for the shortage in infrastructure spending – maybe Chinese funding 
could provide an additional source of support in the future.    
3.5.5.5. Chinese FDI Produced by State-Owned versus Privately-Owned Enterprises    
In an attempt to secure extraction rights to oil, gas, precious metals and other commodities, the 
Chinese government encourages predominately state-owned companies to invest in the energy 
sectors of foreign countries (Alden, 2005; Brautigam, 2009; Zhao, 2011a; Zweig and Jianhai, 
2005). Instead of purchasing extraction rights in relevant countries, Chinese’s companies are 
buying equity shares (stakes) to secure ownership rights in heavily subsidised state-owned 
African entities (Alden, 2005: 149; Zafar, 2007: 124). China now holds partial ownership in 
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extractive-companies granting authority in the decision making process. As a result, commodities 
can be exported back to China at below international market rates.  
According to Morck, Yeung and Zhao (2008: 340), most Chinese OFDI flows are strategically 
distributed by government-influenced SOEs which hold a monopoly in their respective 
investment sector. Monopolies exist in the key industries of communications and electricity as 
well as natural resources and commodities. Rupia and Southall (2009: 176) note that by 2005, 
approximately 674 Chinese entities operated in Africa, mainly in the oil, natural resources, fish, 
timber, fabric and clothing products, construction, telecommunication and farming sectors. In 
2001, 12 of the 50 largest transnational companies from developing countries belonged to 
Chinese owners (Gammeltoft, 2008: 12). Chapter Four provides a more thorough analysis of 
China’s SOE entities and their specific FDI involvement in SSA. 
Estimates (MOFCOM, 2010) record that by the end of 2008, more than 1600 Chinese 
companies operated in Africa. Prior to 2003, privately owned Chinese companies were not 
allowed to participate in international investments. According to Chinese standards, private 
ownership refers to entities in which the state holds less than 50 percent ownership (Kaplinsky 
and Morris, 2009: 4). Currently, most investing Chinese companies remain state-owned 
enterprises. The small numbers of private Chinese companies allowed to invest abroad are 
heavily regulated by the Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China (MOFCOM) 
and the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC). Both entities only subsidise 
overseas investments directed towards specific countries or companies. Special preference is 
thereby given to overseas resource acquisition (Zhao, 2011a; Zweig and Jianhai, 2005: 26).  
Preferential tax treatment is granted by the Chinese government for approved investment 
regions or industries (Oyeranti et al., 2010: 22). However, unless private Chinese investors 
comply with certain strict regulations, they are not allowed to pursue overseas investments. With 
respect to Sino-African relations, MOFCOM resembles the most important Chinese institution 
as it approves all foreign investment packages, aid and loan agreements to Africa in agreement 
with China’s Eximbank (Zhao, 2011a).   
Rui and Yip (2008) acknowledge that Chinese SOEs pursue strategic long-term goals when 
investing in M&As. Institutional incentives are utilised to conduct OFDI with the overall aim of 
acquiring strategic assets, subsidising competitive disadvantages and strengthening firm-specific 
advantages (Rui and Yip, 2008: 214).  Even though the Chinese government imposes strict 
sector-specific FDI requirements on all outward-investing firms, state ownership can also imply 
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firm-specific advantages. Easier access to strategic resources, cheaper loans below market rates 
and political or economic advantages are some of the benefits derived from state-ownership 
(Wang, Hong, Kafouros and Boateng, 2012: 428). A further advantage of investing in Africa 
through Chinese SOEs is that such entities do not necessarily have to be profitable. As long as 
the firm’s objectives are in line with China’s overall long-term development strategy, namely to 
invest in reliable and cheap producers of raw materials, profits become of secondary importance 
(Zafar, 2007: 124).   
Despite continuous criticism, Brautigam (2011a, 2011b) urges the intellectual community to view 
China’s involvement in Africa as a conduit for economic development instead of considering it 
as a threat to the current world order. Even though she also acknowledges the lack of 
transparency in official Chinese figures, “a more realistic appraisal of China’s engagement in 
Africa - an appraisal that cuts through the many myths that circulate like viruses through 
cyberspace” should be made (Brautigam, 2011b: 1). China has been actively involved in 
providing development assistance to African nations since they reached independence in the 
1960s. Beijing’s engagement in Africa peaked in the 1970s when it surpassed the amount of US 
aid programmes targeting Africa (Brautigam, 2011b). This might have been forgotten in recent 
years and suggests that the current hype about Chinese development assistance is exaggerated.   
3.6. CONCLUSIONS  
Global FDI flows have still not recovered from the financial crisis in 2008. Despite a slow-down 
in aggregate flows, SSA succeeded in attracting growing inflows. After reviewing the most 
current FDI data, supporting evidence suggests that most Chinese OFDI to Africa is motivated 
by the hunt for natural resources or commodities. Sectoral MOFCOM (2010) data indicate that 
the Leasing and Business Service Sector in SSA attracted the largest amount of Chinese OFDI. 
Nevertheless, this data does not allow for any valid explanation.  
Throughout this chapter, multiple resources indicate that oil-producing and resource-rich SSA 
nations attract more FDI from both global and Chinese investors. The largest recipients in SSA 
have only marginally-diversified economies, with South Africa being the only exception. 
Comparative advantages are mainly found in commodities or natural resources, underscoring the 
fact that the availability of natural resources as well as agricultural products seems to be the 
dominant attractor for FDI flows to Africa. In the case of South Africa, strategic-asset seeking 
motives in its sophisticated financial services sector seem also relevant.  
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After reviewing the relevant literature, a number of multifaceted reasons other than just 
extractive motives appear to contribute towards China’s growing interest in Africa. Firstly, China 
is incorporating its very own experiences of receiving FDI and OFDI in its long-term African 
investment strategy. Complementing the traditional investment motives of horizontal, extractive 
and strategic-asset seeking, China also engages in FDI in search of profits, to dispose of 
accumulated household and corporate savings, as symbolic diplomacy and obviously to benefit 
from host countries’ commodities. Evidently, some of the most prevailing features of Chinese 
FDI can be derived from its highly restrictive domestic business environment. Institutional 
challenges are thereby encouraging Chinese companies to internalise those challenges. The 
resultant overseas relocation of Chinese firms yields some of the IFDIs to Africa. China’s FDI 
should therefore be regarded as a political tool combined with profit-seeking motives and most 
importantly, China’s quest for Africa’s resources.    
Due to flawed data and inconclusive definitions of what FDI, ODA or OOF entail, China’s 
current investment in Africa ought to be classified as a combination of those mediums of 
external assistance. China’s engagement in Africa could be viewed as a new, untraditional form 
of providing development assistance as its loan or aid packages do not require the 
implementation of free trade policies or attach any obvious conditionalities. Host countries’ 
compliance with democratic or humanitarian rights, especially in conflict-prone host countries, is 
also not a pre-requisite to qualify for Chinese development financing. Most of China’s FDI, 
ODA or OOF is targeting African infrastructure projects that are financed through concessional 
loans or resource-backed export credits.  
Chinese flows are of great importance to African countries, although China’s contribution to 
African FDI inflows are relatively small compared to global FDI flows to Africa. Source-
depending, China only produces between 3.5 and 5 percent of Africa’s FDI capital. Because 
most Western aid neglected the local infrastructure sector, the cost of doing business in Africa 
remains high. Despite the positive effects that Chinese OFDI flows bring along, numerous 
aspects of China’s going-global policy are accused of not meeting “Western standards”. Most 
importantly, criticism about the negligent screening process of host countries’ in comparison 
with rigorous stipulations of conditional loans offered by the IMF is on the rise (Zweig and 
Jianhai, 2005). A case-study approach in the next chapter seeks to investigate whether the 
benefits of Chinese-induced investment flows are indeed mutually benefits or whether African 
nations are entering into dependency-creating partnerships.  
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CHAPTER FOUR:  
EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND CASE STUDY ANALYSIS 
 
4.1. INTRODUCTION     
This chapter reviews the Top-Ten Sub-Saharan African recipient countries of Chinese OFDI on 
an individual basis. As established in Chapter Three, Chinese OFDI to SSA between 2004 to 
2010 was distributed highly unevenly by both country and sector. While information for Angola, 
the DRC or Zambia is readily accessible, other countries, namely Kenya, Niger or Madagascar 
only provide sparse data. Hence, the amount of information compiled in each section of this 
chapter varies dependent on data availability. Section 4.1 provides a general introduction to the 
chapter, followed by an individual analysis of resource-rich, oil-rich and agricultural-rich nations 
in Sections 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4 respectively. Table 3.7 presented in the previous chapter provides the 
principal source for the applied country classification based on resource, oil or agricultural 
potential.  
Table 3.8 (Reproduced): Top-Ten recipient nations of Chinese FDI in SSA between 2005 to 2010, 
in percent 
Rank Country 
% 2004-
2010 
Exports Oil Resources Main Three Export Products Main FDI Motives 
1 South Africa 49% 92 - x Platinum, gold, iron Resources + Finance Sector 
2 Nigeria 9.09% 1 x - Oil, natural gas Oil 
3 Zambia 5.23% 3 - x Copper, unrefined copper Resources 
4 DRC 5.05% 6 - x Copper, cobalt, cathodes Resources 
5 Niger 2.97% 1 - x Uranium, light oils Resources 
6 Sudan 2.88% 1 x - Oil Oil 
7 Ethiopia 1.56% 3 - - Coffee, Sesamum seeds, flowers Agricultural 
8 Kenya 1.40% 48 - - Tea, flowers, coffee Agricultural 
9 Madagascar 1.40% 32 - - Cotton products, vanilla, seafood Agricultural 
10 Angola 1.39% 1 x - Oil Oil 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s own table created with data extracted from MOFCOM (2010) and African Economic 
Outlook (2012) 
Note:  “Exports” is a measure of export diversification and simply indicates the number of products that 
account for over 75 percent of exports (African Economic Outlook, 2012). The higher the number of 
products, the more diversified is the country’s economy. Based on the “The Three Major Export  Products” 
identified in each nation, the “Main FDI Motives” were categorised by the author as either natural resources, 
oil, agricultural products or a combination thereof.    
 
 
Although Sino-African trade has increased significantly over the last decade (see Section 3.3), it 
appears to be highly concentrated since only a few selected countries benefit. Angola, Nigeria, 
South Africa and Sudan accounted for over three-quarter of all Sino-African trade in 2004 
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(Zafar, 2007: 115). Only commodity-rich export nations seem to be significant trading partners. 
On the other hand, textiles and processed food are less significant exports in the non-commodity 
area (Zafar, 2007: 115). This empirical data could support both the agricultural and resource 
motives behind China’s OFDI goals. As stated in Section 3.5.2, only 3.43 percent of aggregate 
FDI to Africa was produced by China. Table 4.1 below represents China’s FDI to Africa as share 
of recipient countries’ total FDI over the investment period 2005 to 2010, expressing Chinese 
FDI not from the viewpoint of China but from the relevant source country. In order to derive 
this data, Table A.7 was shown as percentage of Table A.4 (both listed in the Appendix). As 
evident by this table, albeit quite small from China’s perspective, Chinese investments to most 
recipient nations in SSA provide an important source of external capital.  
Table 4.1: Top-Ten SSA recipient nations of Chinese FDI in SSA between 2005 to 2010, in percent 
of aggregate global FDI  
Top-Ten SSA Recipients 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 % 2005-2010 
Angola 0.01% 0.01% 0.42% -0.06% 0.07% 1.02% 0.26% 
DRC 0.00% 14.34% 3.17% 1.39% 34.22% 8.04% 7.93% 
Ethiopia 1.86% 4.39% 5.98% 8.95% 33.55% 0.47% 11.95% 
Kenya 9.66% 0.36% 1.22% 24.30% 20.01% 76.08% 13.99% 
Madagascar 0.16% 0.40% 1.71% 5.23% 3.99% 3.90% 3.57% 
Niger 19.01% 15.71% 78.14% 0.00% 5.40% 0.40% 14.24% 
Nigeria 1.07% 1.39% 6.41% 1.97% 1.99% 3.03% 2.65% 
South Africa 0.71% 0.00% 7.98% 53.38% 0.78% 26.48% 20.92% 
Sudan 3.95% 1.44% 2.70% 0.00% 0.72% 1.94% 1.28% 
Zambia 2.83% 14.20% 9.01% 22.80% 16.09% 7.21% 12.43% 
TOTAL AFRICA 
      3.43% 
 
Source: Author’s own table created with data extracted from MOFCOM (2010) and African Economic 
Outlook (2012), refer to Table A.4 and A.7 (Appendix) for original data   
 
 
 
4.2. RESOURCE-RICH SUB-SAHARAN AFRICAN COUNTRIES  
Zhao (2011a) groups China’s official energy strategy into two categories, namely short to 
medium-term and medium to long-term objectives. Short to medium-term goals comprise the 
extraction of China’s own indigenous non-renewable resources11 as well as the extraction and 
production of foreign-owned non-renewable resources. Additionally, this includes the 
construction of new pipelines or other infrastructure mediums to transport resources back to 
China. Medium to long-term goals include the establishment of renewable energy sources12, the 
establishment of R&D facilities to create efficient and sustainable energy resources (both 
                                                          
11
 In this context, non-renewable resources refer to coal, oil, natural gas (Zhao 2011a).  
12
 In this context, renewable sources refer to hydropower, solar, wind or nuclear energy (Zhao 2011a).   
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renewable and non-renewable) and the reduction of negative environment-degrading effects of 
resource-extraction (Zhao, 2011a). Not only do oil and resources plays a crucial role in China’s 
current energy goals, but the need to secure both are also openly stated in China’s foreign aid 
policies. As postulated throughout this research study, China’s increasing demand for aluminium, 
copper, nickel, iron ore and oil for its manufacturing sector has guided its foreign policy goals 
towards securing global access to raw materials (Alessi and Hanson, 2012).  
According to Zhao’s (2011a) two categories stated above, Africa fits into China’s medium to 
long-term energy goal. Hence, China’s intentions to extract and produce foreign-owned 
resources is partially realised by financing African infrastructure projects or issuing commodity-
linked loans via the Eximbank. Mills (2010: 227) states that other observers consider China’s 
scramble for African resources to be a 50 to 100 years long-term investment strategy. Regardless 
whether Chinese goals are timed for 10, 50 or 100 years, Chinese investors certainly have secured 
large shares of Africa’s most precious commodity reserves. While this chapter explores the case 
of Africa’s Top-Ten Chinese OFDI recipients in more depth, the analysis conducted does not 
capture the entire picture due to the limited scope of this thesis.  
A conference paper released by the American National Intelligence Council (NIC, 2005: 1) 
predicts that amongst a few other resource-rich SSA nations which actively implemented 
regulative policies, South Africa will continue to attract large amounts of FDI. In general, SSA 
holds approximately 30 percent of all global minerals - the majority of which are still 
underexplored (Prichard 2009: 240). Most of SSA’s mining activities are in fact sponsored by 
FDI funds, implying that Greenfield Investments dominate all other entry-level modes of FDI in 
SSA. According to Zafar (2007: 109), China was the world’s biggest consumer of copper, coal, 
steel, cement and platinum in 2005 and became the largest global commodity user in 2010 (Mills 
2010: 347). In respective order, petroleum, iron ores as well as concentrates and other 
commodities constitute China’s first, third and tenth import commodities in 2009 (UN 
Comtrade, 2012).  
It comes as no surprise that from 2002 onwards, most of China’s commodity supplies have been 
exported from SSA. Mainly as a result of China’s increased demand for all kinds of commodities 
and especially base metals, resource-rich SSA nations have benefited from a global rise in 
commodity prices since 2002 until the height of the mining boom in 2008 (Prichard, 2009: 271). 
China hereby remains a primary commodity buyer rather than a producer. Until the onset of the 
global financial crisis in 2008, FDI in the SSA mining sector increased fourfold. An interesting 
feature of Chinese-induced mining FDI to SSA pertains to ownership. Excluding Zambia, most 
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of Sino-African mining deals are mainly entered through long-term buying rights instead of 
purchasing majority stakes in African mining companies (Prichard 2009: 250-255). This conflicts 
previous observations made by Alden (2005) and Zafar (2007) who postulate that Chinese 
companies purchase equity stakes in mining companies. Nevertheless, all three sources agree in 
the case of Zambia where China has been actively controlling all major mines through the 
acquisition of ownership stakes (Alden, 2005; Prichard, 2009; Zafar, 2007). See Section 4.2.2 for 
more details.   
Mineral extraction in SSA is not just a contemporary activity though. During Colonial times, 
Europeans actively exploited Sub-Saharan Africa’s vast mineral resources. Vernon (1971) notes 
that foreign investment capital represents a crucial ingredient in global mining operations. This 
claim is strengthened by observations of the World Investment Report 2007 (UNCTAD, 2007) 
which reports that developing countries’ extractive industries captured half of total global OFDI 
flows. A positive by-product of traditional FDI flows targeting Africa is the establishment of 
infrastructure. Construction of railways and roads assured that minerals could be transported 
back to the European mainland more efficiently and cost effectively. Zambia, the DRC and 
Ghana are prime examples of European exploitation. The post-colonial period witnessed the 
nationalisation of many mining and oil companies as well as the implementation of stricter 
labour, tax and profit repatriation laws by local African governments (Prichard, 2009: 241). 
Because most state-owned operations failed and pressure applied from the World Bank or the 
IMF, many SSA governments introduced liberalisation reforms between 1985 to 2000 in an 
attempt to decrease the role of the state’s involvement in the mining business. Ascending FDI 
inflows followed as a result of liberalisations efforts.   
Recent years witnessed the rise of Chinese and other investors from emerging countries. The 
bargaining power of resource-rich SSA nations was significantly boosted as the competition from 
bidding Western and Eastern companies now amplified the available choices in host countries. 
Nevertheless, neglect of labour laws, environmental standards, worker’s safety and the spread of 
corruption are valid disadvantages derived from some developing source country investors- these 
aspects will be further explored in Section 4.6 of this chapter.    
4.2.1. South Africa 
South Africa’s investment pattern offers a unique case study compared to all other SSA nations. 
On one hand, South Africa is by far the largest recipient of Chinese OFDI, securing almost half 
(49 percent) of all incoming flows (MOFCOM, 2010). Considering the second ranked country 
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Nigeria only captured 9 percent of Chinese OFDI, South Africa should be treated as an outlier 
which portrays different determinants and characteristics than other SSA nations. Interestingly, 
South Africa also produces a large amount of OFDI destined to African nation. Although South 
Africa’s intra-regional African OFDI does seem to predominantly target natural resource-related 
industries, more diverse investments in basic utilities, telecommunications and retail sectors also 
appear substantial (Daniel and Bhengu, 2009: 141; Southall and Comninos, 2009: 366). Over the 
investment period 2005 to 2010, Chinese flows to South Africa resemble roughly one fifth of 
aggregate global flows (refer to Table 4.1).   
Prichard (2008) identifies the transfer of historical linkages, technical and managerial knowledge 
as well as the political and financial support South Africa extends to other SSA nations as key 
areas of regional collaboration. South Africa is classified as both an investor as well as a recipient 
of mining FDI. Prichard (2009: 259) states that “South Africa acts as a regional platform for 
mining activities. All of the major mining firms have established offices in Johannesburg, viewing 
South Africa as a hub from which to conduct business in the rest of Africa”. Two of South 
Africa’s largest mining companies, namely AngloGold Ashanti and Randgold and Exploration, 
actively participate in FDI-induced mining contracts in and Burkina Faso, Ghana, Guinea, Ivory 
Coast, Mali, Namibia, Senegal and Tanzania, (Southall and Comninos, 2009: 370).                                           
South Africa exhibits the largest and most diversified economy of all nations in SSA with 92 
different products earning at least 75 percent of export revenues (see Table A.8 in Appendix). 
Platinum, iron ores, coal, ferroalloys, gold, diamonds and petroleum oils constitute the most 
significant export minerals (UN Comtrade, 2012). South Africa is also a supplier of agribusiness, 
wine, automotive industry, harbour wharfs docking facilities, coal to liquids technology and 
chemicals. Gelb (2010: 1) notes that by 2009, China overtook Germany to become South 
Africa’s largest trading partner. His paper is considered the most detailed and accurate empirical 
account of China’s FDI to South Africa. As addressed in Section 3.5.5.1, Gelb (2010) strongly 
criticises the accuracy of Sino-South African investment data. Accordingly, Chinese FDI stock in 
South Africa in 2007 is estimated to be inflated tenfold compared to official South African 
figures (Gelb, 2010: 6).  
By the end of 2007, only 47 Chinese entities operated in South Africa. This number appears 
quite small considering that in total, more than 2000 foreign companies were said to operate in 
South Africa. As reported in other SSA nations, Greenfield Investments comprise of the 
preferred market-entry method (Gelb, 2010: 20). So far, China’s largest surge of FDI to South 
Africa targeted the financial institution Standard Bank in late 2007 with China’s state-owned 
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Industrial and Commercial Bank of China acquiring 20 percent ownership rights for $5.6 billion 
(Brautigam, 2009: 279). This underscores the fact that China does not exclusively focus on 
investments in the mining sector, but also targets strategic asset-seeking motives (see Sections 
2.3.4 and 3.5.4.3) in South Africa’s sophisticated banking sector which offers strong institutional 
advantages to Chinese investors (Cattaneo, 2011: 6-7; Gelb, 2010: 14). In response to the 
extensive amount of inflowing capital following the acquisition deal, Chinese FDI flows to South 
Africa appear heavily inflated in 2008. According to the authors own calculation performed with 
MOFCOM (2010) data, in 2008, China’s acquisition of shares in Standard Bank accounted for 83 
percent of its aggregate OFDI flows to South Africa between 2004-2010. Hence, as mentioned 
previously, the year 2008 should be considered as a data outlier.  
Sandrey cited in Hartzenberg, Erasmus and Du Pisanie (2012) acknowledges that in respective 
order, the mining, manufacturing and financial sectors have attracted significant Chinese inflows 
since 2008 (2012: 190-193). Gelb (2010: 14) affirms China’s multifaceted investment motives in 
South Africa. Accordingly, Chinese investments in the infrastructure, construction, mining, 
automobile, electrical machinery and financial service sectors evidently played a crucial role from 
the mid 2000s. Nevertheless, mining inflows are relatively small, suggesting that Chinese 
investment motives in South Africa are well diversified. In addition to stable mining inflows 
motivated by resource-extractive reasons, Chinese growing investments to South Africa’s 
automotive sector seem to be driven my market-seeking motives, while inflows in the financial 
sector are driven by strategic-asset seeking motives. In conclusion, the empirical evidence above 
indicates that South Africa portrays a well diversified economy capable of attracting a wide range 
of differently motivated FDI.    
4.2.2. Zambia 
Zambia has been the showcase for China’s ideologically-driven foreign policies since the 1970s 
when construction on the great railway project Tam-Zam connecting Tanzania and Zambia 
officially began. Over 25,000 imported Chinese labourers helped with the project (Michel and 
Beuret, 2009: 234). However, until the last decade, China’s engagement in Zambia remained 
fairly insignificant after the completion of the railway in 1976. According to the MOFCOM 
(2010) publication, Zambia received the third largest share (5.23 percent) of Chinese FDI during 
the period 2004-2010. With respect to global flows, China produced about 12.5 percent of 
Zambia’s aggregate FDI inflows (refer to Table 4.1). This implies that China is of average 
significance to the Zambian economy with respect to foreign direct investments.   
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Zambia’s Copperbelt which used to be a British dominated enclave for copper extraction has 
now been taken over by China, mainly during the mining boom between 2004 to 2008. 
Chambezi copper mine was bought in 1999 and is now fully managed under China’s authority. 
Copper production in 2009 reached three times the levels of 1994 (Mills, 2010: 369). Hönke 
(2009: 281) states that China’s recent engagement in Zambia is the product of two historic 
trends, namely the nationalisation of the mining business after Zambia gained independence in 
1960 and the later deterioration of mining activities due to the copper crisis in the mid 1970s. In 
order to satisfy its copper demand, which by 2005 was the largest global demand for copper, 
China allocated close to $170 million towards Zambia's mining sector (IRIN, 2006). Copper 
products alone account for Zambia’s top five export products (UN Comtrade, 2012).  
As revealed in Table 3.8, Zambia failed to diversify its economy and relies almost exclusively on 
copper exports to earn foreign exchange. Zambia flourished in the early 1970s but its economy 
crashed during the global copper crisis and the resultant price collapse in the 1980s. 
Liberalisation programs imposed by the World Bank in the late 1990s which aimed at privatising 
Zambia’s mining sector also failed (Reed, 2001: 140). As a result, Zambia’s economy collapsed 
and caused immense losses - making it one of the poorest and most heavily indebted country in 
the world by that time (Brautigam, 2009: 27). So far, Zambia remains the only SSA country 
where China actively sought ownership control in mining activities. Prichard (2009: 255) argues 
that China’s heavy investment in Zambia’s Copperbelt was triggered by the volatile price increase 
in copper after 2005. Spikes in Zambia’s IFDI flows were observed from 2004 onwards (Hönke, 
2009: 282). Even though many global foreign investors pulled out of Zambia’s copper mines 
after a windfall tax13 was imposed by the Zambian government, the Chinese did not (Mills, 2010: 
224). In addition to running three other copper mines in Zambia, China now entirely controls 
the Chambishi copper mine which had been closed down for over ten years. Beijing further 
pledged to pump more than $900 million into Zambia’s copper industry (BBC 2011; Prichard 
2009: 255). It is estimated that by the end of 2005, over 160 Chinese firms had invested in 
Zambia (Brautigam, 2009: 4).  
In an additional attempt to secure Chinese mining rights in Zambia, the establishment of a 
Special Economic Zone (SEZ) and large debt cancellations were agreed upon. The Zambian 
SEZ was established around the Chambishi mine and received major capital inflows from 
                                                          
13
 A windfall tax refers to a special tax imposed by the Zambian government on mining revenues. If copper 
prices rose above the threshold of $3 per pound, an additional 25 percent would be charged to extracting 
companies. Although the Zambian government hoped to reap a direct benefit from rising copper prices, many 
mines became economically unviable and eventually closed down as investors pulled out of the country (Mills 
2010: 369). The windfall tax was abolished in 2009 out of fear of losing more foreign investors.  
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China’s Nonferrous Metals Company (CNMC) (Hönke, 2009: 282). In theory, it was envisaged 
that this project would attract 150 Chinese companies, create 6,000 Zambian jobs and secure 
roughly $800 million of FDI (Michel and Beuret, 2009: 234). CNMC intended to sponsor a 
number of firms to engage in the mining, processing, recycling, machinery and service segments 
of the copper and cobalt industry (Brautigam, 2009: 101). Present developments show a different 
reality, since only 11 companies had invested in the zone by the end of 2009. The Chinese SOE 
CNMC is particularly involved in this zone to extract copper from the mine and critics claim that 
the zone was created to protect CNMC profits which qualify for preferred tax rates.   
Opposing inadequate working and safety conditions, Anti-Chinese sentiment in Zambia has 
grown remarkably (see section 4.5.1.4). The opposition candidate, Michael Sata, used xenophobic 
tactics as a tool to secure votes in the presidential elections of 2006 by claiming that Chinese FDI 
is exploitative rather than beneficial to the Zambian population (Brautigam, 2009: 6). Despite the 
population’s growing distrust of its Chinese counterparts, Zambia’s government continues to 
strongly support and encourage Chinese investment as it recognises the country’s dependence on 
FDI. While beneficial in times of high global copper demand, it has long been argued that 
Zambia’s economy has to diversify away from its reliance on copper revenues. In order to 
achieve long-term prosperity, focusing on agricultural products might be an alternative to the 
copper trap (Reed, 2001: 79). Although the country is not a leading agricultural producer, 
Chinese FDI to Zambia has recently been labelled as agriculturally-motivated investment. 
Section 4.4 evaluates Zambia’s agricultural attractiveness to Chinese investors in more detail to 
determine the validity of these claims.    
4.2.3. The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)  
The DRC also heavily relies on revenues generated through the export of minerals, mostly found 
in the Katanga Province. During Colonial times, the country was a safe haven for Belgian 
investors to expropriate the country’s vast supplies of cobalt, copper and more recently also 
uranium. According to Table 3.7, three of the major products that generate more than 75 percent 
of the DRC’s export revenues are minerals. Despite being classified as a “failed state” with 
regards to corruption, poverty, absence of humanitarian rights, lack of good governance and the 
ongoing violent conflict in the east, the DRC has become one of the most lucrative FDI 
destinations in SSA since 2006 (Reyntjens, 2007). A limited set of legal rights were then granted 
to multinational mining entities which improved investors’ confidence in the country (Hönke, 
2009: 281-84). A report conducted in 2010 estimates that the world’s largest untapped mineral 
reserves of cobalt as well as rich diamond and copper supplies worth $24 trillion are found in the 
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DRC (Kuepper, 2010). Between 2004 to 2010, China allocated approximately 5 percent, or 
$598.32 million, of its aggregate African OFDI to the DRC. From a global perspective, China 
contributed almost 8 percent of the DRC’s global share of FDI inflows.      
Chinese FDI in the DRC’s vast copper and cobalt mines included a record infrastructure deal 
worth $5 billion (IRIN, 2006; Prichard, 2009: 256). Other sources estimate the value of 
infrastructure and mining contracts to be as high as $9 billion (Daniel and Bhengu, 2009: 161). 
This implies a six fold increase from the DRC’s previous domestic infrastructure budget. 
According to Daniel and Bhengu (2009: 161), repayment was negotiated in exchange for mineral 
exports. As thoroughly discussed in Chapter Three, this entails the funding of Chinese-approved 
infrastructure projects in the DRC and not the actual lending of money. In quantitative terms, 
this implies that the huge $9 billion loan was supposed to be repaid with 13 million tons of 
copper (Mills, 2010: 227).  
Similar to other Sino-African construction projects, China’s Eximbank also agreed to fund public 
streets, two airports and numerous hospitals and clinics. The SOE China Railway Engineering 
Company agreed to renovate the DRC’s railways while Sinohydro, another Chinese government-
owned company, offered to build two electricity distribution channels. In return, the DRC is 
obliged to repay these infrastructure investments with copper and cobalt commodities extracted 
by the national Congolese mining firms Gecamines and the privately-owned Socomin entity 
(Hönke, 2009: 289-292; Prichard, 2009: 256). Such infrastructure-for-resources contracts fit 
perfectly into the FDI model discussed in Chapter Three.  
4.2.4. Niger 
Niger falls into the resource-rich category of non-diversified SSA economies that generally rely 
on their major commodities to generate export income. Uranium and light oil products obtain 
the most export revenues in Niger. Out of both, uranium is of greater significance (see Table 3.8 
and WTO, 2012). Securing almost 3 percent, or $ 352.17 million, of China’s OFDI flowing to 
SSA, it is ranked as one of the top five nations amongst investigated countries over the 
investment period 2004 to 2010.  In terms of Chinese FDI as share of Niger’s total FDI inflows, 
calculations derived that Beijing produced a fairly significant share of 14.24 percent (refer to 
Table 4.1). Although livestock and cotton products are exported in small volumes, only oil and 
uranium count as significant export commodities (UN, Comtrade 2012). According to WTO 
(2012), fuel and mining products accounted for 54.5 percent of Niger’s exports. Agricultural 
products only contributed 11.6 percent towards the country’s aggregate exports. This suggests an 
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unsustainable economic development path, especially because Niger’s economy remains 
dominated by small scale agricultural activities (World Bank 2012b).  
China was Niger’s second largest trading partner in 2011 (WTO, 2012). No sector-specific 
investment data could be located. The WTO (2009) notes that Niger established at set of special 
tax framework aiming to increase foreign inflows in the agriculture, energy, housing, services, 
transportation and education sectors. FDI to the mining sector is strictly governed by the Mining 
Code and diversifications in the mining industry are envisioned. It was projected for oil 
extraction to commence from 2010 onwards (WTO, 2009). 
Although this section briefly reviewed the country’s trading profile, the lack of empirical data 
prevents a discussion on its FDI potential. Based on Niger’s trading profile, the country is 
classified as a resource-rich country. A priori assumptions suggest that the country’s inflowing 
FDI targets the mining- and oil-extractive industry. However, no empirical data could be found 
to substantiate this claim.  
4.3. OIL-RICH SUB-SAHARAN AFRICAN COUNTRIES  
Inter-nation struggles to secure access to precious oil reserves seem ironically artificial when 
official data from oil producers is accessed. A report compiled by one of the largest global energy 
and gas multinationals BP (BP, 2012: 1) states that  
“our world is not structurally short of hydrocarbon resources – as our data on reserves confirms 
year after year – but long lead times and various forms of access constraints in some regions 
continue to create challenges for the ability of supply to meet demand growth at reasonable 
prices”.   
The fact that China has entered the global scramble for Africa’s precious “black gold” is now 
widely accepted. As this chapter unfolds, both quantitative and empirical evidence is able to 
substantiate China’s oil-hungry interests in SSA nations. However, extracting resources from 
developing countries does not necessarily imply an exploitative relationship between host and 
home countries. Zhao (2011a) stresses that China’s strategic energy policies can benefit 
developing countries by improving market shares, enhancing industrialisation processes and 
supplying financial capital (for example via FDI). In theory, the possibility to create mutually 
beneficial Sino-African investments agreements therefore arises.  
With a global consumption of 33 percent, oil remains the world’s most important source to 
generate energy (BP, 2012: 2). Throughout its own successful industrialisation process, Beijing’s 
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energy needs were mostly fulfilled by coal products. Constrained by environmental, financial and 
sustainability factors, China eventually began to modify its energy sources (Zafar, 2007: 118). 
Although coal remains a vital method of energy generation, China recently became the world’s 
second largest oil consumer after the USA (Mills, 2010: 347). In 1993, China transitioned from a 
net oil-exporter to a net oil-importer and is now predicted to emerge as the world’s largest oil 
consumer by 2020 (IEA, 2011). According to the Statistical Review of World Energy June 2012 
(BP, 2012: 2), China’s current energy consumption alone contributed 71 percent towards total 
aggregate global consumption growth. Further estimates project Chinese oil imports in 2020 to 
equal the size of Africa’s production capacity and double the amount of Saudi Arabia’s 
production capacity (Michel and Beuret, 2009: 175).  
Nonetheless, as argued in Chapter Three, the quest for tapping into precious African oil 
resources which were traditionally accessed by the Western powers is also partially undertaken 
for strategic foreign policy objectives. Just like Sino-African infrastructure-for-resources deals, oil 
exports are exchanged for project funding. In return for cheap and reliable oil supplies not 
subject to market price or exchange rate fluctuations, China provides competitive loans to fund 
public infrastructure projects. In this way, neither rising inflation nor soaring oil prices will affect 
any Sino-African oil arrangements- a very clever and well-implemented strategy indeed!   
China’s most influential state-owned oil entities, China National Offshore Oil Corporation 
(CNOOC), China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) and China Petroleum & Chemical 
Corporation (SINOPEC), have expanded their presence all over SSA (Doriye, 2010: 26; Zhao, 
2011a). Table 4.2 below illustrates the respective African territorial investments of China’s three 
dominant oil companies. Accordingly, some of the top Sub-Saharan African receivers of Chinese 
OFDI (as indentified in Chapter Three), namely Angola and Nigeria, profit from China’s most 
powerful government-owned oil entities.  
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Table 4.2: China’s main national oil companies  
 
 
Source: Zhao (2011a) 
Due to robust petrol demand, estimates foresee that Sub-Saharan Africa’s oil producers will reap 
the benefits of steady export revenues for at least another decade. The National Intelligence 
Council (NIC, 2005) recognised that by 2005, China had already secured over 25 percent of its 
aggregate oil demand from African suppliers. Although African oil reserves only generate about 
10 percent of aggregate global output, they satisfy more than one third of China’s current oil 
demand while exporting 15 percent of its supply to America (Michel and Beuret, 2009: 178; 
Zhao, 2011c). Other estimates approximate that China only imports 13 percent of its total oil 
requirements from Africa (IPG, 2011). Whatever the case, Africa’s “black gold” appears 
especially precious because of its underutilisation and the ample amount of untapped reserves. 
Table 4.3 below summarises the most important Sino-African petrol contracts of 2009. Three 
out of the five countries in the table are amongst the Top-Ten recipient nations of Chinese FDI 
to SSA. While Angola and Sudan have been vital suppliers of Chinese oil for years, Beijing’s 
interest in Nigeria recently increased.  
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Table 4.3: China’s main oil suppliers in SSA 
  
Source: Zhao (2011b) 
Interestingly, China’s state-owned oil companies act more like independent privately-owned 
firms according to their profit-seeking behaviour and high degree of autonomy in spite of 
governmental stipulations (Gill and Reilly, 2007; Zhao, 2011a). China’s SOEs in the oil sector 
seem to indeed pursue conflicting goals (Zhao, 2011b). Firstly, as an official arm of the 
government, they ought to fulfil interests that are consistent with China’s official energy strategy. 
In respect of the African content, this implies the extraction and production of resources (refer 
back to Section 4.1). Yet, in addition to complying with state-imposed requirements, Chinese oil 
firms also compete amongst each other in search of expanding market sizes and higher profits. 
This competitive rivalry should theoretically clash with the communistic ideologies inherent in 
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the Chinese government. Popular media reports generally neglect to mention the commercial 
aspects of Chinese SOEs but rather perceive them as puppets of the state.  
Nigeria, Sudan and Angola are all amongst the top receivers of Chinese OFDI to SSA. Ranked in 
descending order, they secured 9, 2.9 and 1.4 percent of Chinese investment (MOFCOM, 2010). 
When synthesising this data with Sub-Saharan Africa’s largest receivers of Chinese financial 
assistance consisting of Official Development Assistance (ODA) and Other Official Flows 
(OOF), the same countries appear in a slightly different order. Accordingly, Sudan received $15 
billion, Nigeria $11 billion and Angola $8 billion of Chinese financial assistance (Michel and 
Beuret, 2009: 176). As noted in Chapter Three, ODA differs from FDI with regards to 
ownership rights. Compared to FDI, ODA funding must be extended with a minimal grant 
element of at least 25 percent that pertains to an overall poverty reducing goal (IMF, 2003). Case 
studies of Angola, Niger, Nigeria and Sudan, all of which seem to attract Chinese OFDI for their 
oil availability based on a priori assumptions, follow in the next section.      
4.3.1. Angola 
Angola was China’s top oil supplier in 2005 and the second largest producer in Africa overall 
(Zafar, 2007: 119; Zhao, 2011b). By 2010, Angola successfully surpassed Saudi Arabia as the 
largest oil-supplying nation to China (Doriye, 2010: 26) Similar to China’s engagement in Sudan, 
investments in Angola’s oil industries commenced when Western firms discontinued their 
assistance to Angola because it refused to accept Western aid conditionalities (Obi, 2009: 201). 
According to Zhao (2011b), Angolan oil revenues in 2009 contributed 85 percent towards the 
country’s GDP, generated 95 percent of aggregate export revenues and accumulated 85 percent 
of total government revenues.  
These numbers endorse the findings of Table A.8 (see Appendix) which identify Angola as an 
undiversified economy with only one product, namely petroleum oil, securing over 75 percent of 
all export revenues. Although ranked last out of Sub-Saharan-Africa’s top ten recipients of 
Chinese OFDI (see Table 3.8), Angola presents a compelling showcase for China’s 
unconventional practises. As previously mentioned, tying FDI not only to financial assistance 
but also to profit-seeking and diplomatic strategies is an unusual method of extending foreign 
assistance.  The successful implementation of China’s finance packages in Angola is also referred 
to as the “Angolan Model” and provides a reliable model for numerous other Sino-African 
investment deals.   
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Africa’s aggregate oil reserves are grouped into 76 “blocks”, yet currently, only 35 are utilised for 
oil extractive-activities. The majority of Angola’s oil reserves are located in Blocks14 1 to 35 
(Zhao, 2011b). Although Sinopec bought two Angolan oil blocks via a $2 billion-backed 
infrastructure soft loan, Westerns multinational oil entities actually still dominate Angola’s oil 
industry (Obi, 2009: 192; Zhao, 2011a and 2011b). Despite this dominance, China’s investment 
flows to Angola appear to have increased.  
In line with other Sino-African FDI projects, Chinese companies and the SOE Sinopec entered 
into deals with Angola’s government-owned oil company Sonangol Group. In 2004, a joint 
venture called Sonangol Sinopec International Ltd was founded as a Sino-Angolan entity. 
According to Zhao (2011b), Sonangol acquired a 50 percent ownership stake in oil Block 18 for 
$2.46 billion in 2010 and further purchased a 20 percent ownership stake in oil Block 32 from an 
American oil company for $1.3 billion. Zhao (2011b) acknowledges that between 2004 and 2007, 
China issued three major financial packages through its Eximbank. Angola received a $2, $1 and 
$2.5 billion credit lines in 2004, 2005 and 2007 respectively, while granting Sinopec the rights to 
drill for oil. Additionally, another multibillion-dollar agreement in 2005 regulated the export of 
Angolan oil to China. In return, China extended a $2 billion loan to Angola (Zhao, 2011b).  
Similar to other Sino-African projects, investments in Angola’s infrastructure system, particular 
its railways, are necessary to create a reliable and cheap transportation mechanism for the 
transport of mineral resources back to China (Kaplinsky and Morris, 2009: 14). Aggregate 
foreign Chinese assistance to Angola is estimated to be worth $8 billion. Funds targeting the 
reconstruction of Angola’s war-torn infrastructure system are valued at approximately $6 billion 
(Michel and Beuret, 2009: 161, 213).  
However, considering Chinese OFDI to Angola from 2004 to 2010 was only valued at $164.08 
million, and respectively ranked as the lowest recipient of SSA’s Top-Ten receivers, these figures 
seem suspicious (refer back to Table A.7). Further calculations reveal that based on global FDI 
inflows, China only produced 0.26 percent of Angola’s aggregate FDI shares during the period 
2005 to 2010 (refer to Table 4.1). These numbers significantly contradict the valuations of 
Chinese investments in Angola’s infrastructure sector! One possible explanation for the large 
data divergence could be the fact Sino-Angolan infrastructure packages are not accounted for as 
official FDI transactions but are rather “hidden” in other transactions, such as ODA or OOF.  
 
                                                          
14
 The major foreign stake holders in Angola’s oil sector are listed in Tables A.9, A.10 and A.11 (see Appendix).     
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4.3.2. Sudan 
Sudan15 is ranked as sixth largest recipient of Chinese OFDI in SSA, securing roughly 3 percent, 
or $341.14 million of Chinese funding to SSA from 2004 to 2010 (see Table 3.8). According to 
the author’s own calculations, this implies a marginally low allocation rate of Chinese OFDI in 
comparison with aggregate global flows to Sudan. China only contributed 1.28 percent of 
aggregate FDI inflows over the investment period of 2005 to 2010 (see Table 4.1) – questions 
about the potential benefits arising from Chinese-induced funds must be asked therefore. As 
Africa’s third largest oil producer, it is estimated that Sudan generates roughly 7 percent of 
China’s aggregate oil imports (Michel and Beuret, 2009: 192). Sudan resembles a perfect example 
of China’s diplomatic going-global policies which allow foreign investments to any host 
countries regardless of (ongoing) civil wars or the lack of good governance, humanitarian and 
democratic rights.  
According to China Daily (2010), Sudan’s greatest investment potential is found in its mining, 
petroleum, energy and agricultural sector. Additionally, sugar, groundnuts, sesame and cotton are 
identified as strong key export products, highlighting Sudan’s possible agricultural potential 
secondary to its vast oil resources. Maglad (2008: 11) points out that in 2007, 72 percent of 
Chinese OFDI was targeting Sudan’s mining sector, followed by the manufacturing sector 
(electrical appliances, electronics and computer assembly) at 24 percent. Only 2 percent of 
Chinese OFDI was oriented towards the agricultural sector (Maglad, 2008: 11). Surprisingly, all 
foreign investment funds other than the export-oriented mining sector generate local revenues. 
This suggests that China refrains from investing into the export-oriented segments of the 
Sudanese economies, with the exception of oil.   
The ongoing civil war between the central government and rebels, partly about disputes for 
ownership rights of precious raw materials, resulted in the withdrawal of the major Western oil 
companies Chevron, Concorp, Arakis, Taslismand and Lundin from Sudan after 1992 (Patey, 
2006). This enabled Chinese entities to eventually establish their presence in the Sudanese oil 
business. A 40 percent ownership stake in the largest Sudanese oil company, Greater Nile 
Petroleum Corporation, was acquired by Chinese investors and oil exports to China commenced 
in 2009. Obi (2009: 192) reports that Sudan exports between 50 to 60 percent of its aggregate 
petrol production to China. Currently, Sudan ranks as China’s third largest African trading 
partner (China Daily, 2010).  
                                                          
15
 In 2011, the former Sudan was split in two separate nations, North Sudan and South Sudan. As all empirical 
data reviewed in this section precedes the country’s division, it includes Sudan’s aggregate figures.  
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IRIN (2006) indicates that China pumped more than $8 billion into a Sino-Sudanese joint 
venture contract which, apart from other oil related projects, entailed the construction of a 
pipeline to the Red Sea as well as building a tanker facility at Port Sudan. The $2 billion heavy 
Merowe Dam is another key Chinese-sponsored infrastructure project. Different sources 
estimate the value of China’s FDI investments in Sudan as reaching almost $15 billion. In 
addition to oil investments, the Sudanese textile and fishing industries were also targeted by 
Chinese investors (Michel and Beuret, 2009: 149). Similar to Sino-Angolan oil-for-infrastructure-
deals, roads, bridges, hydro-electric dams, power facilities, hospitals, educational institutions as 
well as agricultural projects, such as irrigation and farming facilities, all attracted foreign Chinese 
funding (China Daily, 2010). In line with Angola’s case, Chinese financial assistance helped to 
rebuild Sudanese war-torn infrastructure.     
In summary, it can be concluded that China’s interest in Sudan is mainly motivated by the 
availability of oil. However, according to Table 4.4 following below, investments in other 
segments of the economy were also of relevance. Rui (2010) notes that during the years of 
China’s financial assistance, Sudan managed to implement favourable labour laws, sometimes 
requiring Chinese contractors to hire and train up to 95 percent of labour from Sudan’s local 
work force. Additional positive spillovers of Chinese engagement in Sudan include adequate 
worker’s compensation, the expansion or improvement of Sudan’s infrastructure systems and the 
Sudanese government’s effort to diversify investments away from resources.  
For the first time, China has also refrained from its non-interference policy in Africa by taking an 
active role in assisting Sudan with peace talks and actively participating in peace missions 
(Maglad, 2008: 3). This symbolises China’s willingness to accept and positively react to Western 
criticism. In a way, this could also indicate a new direction in China’s foreign policy.  
Table 4.4: Chinese FDI in Sudan’s non oil-related industries 
Year Projects 
(employees) 
Amount 
(US$)  Industries 
2000 5 38,440,451 Petrochemical service station, Roads and 
Bridges (2), Computer Assembly, Bricks 
2001 1 200,000 Leather products  
2002 2 1,531,800 Furniture, plastic products 
2003 3 12,071,850 Leather products, furniture, lighting bulb 
 
2004 
 
8 (414) 
 
10,889,933 
Plastic products (2), leather products, garment, 
food (2), oxygen supply, building material 
manufacture (2) 
 
2005 
 
12 (828) 
 
46,376,952 
Steel Manufacture, building material manufacture 
(2), plastic products (2), poultry and vegetables, 
earth moving, restaurant, roads and bridges (3), 
construction equipment 
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2006 
 
17 (1141) 
 
97,178,745 
Transportation (3), advertisement, soil analysis, 
construction (2), irrigation, plastic products (3), 
construction equipment, 
medical equipment, mining, computer equipment, 
furniture, car component manufacturing and 
engineering 
 
2007 
 
22 (1615) 
 
33,574,420 
Car service (4), constructions(2), transportation, 
hotel, media and advertisement, farms (2), 
poultry products, engineering workshop (2), 
steel, plastic products (3), mining (2), cement, 
garment 
 
Mar-08 
 
4 (386) 
 
8,530,039 
irrigation, agricultural products, miscellaneous 
(flooring and blankets), 
Plastic Products 
2000- 
Mar2008 74 248,794,190   
Source: Rui (2010: 58) 
4.3.3. Nigeria  
It was estimated that by 2005, Africa surpassed the Middle East as largest crude-oil supplier in 
the world. Nigeria in particular transformed into the biggest oil-producer in Africa and the fifth-
biggest globally (Rupia and Southall, 2009: 171). In respect to Chinese OFDI to SSA, Nigeria is 
the second largest recipient; although only 2.65 percent of aggregate global inflows to Nigeria 
were created by Chinese investors (refer back to Table 4.1 and A.7). Evidently, its vast oil 
reserves seem responsible for an estimated inflow of $11 billion from China (Michel and Beuret, 
2009: 161). Nigeria’s explicit resource-dependency also unfolds in the lack of economic 
diversification which defines its economy as overwhelmingly reliant on oil exports (see Table 
3.8). Accordingly, petrol revenues currently generate 95 percent of the country’s income and the 
petrol industry attracts the majority of foreign investments inflows (Portnoy, 2012).  
A Sino-Nigerian contract worth $800 million in 2005 enabled the Chinese SOE Petrochina to 
extract 30, 000 barrels of crude oil daily over a one-year period (Daniel and Bhengu, 2009: 161). 
Another significant deal followed shortly after in 2006 through which CNOOC purchased 45 
percent ownership shares in an offshore petrol and natural gas field for $2.3 billion (IRIN, 2006). 
At the time of writing, this was considered to be CNOOC’s largest global oil acquisition deal 
(Obi 2009: 192). By 2015, projected annual FDI inflows to Nigeria are expected to be as high as 
$12 billion (Portnoy, 2012).  
But Nigerian petrol companies are not the only attractors for foreign funds. Major surges in 
Chinese-induced FDI were also recorded in Nigeria’s infrastructure sector. In 2006, almost $5 
billion worth of infrastructure financing, which by then accounted for 70 percent of China’s 
overall commitment to SSA in 2006, were recorded in Nigeria (Oyeranti et al., 2010: 54). The 
same authors report the dispersed spread of China’s infrastructure investment in Nigeria. 
Accordingly, transport projects received 65 percent of overall infrastructure funding followed by 
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the power sector with 24 percent. China also pledged to improve Nigeria’s railway system and to 
construct six power dams by 2006 (Oyeranti et al., 2010: 54).  
The establishment of two Special Economic Zones, namely the Lekki Free Trade Zone and the 
Ogun-Guangdong Free Trade Zone, highlights China’s strategic interest in Nigeria. Lekki SEZ is 
a joint-venture agreement between four Chinese companies and local government entities 
located in the greater Lagos region by a deepwater port (Brautigam and Xiaoyang, 2011: 10). 
Investments are planned in the transportation, equipment, textile, light industry, home 
appliances, communication, warehousing and export processing sectors. However, construction 
and investments in the zone have been delayed until further notice. The second SEZ in Nigeria, 
Ogun-Guangdong, has also run in administrative and financial problems. By 2010, only six out 
of the registered 36 companies had actually begun construction. This Zone provides financial 
incentives to both Chinese and Nigerian businesses to produce construction materials, ceramics, 
ironware, furniture, wood, processing, medicine, small home appliances, computers, lighting and 
paper (Brautigam and Xiaoyang, 2011: 10-12). The full implications of both SEZs will only be 
known in the future as corruption and financial difficulties delayed construction in both cases. So 
far, infrastructure investments in roads, power plants as well as water and sewage plants close to 
the zones are the only derived positive externalities.  
 
At the same time, China also pursues investments in Nigeria’s pharmaceutical ventures and other 
business sectors. For example, the Sino-Nigerian joint venture Sichuan Guangda Pharma is 
expected to produce local anti-malaria drugs (Brautigam 2009: 223). A communication satellite 
was also established by the Chinese in 2007 (IRIN, 2006). Other segments of the Nigerian 
economy of interest to private Chinese investors are agro-allied industries, manufacturing or the 
telecommunication sector (Oyeranti et al., 2010: 36). A research report estimates that in 2006, 
approximately 30 Chinese-owned companies or joint ventures operated in the construction, oil, 
technology, services and education segments of the Nigerian economy (Ongunkola et al., 2008). 
In summary, it can be concluded that China’s strategic interests in Nigeria are mainly driven by 
oil-extractive motives, although other segments of the Nigerian economy also received 
significant financial support. Therefore, this suggests that Chinese FDI to Nigeria flows to a 
range of diverse sectors apart from the primary sector.   
4.4. AGRICULTURALLY-RICH SUB-SAHARAN AFRICAN COUNTRIES 
Despite employing almost half of its population in the agricultural sector, a conference report 
(NIC, 2005: 15) argues that Africa has “the lowest level of inputs and the lowest yields compared 
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to genetic potential of any region on earth”. Considering the fact that 35 out of all 48 SSA 
nations are actual food importers, Africa remains a net-recipient of foreign food donations 
(Mills, 2010: 136). On the other hand, producing as much as 40 percent of export revenues while 
employing almost 70 percent of its population, many SSA countries continue to rely on the 
agricultural sector as the largest export driver (Oyejide, 2005: 109). Aggregate economic growth 
in most SSA nations is therefore still pivotally reliant on the performance of the agricultural 
sector.  
Although less significant than investments in the mining or manufacturing sectors, Africa’s 
textile, clothing and food sectors have become seemingly attractive to Chinese investors. Leather 
resources in Africa are vast and the textile sector could become a sustainable economic 
alternative to economically diversifying away from resource dependency (Goldstein et al., 2006: 
123). While 15 percent of the world’s cattle and 25 percent of sheep and goats live in Africa, the 
continent currently only accounts for 2 percent of global leather trade (Brautigam, 2009: 211). 
Despite the fact that some of the world’s best cotton products evolve from Africa, SSA does not 
yet play a significant role in global cotton trade. Unfavourable global multilateral cotton and 
textile agreements disfavour Africa’s role in the global cotton trade.  
Thompson (2009: 299) argues that the scramble for Africa not only entails the plundering of 
mineral resources but also the extraction of bioresources16. Brautigam (2009: 234) notes that 
despite owning only 8 percent of the world’s arable land, China has succeeded in locally growing 
roughly 95 percent of its foods to feed its population, currently making up 20 percent of the 
world’s entire population. In comparison to Africa, yields on China’s arable land are at least three 
times higher.  
As Section 3.5.4.8 briefly explained, China supposedly aspires to secure ownership rights to 
fertile arable African land. Reasons for this are attributed to rising food prices and China’s 
explosive population growth over the last few decades (Doriye, 2010: 28). Coinciding with 
Beijing’s other strategic African objectives, Brautigam (2009: 236) claims that Chinese 
agricultural engagement is not a new trend, but has rather been part of China’s foreign aid 
policies since the 1950s when state-owned dairy farms and poultries were set up in Tanzania. 
Plenty of Taiwanese-sponsored agricultural projects in Africa were taken over by China after 
being abandoned by Taiwan. Agricultural interest in Africa could therefore also symbolise a 
political tool which aims to gain the diplomatic support of African nations in return for 
investments in agricultural projects. This reinforces the earlier observation of non-
                                                          
16
 Bioresources refer to plants, animals and their natural biotopes.  
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conditionalities attached to Chinese financing packages only holding true on paper as there may 
be “hidden” conditionalities.  
Only a limited scope of scholarly research investigating China’s agriculturally-motivated FDI in 
Africa exists17. At the Beijing Summit of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation 2006, China 
pledged to establish ten agricultural demonstration centres in Africa in addition to annually 
educating 5000 Africans farmers. In 2007, the establishment of five additional centres was 
announced (Brautigam, 2009: 240-252). Chinese companies were supposed to manage those 
centres with a three-year long loan offered by MOFCOM. After this initial period, African 
enterprises are encouraged to take over those centres. Considered as yet another unconventional 
way of extending foreign assistance, these centres symbolise the lucrative merging of foreign aid 
or investment with global profit-seeking motives (Brautigam, 2009: 241). Additionally, the China 
Development Bank and the EximBank both pledged to fund water and land resource projects in 
SSA.  
Agricultural centres were established in some of the Top-Ten recipient nations of Chinese OFDI 
in SSA, namely Ethiopia, Nigeria, South Africa, Sudan and Zambia, while Chinese agricultural 
experts were sent to Nigeria and Zambia. In regard to establishing overseas farming facilities, 
China is also no newcomer. For example, Beijing’s agricultural funding in Zambia has been a 
longstanding tradition (Brautigam, 2009: 254). By 2009, estimates suggested the number of 
Chinese-owned farms in Zambia to be between 15 to 23. Nevertheless, Brautigam (2009: 257) 
argues that the Chinese farms in Africa are mostly aimed at ensuring small scale food production 
for local African markets. Domestically produced goods include rice, wheat, livestock and 
poultry. Mwanawina (2004) makes note of China’s attempt to educate Zambian farmers and 
Beijing’s financial support of local Zambian cotton and textile factories.  
A conference report compiled in Lusaka (National Consultation Workshop, 2009) confirms 
those findings by claiming that Zambia does not export agricultural products back to China. A 
joint-venture deal struck in 2007 between one of China’s largest telecommunication SOEs, 
Zhong Xing Telecommunication Equipment Company, and a local bio-fuel entity in the DRC 
was heavily criticised. Mass media reports worldwide exaggerated the size of the acquisition 
almost threefold (Brautigam and Xiaoyang, 2009: 694). This reemphasises the fundamental issue 
with Chinese FDI data. Inaccurate and flawed data hence result in contradictory numbers.  
                                                          
17
 Recent studies on China’s investment in Africa’s agricultural sector include Edinger and Sandrey (2010) and 
AATF (2010).  
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When quantitative data is consolidated, agriculturally-motivated Chinese FDI in Sub-Saharan 
African recipient nations is only of minor importance. Countries like Guinea, Mali, Somalia or 
Tanzania have received small amounts of Chinese FDI to establish farms, irrigation systems and 
provide workers’ training with the goal of developing self-sufficient food-producing nations. 
Since these countries do not fall under the scope of this thesis, a more detailed analysis will not 
be performed. Brautigam and Xiaoyang (2009: 694) further acknowledge that most Chinese 
companies remain hesitant to invest in the agricultural sector of African nations. Poor 
infrastructure systems and substantial market uncertainties are the main reasons. If hypothetically 
speaking, China was to cultivate African food products for export purpose; this would not be 
economically viable or profitable.  
Nevertheless, a few Chinese pioneers are presently trying to expand their operations to African 
markets. At the core of improving Africa’s agricultural technologies is the development of hybrid 
grains for rice or maize production. Because Beijing prides itself in having successfully developed 
hybrid grains, agricultural pursuits in Africa could be perceived as a mixture of chasing profits, 
extending symbolic diplomacy and improving Africa’s food security (Brautigam and Xiaoyang, 
2009: 694-701). In addition, Chinese farmers may also be encouraged by their own government 
to resettle in Africa, but to date, data recording Chinese farming immigrants in Africa is still 
unavailable. Therefore, common claims that China is land grabbing or that the dislocation of 
local African farmers threatens African food security cannot be validated. Further research is 
required to evaluate the full implications of China’s agriculturally-motivated FDI to Africa, in 
particular since the vast amount of arable land in Africa seems to be slowly running out.  
4.4.1. Ethiopia  
Ethiopia has gained recent attention from foreign investors and according to MOFCOM (2010) 
data, it is ranked as the 7th top receiver of Chinese OFDI in SSA with approximately $185.12 
million FDI flows having reached the country between 2004 to 2010. In 2005, Chinese aid 
(ODA and OOF) to Ethiopia was negligible, only amounting to $800 million. By 2007, that 
number had already doubled to $1.7 billion, which could serve as an indicator of the country’s 
projected oil potential (Michel and Beuret, 2009: 191). Foreign aid figures in 2007 were almost 
the same as the total amount of Chinese FDI inflows between 2004 to 2010 which implies that 
ODA and OOF are vital tools in channelling foreign capital to developing nations. Despite being 
one of the poorest countries in the world, Ethiopia was classified as a nation attractive for its 
agricultural potential (see Table 3.8). Unfortunately, only a limited amount of data is available on 
China’s presumed agricultural engagement in Ethiopia. Initially classified as an agriculturally-
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attractive nation, Daniel and Bhengu (2009: 180, 191) acknowledge the country’s vast untapped 
oil reservoir under the desert. Investment potential is also found in Ethiopia’s growing light 
manufacturing industry. In fact, Chinese FDI to Ethiopia appears more diversified than 
presumed as both oil and agricultural motives seem relevant.   
The Chinese SOE Sino African Overseas Leather Products signed a joint-venture agreement 
worth $34 million in order to build a tannery and numerous factories for the manufacturing of 
various textile products. Mainly shoes, gloves and leather jackets are produced for export 
purposes. Another notable Chinese investment in Ethiopia’s leather segment includes an FDI-
induced project between Huajian Group and a local shoe producer (Whitehead and Green, 
2012). The establishment of a second Special Economic Zone (SEZ) is also planned as part of 
this investment deal. Greenfield Investments, on the other hand, predominantly occur in oil-
extractive industries. Chinese companies also began investing in Ethiopia’s construction sector. 
For example, the China-Africa Development Fund acquired 40 percent ownership shares in an 
Ethiopian plate glass project and invested $60 million in a local cement plant (Brautigam, 2009: 
224). Joint-venture investments were also recorded in Ethiopian building material plants.     
Plans to realise the implementation of Ethiopia’s Eastern Industrialisation Park, one of China’s 
six SEZs in Africa, has been slow. On paper, the creation of 10,000 to 20,000 jobs was 
envisioned by approximately 80 sponsoring companies. Yet by 2011, only one cement factory 
has been established in the Zone after financial constraints forced the initial investors to 
abandon the project. Since then, 11 additional investors signed letters of intent while China’s 
EximBank is still negotiating the financing terms (Brautigam and Xiaoyang, 2011: 76). 
Nevertheless, revenues obtained from the established cement factory have already benefited 
nearby infrastructure developments. Further industries are expected to commit to the Zone’s 
development in the near future (Brautigam, 2011c; Brautigam and Xiaoyang, 2011: 76-77).  
China’s effort to pump financial support into Ethiopia’s roads, its dazzling embassy, the 
country’s largest Tekeze Dam and the local communication network could be perceived as a 
long-term strategy to secure oil access. In order to advance telecommunication services in one of 
the world’s least telephone - dense region, a notable multi-billion Sino-Ethiopian 
telecommunication contract worth $1.5 billion was signed in 2007 via supplier credits. 
(Brautigam, 2009: 187). Although Ethiopia is still considerably underdeveloped, both America 
and China seem eager to secure access to the country’s untapped oil reserves before other 
foreign nations get a chance to become involved in the hunt. Hence, Ethiopia embodies the 
classical ideological conflict between China’s semi-communist interests and America’s capitalist 
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ideologies. In response to America opening its biggest West African embassy in Ethiopia in 
2005, China not only constructed an even more impressive one shortly after but also pledged 
$150 million towards the African Union’s new headquarters (Michel and Beuret, 2009: 191).  
This case study of Sino-Ethiopian engagement shows supporting evidence for China’s 
unconventional foreign assistance practices. In consistency with other Sino-African deals, 
diplomatic, capitalist and energy-related motives seem to be simultaneously tied to Ethiopia’s 
funding packages.    
4.4.2. Kenya 
Although Kenya only secured less than 2 percent of inflows, it is ranked as the 8th largest 
recipient of Chinese OFDI to SSA. According to the author’s own calculations summarised in 
Table 4.1, roughly 14 percent of aggregate global FDI to Kenya between 2005 to 2010 was 
sourced by Chinese investors. Based on Table 3.8, Kenya is classified as a diversified economy 
with 48 products generating more than 75 percent of its export revenues. Black tea, cut flowers 
and coffee hereby absorb the largest share of foreign revenues (see Table A.8 in Appendix). 
Although UN Comtrade (2012) classifies 45 percent of aggregate Kenyans exports as agricultural 
products, surprisingly, Kenya generally does not export its agricultural products to China. This 
could refute the assumption that China’s FDI interests in Kenya rest on agrarian motives, at least 
not in the short-run. However, China became the largest FDI supplier to Kenya by 2010 (Juma, 
2011). So if not for agricultural reasons, why then does China display a genuine interest in 
Kenya?    
According to Onjala (2008: 8), “China views Kenya as a gateway to the region and it has become 
a key focus of China’s trade and economic strategy in Africa”. Compared to more aggressive 
FDI strategies in resource-rich SSA nations, China’s concern for Kenya could be considered as a 
fairly recent and more diversified development approach in pursuit of various multifaceted 
investment motives. In the early 2000s, 90 percent of Chinese OFDI to Kenya targeted 
manufacturing services, with the remaining 10 percent invested in service industries. By 2003, 11 
fully-owned Chinese service companies were established and 50 more followed the year after 
(Onjala, 2008: 16). Aiming to strengthen technical and economic cooperation, 2006 witnessed 
the signing of six bilateral Sino-Kenyan trade agreements. A Greenfield Investment deal was 
struck in 2006 to reserve offshore oil drilling rights. Additionally, Sino-Kenyan pharmaceutical 
joint ventures were formed and another joint venture worth $130 million was initiated in a 
Nairobian solar panel factory (Brautigam, 2009: 224; Onjala, 2008: 9-17).  
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Despite a lack of data, it was estimated that by 2007 approximately 8,000 Chinese resided in 
Kenya, the majority of whom were involved with the importing of manufactured goods (Kamau, 
2007). Recent foreign investments also targeted auto-assembly plants and distribution centres for 
car parts (Juma, 2011). While Chinese investment motives in the early 2000s focused on the 
manufacturing sector, recent investments now predominantly reach resource-extractive 
industries, even though manufacturing segments continue to be targeted. Other sectors 
supported by Chinese funds are construction, telecommunication, tourism and transport and 
retail ventures. For example one of China’s largest SOEs, Huawei, won a large 
telecommunication deal to expand Kenya’s local cell phone network. Most Sino-Kenyan 
investment agreements are not implemented by joint-ventures, but rather through fully-owned 
Chinese entities (Onjala, 2008: 20-30).   
While only modest compared to other African trading nations, Kenya’s exports to China 
constitute agricultural products, such as hides and skins, sisal, fibre, coffee, tea and fishery 
products. China’s dominant exports to Kenya, on the other hand, comprise of machinery, 
equipment, medicine, footwear textiles and clothing, batteries, office supplies, appliances, 
industrial and agricultural tools, textile goods, commodities for daily use, and building materials. 
Furthermore, in an attempt to secure new export markets for Chinese products, Kenya has 
become an important investment location (Onjala, 2008: 32). Although Kenya was initially 
classified as an agriculturally-motivated FDI host nation, empirical results suggest that China 
might also be pursuing resource-extractive and market-seeking motives.  
4.4.3. Madagascar  
During the investment period 2004 to 2010, Madagascar captured 1.4 percent of China’s OFDI 
to SSA and was ranked as 9th largest receiver amongst the countries investigated. According to 
Table A.8 (see Appendix), Madagascar records 32 main products responsible for securing 75 
percent of all export revenues. China’s OFDI as a share of Madagascar’s total FDI is fairly small 
at about 3.57 percent (refer to Table 4.1). Cotton merchandise, vanilla and seafood are the most 
significant exports. Close to 80 percent of Madagascar’s population is employed in the 
agricultural sector which generates 30 percent of the country’s GDP (Üllenberg, 2009). Despite 
its reasonably well-diversified economy, textile exports are the major economic drivers. 
Nevertheless, Madagascar has plenty of fertile land and due to its low agricultural productivity, 
plenty of investment potential to boost the country’s agricultural sector exists.  
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Table 4.5: Agriculturally-motivated FDI in Madagascar in 2009, in hectare of land 
 
 
 Area, in ha 
FDI in land (in total) 3,020,300 
FDI in land for food production 1,446,500 
FDI in land for agro-fuel production 1,531,700 
FDI in land for cash crop production                      9,100 
FDI for other purposes 33,000 
Others                       530 
 
Source: Üllenberg (2009: 9) 
 
Table 4.5 provides an overview of aggregate FDI in Madagascar’s land resources. Accordingly, 
FDI flowing into Madagascar’s agricultural sector seems to be motivated twofold; either for local 
food production or for agro-fuel production (Üllenberg, 2009). Chinese FDI to Madagascar 
reveals a similar trend. In line with foreign investments into Zambia, the portion of China’s 
OFDI targeting Madagascar’s agricultural sector is only aimed at enhancing local food security. 
Examples of China’s engagement in Madagascar are sparse. One of those is China’s investment 
in the previously state-owned local sugar cane company SUCOCOMA. After the indigenous 
Madagascan’ company failed, the 10,000 hectare of land are now used to recultivate and regrow 
sugar cane. Only one FDI project so far recorded agricultural export serving international 
markets. Popular agriculturally-motivated FDI businesses in Madagascar are agro-fuel projects or 
investments in the sugar, palm oil and cattle. However, the majority of OFDI in land-projects are 
utilised for crop cultivation. As bidding for land ownership rights is hindered by a lack of 
transparency and inaccurate ownership records, the targeting of Madagascar’s fertile land via FDI 
does not seem as viable as portrayed by the media (Üllenberg, 2009: 6-20).  
Contrary to China’s FDI to Madagascar which seem to address agricultural goals, other 
researchers claim that most of aggregate global OFDI to the country is motivated by mining 
incentives, particularly in cobalt, nickel or iron ore resources (Razafindravonona, Rakotomanana 
and Rajaobelina et al., 2009: 6). This seems generally applicable for FDI flowing from 
international source countries, excluding China. Indeed, the major portion of Chinese OFDI 
appears to target the manufacturing sector followed by the construction and telecommunication 
sectors. In terms of size, a Chinese joint-venture in the telecommunication sector is the largest 
known deal so far. Textile investments were targeted on a much smaller case by Asian investors 
(World Bank, 2007: 12).  
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Madagascan farmers welcome FDI in hope of improving their own living conditions. 
Investments in infrastructure, rural electrification, water facilities, schools, hospital and the 
creation of local employment are all recorded benefits of FDI. It is estimated that 11 percent of 
local employment in the telecommunication and manufacturing sectors was created by Chinese 
OFDI (Razafindravonona et al., 2009: 29). The government also benefits from increased tax 
revenues, increased agricultural production and greater food security (Üllenberg, 2009: 25). 
On the other hand, flooding the Madagascan market with cheap Chinese imports, a low 
inclusion rate of local investors in projects and the resistance to employ local Madagascan 
workers for Chinese projects are some of the negative externalities from Chinese investments 
(Razafindravonona et al., 2009: 6, 30). As with Kenya and Ethiopia which were also grouped as 
agricultural nations, Chinese engagement in Madagascar appears more diversified and dispersed 
than initially expected. In addition to its agricultural sector, the manufacturing, 
telecommunication and construction segments also reflected spikes in recent investment. This 
highlights China’s diverse investment motives.  
4.5. NEGATIVE EFFECTS OF CHINESE FDI IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 
4.5.1. Worker Related Issues 
4.5.1.1. Import of Chinese Workers  
Before supplemental labour laws aiming to raise the number of local workers to 70 percent were 
passed by the Angolan government in 2009, previously only 30 percent of all Chinese-financed 
infrastructure projects in Angola employed local workers. In total, 70 percent of all infrastructure 
contracts in host nations are awarded to Chinese firms, leaving little room to benefit the local 
economy. Labour statistics in Madagascar show a worrisome rate of local employment. Only as 
low as 23 percent of all labourers in the manufacturing sector are Madagascan citizens  
(Razafindravonona et al., 2009: 25). Chinese oil companies in Sudan, on the contrary, draw 93 
percent of their labourers from the domestic labour pool. In the DRC, 80 percent of mining and 
infrastructure workers are required to be locals (Brautigam, 2009: 157; Lee and Shalmon, 2008: 
135; Zafar, 2007: 120). Other sources dispute these numbers and postulate that China fails to 
create sufficient local employment. IRIN (2006), for example, estimate that by 2005 close to 
10,000 Chinese workers were employed in Chinese-sponsored projects in Sudan; more than 5000 
alone were imported to help build the Merowe Dam (Michel and Beuret, 2009: 161).   
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Criticisms about unfair labour laws and the export of Chinese labourers are widely spread. Some 
reports estimate the number of Chinese labourers immigrating to Africa since the 1990s to 
fluctuate between 300,000 and 750,000 (Brautigam, 2009: 154). Others fear that close to 85 
million Chinese workers could possibly be exported to overseas projects in the future 
(Whitehead and Green, 2012). Labour laws governing the minimum inclusion rate of local 
workers in Chinese-induced infrastructure differ from country to country. The availability of 
skilled local workers, how long a Chinese company has been present in Africa, the given time 
frame for the completion of infrastructure projects and work visa requirements all vary according 
to country-specific factors (Brautigam, 2009: 156).  
Even though Zafar (2007: 123) compliments the quality and low-cost advantages of Chinese 
construction projects in SSA, he also documents that by 2005, more than 700 Chinese 
construction companies employed close to 80,000 imported Chinese workers in over 50 
countries. Considering the vast discrepancies between different date sources, consistent estimates 
on the number on imported Chinese workers in Africa is not available. Yet, regardless which 
country is investigated, researchers concur that tens of thousands of imported Chinese workers 
arrive in SSA for the sake of completing domestic construction projects. Since Beijings’s 
construction companies are also accused of unfairly outbidding Western companies on profitable 
infrastructure contracts, tensions are on the rise (Alessi and Hanson, 2012).  
4.5.1.2. Anti-Chinese Sentiment   
Anti-Chinese sentiment amongst all SSA host nations is currently worst in Zambia where as 
many as 80,000 Chinese are estimated to reside (Michel and Beuret, 2009: 232-234). An 
explosion at the Chinese controlled Chambishi copper mine, which was declared economically 
unviable by other foreign investors, resulted in the death of 51 local Zambian workers in April 
2005 (Hönke, 2009: 284; Prichard, 2009: 255). Insufficient training of Zambian workers, the lack 
of safety equipment and the poor state of the mine itself were blamed for the tragedy (refer to 
Section 4.5.1.5 for a discussion on inadequate working conditions). Anti-Chinese sentiment 
intensified as Zambian workers openly rebelled against harsh working conditions, poor safety 
standards, lack of unions, non-existence of worker benefits and inadequate wages after the tragic 
mining indient (Michel and Beuret, 2009: 233-247). A year later in 2006, Zambian workers 
destroyed mine property and clashes escalated when Chinese authorities lost control over the 
mine and shot 10 workers. A similar incident occurred in 2008 when Chinese mining supervisors 
were taken hostage after Zambian workers destroyed some of the company’s properties and 
went on strike (Michel and Beuret 2009: 236). Growing Anti-Chinese resentment is a clear 
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indicator that China’s presence in SSA is not as warmly welcomed as portrayed by government 
officials on both sides.  
4.5.1.3. Neglect of Human Capital Development 
Zafar (2007: 124) cautions that Chinese SOEs supplying FDI to Africa neglect workers’ training 
and human capital investment, both of which are vital for developing nations. Research indicates 
that most of the higher-level positions in Sino-African agreements are awarded to more qualified 
Chinese workers and that in most instances, only blue-collar African construction workers are 
employed by Chinese companies. Goldstein et al. (2006: 1240) estimate that 90 per cent of all 
managers and 75 percent of technical workers in infrastructure projects are Chinese workers. 
Mills (2010: 31) accurately summarises the trap in African development as follows: 
“Development depends on improving productivity. A lack of investment in people as well as 
equipment and technology can lead to an underutilisation of the labour potential in the world”. 
According to the evidence stated in this section, Chinese investors do not perceive investment in 
human capital or worker training as a crucial aspect of Sino-African collaboration. Most 
employed African workers are low-skilled labourers receiving little or only marginal investment 
in human capital. According with the theory on FDI-induced positive externalities, (see Section 
2.6), this could imply that the transfer of sophisticated knowledge from home (China) to host 
nations (SSA) is not applicable. Evidently, no positive knowledge spillovers might occur.   
4.5.1.4. Cultural Differences  
Language barriers as well as cultural differences intensify friction between Chinese and African 
workers, especially in Arabic-speaking Islamic countries. In countries like Sudan where English is 
not the official language, communication between both working groups (Chinese and Sudanese 
workers in this instance) mostly only occurs via gestures or sign language (Michel and Beuret, 
2009: 148). Sino-African cultural differences are plentiful. Whereas Islamic workers pray five 
times daily out of religious obligation, Chinese workers might perceive them as inefficient and 
lazy. On the other hand, Chinese workers refuse to eat the local African food and attempt to 
grow their own food. Intimate relationships between local Africans Chinese workers are also 
strictly condemned by both countries (Michel and Beuret, 2009). The lack of cultural proximity 
and understanding not only negatively effects the working environment, but also fuels the 
growing resistance to China’s presence in SSA.  
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4.5.1.5. Inadequate Working Conditions    
In response to inadequate working conditions and low wages, anti-Chinese sentiment in Africa 
recently turned violent (see Section 4.5.1.2 for incidents Zambia). Chinese mining companies in 
the DRC are accused of hiring children under hazardous and exploitative working conditions 
(Brautigam, 2009: 300). Inhuman working conditions including long shifts, inadequate salaries, 
lack of respect for workers as well as numerous working casualties have been reported in Nigeria 
(Obi, 2009). A growing wealthy oil-elite in Nigeria which grew powerful after the government 
liberalised the oil sector is now the predominant beneficiary of Chinese FDI. This resulted in the 
violent Niger-Delta crisis between local workers and the Nigerian government which also 
affected foreign investors. It is estimated that internal violent conflicts to protect Nigeria’s oil 
supplies from foreign investors have already cost the country almost one-fourth of oil-exports 
(Obi, 2009: 205-206). Violent conflicts also occurred in Ethiopia where on April 24th 2007, 
clashes between rebels and a Sinopec facility resulted in 65 Ethiopian and 9 Chinese deaths as 
well as Chinese hostages being taken. Evidently, it seems like African workers are not satisfied 
with the Chinese working conditions and as discussed in the preceding section, cultural 
differences hinder the mutual understanding and respect of workers.  
4.5.2. Economic Issues  
4.5.2.1. Windfall Gains and Failure of Resource-Revenues to Benefit the entire Population 
Since extractive sectors continue to remain state-owned or controlled by a few powerful 
individuals, only a small political elite profits from FDI-supported Greenfield Investments in the 
oil and mining sector (NIC, 2005: 7). At the same time, the majority of African mines are now 
owned by foreigners. As incoming petro dollars only benefit foreign owners or the local ruling 
elite, the amount of profits directly benefiting SSA countries is severely restricted (Hönke, 2009: 
284; Satgar, 2009: 47; Southall and Comninos, 2009: 368; UN Conference, 2011b: 1). 
Additionally, Prichard (2009: 262) notes that mining revenues gained through FDI have not 
generated sufficient tax revenues. In other words, the trickle-down effect of mineral revenues 
which are supposed to benefit the population as whole, does not occur.  
Many Sub-Saharan African mining and petrol companies (or governments) accept Chinese 
resource-for-infrastructure contracts, but they have no say in what kind of projects will receive 
Chinese sponsoring or in what area funds should be invested. Although the road systems and 
public infrastructure networks in many SSA recipient nations are improving because of Chinese 
funding, other areas of the economy are neglected. Another common problem with petrol-
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revenues is their cyclical behaviour. Mining and oil revenues are fragile in times of price volatility 
but booming in times of high global prices. Considering the recent surge in commodity-
extractive FDI, researchers are indecisive about whether this is just another cyclical high or 
whether a new era of large mining engagements in SSA is about to begin.  
4.5.2.2. Crowding-out of Domestic African Businesses  
On the consumption side, African markets have been flooded with cheap Chinese imports which 
certainly benefit African consumers with a choice of products that were unavailable before (see 
Section 3.5.4.6). Nevertheless, Chinese goods hurt the domestic African businesses. Sub-Saharan 
Africa’s textile and clothing industry has been severely affected by cheap Chinese imports after 
the WTO terminated import quotas on Chinese goods18 (IRIN, 2006). Between 2003 and 2006, 
South Africa claims the loss of almost 67,000 jobs for textile workers following the imports of 
cheap Chinese clothing (Brautigam, 2009: 189). Madagascar similarly suffers from the market 
entry of Chinese goods which depress the local textile industry (Razafindravonona et al., 2009: 6). 
Zambia, on the other hand, asserts that Chinese farms disadvantage local food production. 
Nevertheless, such charges could not be supported (see Section 4.4).  
While critics blame the crowding-out effects of cheap Chinese textile imports for job losses, 
others point to South Africa’s negligence in not investing enough capital and the low 
productivity of its worker (Edwards, Naughtin and Rankin, 2011). South Africa has not 
sufficiently improved its competitiveness in the global textile market. Surprisingly, when 
analysing China’s trading profile for 2009 to 2010, textile products were not amongst its 
dominant export products (UN Comtrade, 2012). In conclusion, Chinese exports to SSA could 
therefore be seen as mixed blessings, beneficial to African consumers but to some extent also 
hurtful to local African producers.    
4.5.3. Ethical Issues, Violation of Moral Rights and Governance Obligations     
4.5.3.1. Lack of Governance, Democratic and Humanitarian Rights 
Contemporary Chinese loans to Africa encourage an alternative method of foreign assistance- 
one that previously had not been implemented. Beijing’s apparent non-interference policy has 
attracted heavy criticism from Western countries as it neglects to recognise the need for basic 
humanitarian rights, democratic principles or politically stable host governments. It is feared that 
                                                          
18
 The termination of the Multi Fibre Agreement in 2005 meant that (SSA) countries were no longer allowed to 
impose import quotas on Chinese clothing and textiles. See Edwards et al. (2011) for a discussion on Southern 
Africa’s textile industries.  
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unconditional Sino-African deals aggravate the state of corruption, lack of political freedom and 
violent conflicts in authoritarian African nations (NIC, 2005: 7). Currently, Angola, the DRC, 
Ethiopia and Sudan represent specific examples where China’s no-interference policy clashes 
with international stipulations. Whereas most Western oil companies withdrew their operations 
or governments broke off ties with the Sudanese government for continuously violating human 
rights, China continues to financially and diplomatically support the country in exchange for 
securing access to oil (IRIN, 2006). Multi-billion heavy Sino-Congolese infrastructure-for-
minerals deals are also condemned as humanitarian conditions in the DRC are unacceptable 
according to Western standards.  
Particularly in Angola, corruption poses a serious issue. China’s financial aid engagements with 
Angola are criticised based on the lack of transparency and corrupt malpractices (Obi, 2009: 
196). Estimates predict that at least $1 billion of domestic funds vanish annually in the 
government’s accounting books (Michel and Beuret, 2009: 213, 231). Corrupt domestic business 
practices inevitably affect foreign funds. In the case of Angola, $3 billion of Chinese funds were 
reported to have evaporated untraceably. According to the Corruption Perception Index19, most 
of the Sub-Saharan-African nations investigated in this research study scored some of the lowest 
rankings (Transparency International, 2012). Out of 182 countries in total, Sudan, DRC, Angola 
are ranked 177th and 168th respectively. Kenya, Nigeria, Niger, Ethopia and Zambia also scored 
in the bottom half of the index and were ranked 154th, 143th, 134th, 120th and 91st respectively. 
Those findings confirm the argument that China does not seek to encourage good governance or 
ethical business practise when screening potential investment locations. Confidentially signed 
foreign aid and non-transparent Sino-African FDI agreements aggravate the problem of 
accountability (Mwanawina, 2004).  
Corruption not only applies to SSA regimes but also to fraudulent Chinese investors. Some of 
China’s largest investors in SSA, for example China State Construction Engineering Corporation 
and Geo-Engineering, were both blacklisted by the World Bank because of charges of corrupt 
and fraudulent business activities (Brautigam, 2009: 295). Based on the Corruption Perception 
Index (Transparency International, 2012), China ranked 75th out of 182 countries, suggesting that 
corruption in the public service occurs frequently.  
 
                                                          
19
 The Corruption Perception Index ranks countries based on their public sectors‘ perceived corruption levels. 
Rankings are allocated on a scale from zero to ten. Countries with low scores are classified as highly corrupt 
countries, whereas countries with little observed corruption in their public services obtained high scores 
(Transparency International, 2012).  
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4.5.3.2. Chinese Weaponries and Support for Conflict-Prone Regions  
Some of the newer mining and oil recipient nations of Chinese OFDI in SSA are regions of 
unstable governments and conflict-prone areas with high risk of war. The DRC, for example, has 
been war-ridden for almost twenty years and foreign investments from China are greatly 
encouraged by the DRC’s government as traditional investors pulled out of the country when 
loan stipulations to guarantee humanitarian rights were violated.   
A worrisome aspect of various Sino-African oil-for-loan agreements concerns weaponry deals 
struck between war-torn nations in SSA that received Chinese arms in return for oil exports 
(Dowden, 2009; Rupiya and Southall, 2009: 180). Angola, the DRC, Sudan and Zimbabwe are all 
beneficiaries of such secret arms-for-petrol deals. Arms-for-commodity swops do not appear in 
international arm sales statistics and they could therefore be classified as black-market trading. 
Michel and Beuret (2009: 136) affirms that Norinco 9mm pistols - a Chinese model- are widely 
used in most violent muggings and crimes in South Africa. Interestingly enough, South Africa is 
China’s largest recipient of OFDI. Sudan, on the other hand, experiences its own issues with 
Chinese arm deliveries. Before the country split into North and South Sudan in 2011, China 
delivered weapons to the Sudanese government to fight off the rebels. As most of the oil is 
located in the now rebel-governed South Sudan, it is claimed that China started to support the 
former enemy in order to protect their oil drilling rights (Alessi and Hanson, 2012).  
If this correlation between Chinese OFDI and the increase in the quantity of arms in host 
countries holds true for the future, a frightening scenario may evolve. Nevertheless, Beuret and 
Michel (2009: 136) reveal that 42 of the top 100 arms manufacturers are American companies. In 
line with all FDI-related data, caution must be exerted when analysing the sources of such 
statistics as they could be misused for propaganda purposes. Furthermore, the increase of 
Chinese weaponry sales in African host nations could possibly be more trade-related than FDI-
related.  Although it is too early to predict the full implications of Chinese non-interference 
policies, China might be slowly beginning to enforce partial stipulations on loans. Presumably 
Western pressure is the main reason for this. For example, financial aid packages extended to 
Zimbabwe or Sudan recently began to see conditions attached to them. 
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4.5.4 Agricultural Issues 
4.5.4.1. Biopiracy   
Thompson (2009: 300) acknowledges biopiracy20 as a negative externality of agriculturally- 
motivated FDI. Industrialised nations hereby approach Africa in a global competition to extract 
desirable genes (traits) of local animals. Those genes will then be reproduced and eventually sold 
at higher profits in home countries. Unfortunately, neither the local governments nor indigenous 
tribal communities which claim the rightful ownership over breeding animals are reimbursed by 
investing countries.  
Cases of plants or animals from which genetically material has been removed without prior 
consent were revealed in South Africa (tube worm, sea pen extract) and Mozambique (bacteria 
extracts). Uvaria, an African fruit used as traditional medicine in Ethiopia or Tanzania, is further 
protected by patents or copyrights despite its usage in Europe and America. Thompson (2009: 
314) further disputes the company Monsanto’s illegal business practises. Monsanto owns 90 
percent of all global patents for genetically modified organisms though refuses to compensate 
local farmers for contaminating their indigenous crops. Even worse, the company recently began 
suing local farmers whose crops contain minor traces of Monsanto’s patented gene for 
negligence of paying royalties. It was not taken into consideration whether genetic pollution was 
caused by wind pollination or other uncontrollable causes.   
Biopiracy produces the same negative consequences as other forms of piracy - both refuse to 
compensate the rightful owner of the resources. As Thomson (2009: 317) concludes:  
 “The North is gene poor, while Africa is gene rich. The new scramble for Africa is pirating 
 genetic wealth, privatising it and then demanding that African farmers pay to use it or African 
 geneticists pay to explore it. This process is not at all different from the commodity chain for oil: 
 taken from African reserves it ends up as petrol in dilapidated African buses. The commodity 
 chain beginning with columbite-tantalum dug from African soil is processed for laptop 
 computers too expensive for Africans to buy”.   
 
 
                                                          
20
 Biopiracy is not a contemporary concept but dates back to 1977 when the term was phrased by Shiva. 
According to Thompson (2009: 300), biopiracy is defined as the unlawful removal of plants, seeds or animals 
with the purpose of claiming ownership thereof as well as the physical destruction of natural habitats through 
genetic or chemical contamination.  
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4.5.4.2. Pollution and other Environmental Issues 
Considering China is still a developing country itself, lax environmental practises of Chinese 
companies operating in Africa are transferred to SSA host countries. Brautigam (2009: 299) 
postulates that the lack of Chinese social and environmental standards, particularly applicable for 
hydropower dams, roads and large-scale mining projects, severely damages Africa’s environment. 
Incidents of environmental violations are plentiful as oil-related exploration, production and 
manufacturing activities are associated with a series of environmental problems. While the costs 
of negative externalities that result from such practises are borne by host communities, a detailed 
investigation of environmental issues is beyond the scope of this study. Nevertheless, the need to 
ensure that Chinese firms comply with social responsibility laws is valid.  
4.5.4.3. Effects of Chinese-Sponsored Dams 
The construction of the Chinese-sponsored Sudanese Merowe Dam in Sudan also caused severe 
environmental damage. Plenty of controversy surrounds this project which was envisioned since 
1943. Construction began in 2000 with Sinohydro winning the prestige infrastructure deal. 
Projected to generate half of Sudan’s water supply, the dam was officially opened in 2009 
(Michel and Beuret, 2009: 161). However, in addition to date palms being permanently 
destroyed, houses torn down and compensation packages promised by the Chinese government 
never being paid, more than 50,000 indigenous Sudanese people were dislocated from their 
traditional territory. Other hydropower dams in Ethiopia and Nigeria also forced many 
indigenous people from their fertile land and resulted in violent clashes (Brautigam, 2009).      
Depending on whether Chinese or Western data is accessed, most sources reveal conflicting 
findings. Media reports from the West claim that China is land-grabbing, while most of the food 
produced by Chinese farms in SSA is claimed to be exported to China. Vulnerable food-
importing countries, such as Sudan and Ethiopia are reported to export over 70 percent of their 
aggregate food production to China (Doriye, 2010: 29). Chinese authorities, on the other hand, 
ensure that Chinese farms and food distributors in Africa are solely used to enhance local food 
productivity (Brautigam, 2009). More research in the area of agriculturally-motivated FDI is 
therefore needed in order to endorse both claims.  
4.6. CONCLUSIONS  
In order to evaluate the impact and magnitude of Chinese investments, this chapter analysed 
Sino-African FDI deals in more depth. The Top-Ten recipients of Chinese OFDI in SSA were 
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reviewed in country-specific case studies. From these studies, FDI flows appear to be more 
concentrated towards nations that are strategically important to China based on three 
determinants: oil, natural resources or agricultural potential. This is underscored by the fact that 
those Top-Ten recipients secured over 75 percent of China’s aggregate investment funds to 
Africa, whereas South Africa must be treated as a data outlier. Other sectors in SSA that received 
substantial shares of Chinese OFDI are the telecommunication, manufacturing and construction 
sectors. China’s OFDI as a share of recipient countries’ total FDI between 2005 to 2010 varies 
from being statistically insignificant in Angola at 0.23% to almost 21 percent in South Africa. 
Benefits arising from Chinese-produced flows greatly vary therefore.  
Preliminary a priori assumptions suggested that investments in resource-rich or oil-producing 
nations are non-diversified unilateral flows in line with China’s strategic energy goals. The DRC, 
Niger, South Africa and Zambia were classified as resource-rich nations. Excluding South Africa, 
findings confirm the non-diversified export strategies of those nations. Virtually all of China’s 
OFDI flows to the extractive sectors of the relevant economies. An exception to this is South 
Africa, where strategic asset-seeking motives in its financial services sector play a crucial role in 
attracting foreign inflows. In quantitative terms, South Africa received the largest but also most 
diversified Chinese inflows amongst all resource-rich nations, followed by Zambia which also 
indicated agricultural potential. Chinese FDI to the DRC appears to predominantly target 
extractive-intensive industries, while investments to Niger appear to be attracted by uranium 
products. Due to a lack of empirical data, only vague assumptions on Niger’s investment 
behaviour could be drawn.      
Case studies of the oil-rich nations Angola, Sudan and Nigeria confirm the assumption that 
China’s interest in these nations is enhanced by the availability natural resource- in this case oil. 
Surprisingly, all of these “oil countries” also secured a significant amount of funding relevant to 
non-resource segments of their economies. This suggests that resource and oil-motivated 
Chinese OFDI to SSA seems more diversified in reality than initially assumed.  
The last category of Sub-Saharan African host nations reporting Chinese FDI inflows, namely 
agricultural-nations, include Ethiopia, Kenya and Madagascar. All three countries presented 
more diversified economies than any other group. Consequently, in addition to agriculturally-
related inflows, these nations succeeded in attracting the most wide-ranging types of Chinese 
inflows. The empirical evidence presented in this chapter indicates that agricultural FDI into SSA 
is not motivated by land-grabbing or the export of food, but rather focuses on ensuring small-
scale food security for local African markets.  
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In conclusion, it is postulated that as an investment location, Africa serves both China’s short-
term goals as well as its strategic long-term energy goals. The implications of China’s engagement 
in Sub-Saharan African host nations differ on a country-specific level. Negative externalities 
range across a variety of economic, social, humanitarian or environmental issues. The case-study 
approach confirms that inadequate working conditions, marginal investments in human capital, 
the failure to create substantial local employment, crowding-out of local businesses or low 
environmental standards do create serious challenges for sustainable, long-term development in 
African host nations. Neglect of humanitarian rights, support for war-prone conflict zones or 
authoritarian leadership and the engagement in corrupt business practices symbolise additional 
short-comings of Chinese induced FDI in SSA.   
CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSIONS, POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS AND LIMITATIONS 
112 
 
CHAPTER FIVE:  
CONCLUSIONS, POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS AND LIMITATIONS  
The motivation behind this research study is found in China’s contemporary engagement on the 
African continent. In response to its growing financial commitment to 44 African nations 
(FOCAC, 2012), it is important to assess the nature, forms, motivations and determinants of 
Chinese OFDI by reviewing relevant literature and analysing empirical results. Due to a lack of 
domestic investment capital, low savings rates and marginal income earnings, FDI provides a key 
medium through which to supply capital in most SSA nations (Asiedu, 2006: 107). As stressed 
throughout this study, the withdrawal of FDI by foreign investors may severely hinder economic 
growth and domestic developments in African host nations. Hence, it felt necessary to 
investigate Chinese investment patterns in order to critically evaluate their implications for 
African host nations.       
5.1. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS  
This study commenced by addressing the theoretical framework of FDI. Various different 
explanations as to why countries or companies supply foreign investment and what determinants 
appear most successful in attracting foreign inflows were discussed. Chapter Two presented 
relevant theories based on a market-structure taxonomy but also incorporated the contemporary 
trend of considering MNEs as influential institutions in the process of supplying FDI funds. 
Although a number of FDI theories exist, Dunning’s (1979, 2001) Eclectic Paradigm seems to 
best capture both classical trends as well as contemporary developments in international capital 
movements. His theory mainly draws on Hymer’s (1960) Industrial Organisation Hypothesis, 
Vernon’s Product Cycle (1966) and Buckley and Casson’s (1976) Internalisation Theory to 
answer the questions of where, how and why entities engage in overseas investment. Referred to 
as the O-L-I theory, Dunning (1979) postulates that a firm’s ownership, internalisation and 
locational advantages must all be satisfied if FDI is to be utilised as a strategy to expand 
operations overseas. At the present moment, his theory is considered as the most relevant FDI 
model amongst researchers.   
According to the literature review, FDI determinants are highly responsive to country, industry 
or sector-specific variables. No consensus has been reached yet with regards to which host 
country determinants appear more attractive to foreign investors. Nevertheless, it can be 
concluded from the studies under review that economic variables, such as market size or the 
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openness of the economy, and political stability in host countries seem to be the most attractive 
determinants. In general, investment motives vary depending on the investor’s intensions (Lim, 
2001: 12).  
Discrepancies also emerged when investigating the effects of FDI in host countries. Many 
empirical studies concluded the presence of both positive and negative FDI-induced 
externalities. Most researchers confirm a positive relationship between FDI inflows and 
economic growth in host countries (Akinlo, 2004; Borensztein et al., 1998; De Mello, 1997; Lim, 
2001). Moreover, positive externalities in host countries vary from absorbing sophisticated 
technology or knowledge to creating local employment or increasing efficiency and productivity. 
On the other hand, high social costs, crowding-out of local businesses, short-term employment 
and the negative implication of the Dutch Disease all emerged as negative FDI effects on host 
countries. In summary, the magnitude and extent of FDI-induced spillover effects generally 
varies according to country-specific factors, the specific type of FDI received and the mode of 
entry (see Section 2.6.).    
After establishing a solid conceptual framework on FDI theories in Chapter Two, Chapter Three 
looked at global and Chinese FDI flows to SSA. General findings derived from the conceptual 
FDI framework were now applied to the specific Sino-African content of this investigation. The 
Chinese economy has witnessed an impressive developmental process that transformed its 
previously closed economy into an influential global economic powerhouse. China’s annual 
growth rates, sometimes as high as 10.6 percent, mainly rely on its manufacturing sector (China 
Analyst, 2012: 14). China’s ascending transformation to become the dominant global nation is 
currently challenging Western economies.  
African nations, on the other hand, continue to rely on FDI or foreign aid funds. Failure to 
establish diversified economies, unfavourable institutional environments and the reliance on 
resource exports resemble the biggest challenges. Inadequate infrastructure, low investments in 
human capital, persistently negative savings rates and the immediate effects of the HIV epidemic 
have paralysed Africa into a developmental trap. Since Africa currently contains the largest 
number of developing nations on a continent, China’s financial commitments could significantly 
boost its economic development if necessary reforms and stipulations are implemented in 
relevant host nations. Considering that Africa was and continues to be forecasted as the fasted 
growing continent, a possible cause for this could be the positive effects of Chinese FDI-induced 
CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSIONS, POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS AND LIMITATIONS 
114 
 
spillovers in SSA. Nevertheless, further research exceeding the scope of this thesis is required to 
validate such assumptions.  
This study investigated Chinese OFDI from 2004 to 2010 based on information primarily 
extracted from the Chinese Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM, 2010). Within that time frame, 
50 African nations were reported to have benefited from Chinese funds. A fairly new trend in 
FDI is the emergence of South-South flows. Traditionally, FDI originated in Western developed 
countries and targeted developing host nations in the Southern hemisphere. With the growing 
importance developing countries play in the global economy, many of them now also supply 
FDI (Sparks, 2012). The BRICS countries in particular have become a vital source of OFDI - 
and China resembles a perfect example of this new trend.  
As mentioned in the introductory chapter of this thesis and in Section 3.5.5.1, discrepancies 
between different data sets exist. To an extent, inconsistencies in data computations and the 
limited amount of available metadata restricted this research study (OECD, 2006: 62). 
Furthermore, untangling official data on Chinese FDI proves difficult as the majority of Chinese 
financing packages to SSA host nations are a combination of export credits, concessional loans, 
foreign debt cancellations, grants, zero-interest loans or the establishment of Special Economic 
Zones. Hence, most of Sino-African deals cannot be exclusively classified as ODA, OOF or FDI 
according to their definitions but rather as a mixture of each.  
When analysing China’s data, it was found that despite media reports about China’s alleged heavy 
investments in SSA, only five percent of its aggregate OFDI is actually allocated to African host 
countries (Devonshire-Ellis, 2010). A similar pattern was observed for global FDI. Despite a 
general increase in FDI targeted at developing countries, only a marginal share of three percent 
was recorded to have reached Africa (UNCTAD, 2012). Hence, China’s financial assistance to 
Africa is only marginally more than aggregate global funding in proportional terms. These 
empirical results confirm comments in the literature which recommend special regional 
considerations for SSA host countries (Asiedu, 2002, 2006). It is postulated that FDI 
determinants in SSA marginally differ from other regions.  
As Chapter Two stated, different types of FDI are motivated by heterogeneous determinants. In 
accordance with this theoretical framework, motives are found to range from horizontal, vertical, 
extractive, asset-seeking, technology and conglomerate-seeking FDI. Supplementing such 
traditional motives, the empirical evidence assessed in Chapter Three suggested additional 
investment motives applicable to China’s engagement in Africa. These vary from political 
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motives of extending symbolic diplomacy, disposing of accumulated foreign reserves to purely 
profit-seeking motives pursued by ambitious less risk-adverse Chinese entrepreneurs (Michel and 
Beuret, 2009). As Chinese businesses generally have not reached the standards of more 
sophisticated European American firms, African markets are also used as a test market for 
Chinese entrepreneurs willing to enter overseas markets in (see Section 3.5.4).  
China’s investments through SOEs also require special attention. Contrary to common a priori 
assumptions, these entities pursue conflicting motives. Firstly, as an extension of the state, they 
pursue China’s strategic energy goals in acquiring access to foreign natural resources. Secondly, 
expanding operations overseas is also driven by realising profit-hungry business opportunities. 
Hence, China’s interest in SSA should not exclusively be labelled as a quest for securing natural 
resources but rather as a blending of economic and political motives with Beijing’s strategic 
natural resources interests.  
Both data sets used, Chinese (MOFCOM, 2010) and UNCTAD (2012), confirmed that the 
majority of FDI reaching Africa is motivated by extractive activities in the primary segments of 
the oil or resource sectors. Particularly in developing or transitioning economies, Greenfield 
Investments remain the dominant method of market entry. This also holds true for SSA nations, 
as the majority of FDI flowing to resource-rich nations is allocated to Greenfield Projects. Other 
relevant sectors of SSA nations that received IFDI were the banking, retail, construction and 
telecommunication sectors respectively (UNCTAD, 2012). Interesting results were obtained 
from Chinese data (MOFCOM, 2010). According to the data, Sub-Saharan Africa’s Leasing and 
Business Service Sector attracted the largest amount of inflows. Nevertheless, no theoretical or 
other empirical evidence was able to confirm these findings.  
China’s funds are mainly channelled through two institutions, Eximbank and MOFCOM, 
whereas 90 percent of all funds are supplied by MOFCOM (Grimm et al., 2011: 8). Concessional 
loans are offered at more favourable and generous terms than traditional loans, while resource-
backed financing options do not force conditionalities on recipient nations. Loans extended to 
resource-rich SSA nations finance local key infrastructure projects in return for exporting 
resources back to China. Investments in Africa’s infrastructural sector are a vital ingredient for 
its successful economic development as traditional OECD funds neglected to undertake such 
investments. Brautigam (2011a: 758) further argues that with Chinese funding, the actual money 
lingers in China. In a way, resources-for-infrastructure deals could also be regarded as an 
elementary form of barter-trading. Furthermore, as China’s support to African nations does not 
CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSIONS, POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS AND LIMITATIONS 
116 
 
solely rely on providing financial funds but also includes cultural, economic and political support, 
it should indeed be conceived as a new, unconventional form of extending development assistance. 
Chapter Three also pointed out that despite common assumptions, China’s engagement in Africa 
is not a new phenomenon but has gradually evolved since African nations gained independence 
in the 1960s. In fact, Brautigam (2009) noted that the Chinese have never left the continent, but 
that their investments and engagements in Africa have simply gone unnoticed. For example, 
China has supported Zambia ever since the 1960s, mostly for reasons of extending political 
support or symbolic diplomacy. China’s engagement in Africa is commonly exaggerated by 
Western politics or media reports that fear the loss of influence by an ever growing Chinese 
nation, both economically and politically. As part of an ideological power struggle, such sources 
state facts which conflict with Eastern data. Caution is hereby required when analysing China’s 
engagement in Africa as sources from both China and the West have a tendency to manipulate 
data according to their own needs.  
As 75 percent of Chinese OFDI to SSA was dispersed to only 10 countries, the last section of 
this thesis conducted a case study approach of the Top-Ten SSA recipient nations in order to 
establish common investment denominators and patterns. Based on China’s strategic investment 
strategies and country-specific data identifying the major products that account for more than 75 
percent of exports, relevant recipient countries were grouped into three distinctive categories, 
namely resource-rich, oil-rich or agricultural nations. Similarities were found between the group 
of resource-rich and petroleum-rich SSA host nations, most of which (except for South Africa) 
presented with little or insignificant economic diversification. Export revenues in these countries 
almost exclusively rely on natural resources and empirical evidence confirmed that most of 
Chinese inflows to those countries were indeed targeting extractive industries.   
The DRC, South Africa and Zambia were grouped as resource-rich nations. Out of the Top-Ten 
Sub-Saharan African recipient nations of Chinese FDI between 2004 to 2010, South Africa 
portrays the most diversified economy and also received the largest share of inflows. Securing 
almost 49 percent, it should be considered as an outlier, although Chinese inflows were fairly 
diversified. Zambia and the DRC, on the other hand, confirmed a priori assumptions as Chinese 
investments here primarily target the extractive industries. A similar pattern emerged for oil-rich 
countries. Angola, Nigeria, Niger and Sudan were classified accordingly. Due to a lack of 
accurate data, only a very limited amount of empirical results could be obtained for Niger. The 
other three oil-countries are heavily reliant on undiversified oil exports and empirical data 
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strengthened the argument that most of their inflowing FDI from both Chinese and more 
traditional investors is motivated by the availability of oil.  
Interesting results were achieved for the agriculturally-classified nations Ethiopia, Kenya and 
Madagascar. Compared to resource-rich or oil-rich host nations, these countries have more 
diversified economies and Chinese OFDI targeted a wider-range of sectors. All three countries 
managed to secure inflows in their agrarian, telecommunication and manufacturing sectors. 
Claims accusing China of “land-grabbing” or exporting food products from mainly food-
importing SSA nations could not be confirmed. In fact, empirical results revealed the opposite. 
Food production in such agrarian nations is low-scale and local in nature (Brautigam, 2009: 257; 
Üllenberg, 2009: 25). Instead of depriving African nations of their own food, China seems to be 
actually enhancing local food security. Zambia, for example, hosts a number of Chinese farms, 
all of which were supporting local food production. Furthermore, land-ownership rights in 
Africa are complicated. Ownership disputes amongst local tribes and governments exist, which 
makes it even harder for foreigners to acquire land. In fact, China does not seem to have the 
knowledge nor the power to steal away the local land.  
5.2. IMPLICATIONS OF THE RESEARCH AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS  
China’s engagement in Africa is indeed unconventional in many ways. Firstly, China’s own 
experiences of being a major recipient of OFDI is an advantage traditional donors never had. 
Most Sino-African agreements draw heavily upon Sino-Japanese FDI contracts from the 1970s. 
Secondly, China and Africa have more commonalities than Africa and its traditional donors ever 
did. Both are still developing countries, faced with similar problems and issues. Poverty, 
corruption, low humanitarian standards, limited personal freedom, unequal wealth distribution, 
disregard for environmental issues and neglect of appropriate working conditions are challenges 
both regions still have to overcome. Thirdly, compared to structural adjustment programs and 
string-attached loans supplied by traditional nations, China’s non-interference foreign policies do 
not impose any obvious conditionalities on African host nations. Nevertheless, certain obvious 
conditions, such as host nations’ support for Beijing’s foreign policy agenda, are indirectly 
inflicted upon recipient nations.  
At least on paper, Chinese authorities consider Sino-African relations as mutually beneficial 
agreements based on respect, friendship and collaboration. But in line with all FDI, negative 
externalities are evident. Empirical evidence indicates that claims of the crowding-out of local 
African business, poor working conditions, inadequate workers’ safety and compensation, 
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violation of environmental rights, the failure to employ local workers or Beijing’s unconditional 
support for corrupt and authoritarian African nations do appear valid, at least to some extent 
(refer to Section 4.5). Sino-African arms deals benefitting war-torn African conflict nations have 
further drawn collective international criticism, questioning China’s morals and ethics. Based on 
FDI theory, the magnitude of FDI-imposed externalities in host nations varies on a country- and 
industry-specific base. At the time of writing, a growing amount of anti-Chinese resentment is 
experienced in all host nations.       
However, as with any official contract, one cannot receive without being willing to give. This 
relies on one of the simplest economic principles: the law of supply and demand. If China 
supplies foreign funds, they will obviously demand something in return. In the case of Africa, 
this happens to be natural resources or oil, considering natural resources continue to remain the 
continent’s dominant comparative advantage. Remembering their painful experience with 
traditional Western FDI suppliers, African nations should not realistically expect to receive 
unconditional funding without accepting certain trade-offs. As a result of globalisation, Africa is 
now actively embedded in global trade. Therefore, African nations should accept Chinese FDI as 
two-sided contractual agreements beneficial to both parties. Rather than considering China’s 
engagement in SSA as an exploitative dependency-creating alliance, it should be perceived as 
opportunistic trade and development assistance. In the past, China also gave away precious oil 
and coal commodities in return for receiving Japanese investments and more sophisticated 
technology. But China actually never complained about such agreements. On the contrary, China 
realised FDI’s positive spillovers and gladly offered its own resources with the intension of 
creating long-term sustainable development.    
On the other hand, benefits arising in host countries greatly vary. Evaluating China’s FDI as a 
share of the recipient countries’ aggregate FDI from 2005 to 2010 revealed that its share was 
smaller than other sources claimed. Only 3.43 percent of host countries’ aggregate FDI inflows 
were produced by China – a small number compared to other global source countries. Numbers 
also fluctuate depending on the relevant host country. South Africa is both the biggest recipient 
of Chinese OFDI from 2004 to 2010 and the largest beneficiary of China’s FDI as a share of the 
country’s total FDI inflows at 21 percent. Angola, on the other hand, is the 10th largest recipient 
of China’s FDI in SSA. Yet, this comprises only 0.25 percent of all FDI received by Angola. The 
benefits, if existing, might only be minuscule compared to what Angola gains from non-Chinese 
FDI.       
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As the empirical results have shown, the bargaining power of African nations in Sino-African 
deals has actually improved, although due to limited data, it is impossible to precisely estimate to 
what extent. Unfortunately, it is up to African leaders to negotiate favourable investment 
agreements which not only benefit the local ruling elite, but the host country as a whole. 
Therefore, if host nations are truly trying to maximise the benefits from Sino-African projects, 
African leaders themselves must ensure the favourable outcome of investment agreements. Only 
they have the power and authority to influence agreements. In order to increase positive 
externalities derived from Chinese investments, SSA leaders should increase the tax rates 
imposed on extractive industries, change the labour laws to increase the number of local workers 
employed, increase minimum wages for local workers on par with international standards, ensure 
working conditions are safe and further establish environmental regulations that impose penalties 
for non-compliance. Lastly, it is recommended that SSA nations implement uniform foreign 
investment codes and laws. If investment regulations were unified, regional cooperation and 
integration amongst recipient countries in SSA could be enhanced.     
At the same time, China needs to step up its game to ensure that African host nations are treated 
fairly and in accordance with international standards. Lax humanitarian, ethical, working, political 
or economic standards are causing justifiable tensions and frustration in African host countries. 
As shown by the case studies, the effects of Chinese OFDI in SSA nations vary from country to 
country. Sudan provides a good example of how successful negotiations resulted in 90 percent of 
all oil workers hired in Chinese projects being locals. After recent violent clashes, Zambian 
authorities have also tightened labour laws and investment stipulations. This supports the 
argument that it is indeed up to African nations themselves to negotiate favourable and mutually 
beneficial investment agreements.  
5.3. LIMITATIONS OF THE RESEARCH  
The limiting amount of available Chinese metadata presents the biggest challenge for this 
research study. Inconsistencies in data computation further restrict the quality of data analysis 
(OECD 2006: 62). Reasons for this are twofold. Firstly, detangling official data on Chinese FDI 
provides difficult. Hence, most of Sino-African deals cannot be exclusively classified as FDI, 
Official Development Assistance (ODA), or Other Official Flows (OOF) according to its 
definition, but should rather be considered as a mixture of all three. Secondly, different 
accounting standards applicable in China compared to those in the rest of the world make it 
impossible to precisely compare data accurately as vast discrepancies between Chinese and 
Western data exist (Gelb, 2010).  
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It is therefore acknowledged that it proved impossible to analyse Chinese OFDI in isolation 
without also reviewing data on ODA, OOF or FDI. Instead of exclusively focusing on FDI, 
China’s aggregate financing packages were critically investigated for the sake of compiling this 
research study. In conclusion, it is stressed that the combination of inaccurate Chinese metadata, 
inconsistent accounting standards causing discrepancies between Western and Eastern data and 
weak FDI recording methods in relevant SSA host countries exacerbate the uncertainty of the 
quantitative segment of this study. An example for this is the inconclusive case-study of Niger as 
no empirical results could be obtained. Aiming to enhance the quality of this research study, a 
mix of primary and secondary data sets from both Western and Eastern reports was therefore 
incorporated. Nevertheless, neither one ensures 100 percent accuracy. Lastly, it is also 
emphasised that information on a large share of Sino-African FDI agreements are not accessible 
for the public. Consequently, the exact state and nature of SSA’s host nations bargaining power 
in Sino-Africa investment deals can only be evaluated to a certain extent, simply because 
information might not be available. However, the empirical evidence reviewed in this research 
study does suggest that Africa’s bargaining power has increased.  
5.4. CONCLUDING REMARKS  
This research study has found that Chinese OFDI to SSA nations (excluding South Africa) from 
2004 to 2010 only targets a limited number of strategic nations which appear significant based on 
their natural resources, oil or agricultural potential. Supplementing those three characteristics, 
South Africa was found to be an attractive investment location based on its sophisticated finance 
sector. China is pursuing both short-term and strategic long-term goals to ensure energy-security. 
Its engagements in Africa should be perceived as an untraditional and unconventional way of 
providing FDI or development assistance. Sino-Angolan investment packages were recently 
coined as the “Angolan model”, a framework that has now become the example for many other 
investments deals. Such resource-backed loans fund vitally needed infrastructure projects at 20 to 
30 percent lower costs than contracts offered from Western lenders. Repayment terms of 
Chinese financing packages are also more generous and loans have no official (yet some indirect) 
strings attached.  
Tensions between America and China are on the rise as both nations actively participate in the 
global scramble for African resources and oil. Elaborating on the shortcomings of Chinese 
OFDI is a popular American propaganda method used to in an attempt of restoring the interest 
of African nations in American capital. African nations, on the other hand, are gradually 
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beginning to distance themselves from the prolonged dominance of American and European 
influence on their continent. China’s “African Safari” could resemble a fresh start for sustainable 
development in SSA, away from the painful experiences of European dominance in the past and 
away from conditionalities imposed by World Bank or IMF financing programs. Nevertheless, 
this research also recognises that many of the critics of China were also critics of the FDI 
supplied by the West. While propaganda motives most certainly apply to the context of this 
notion, a well-established academic argument against FDI per say exist – regardless of host 
nation’s geographical location. Criticism of Chinese engagements in Africa might be a reaction to 
the damaging effects of past FDI malpractices. Therefore, the demand for conditionalities 
attached to FDI packages is justifiable when past mistakes are taken into consideration.   
Undeniably, China is most definitely investing in SSA to extract natural resources or oil needed 
for its own selfish demands. In fact, Sub-Saharan Africa’s oil reserves offer a cheap and reliable 
source of oil exports not subjective to inflationary price fluctuations or foreign exchange 
volatility. But at the same time, Western and other countries have done the same thing for years 
without paying sufficient attention to Africa’s own needs and they still continue to invest in SSA 
resource-rich nations. The only difference lies in publicity. America and Europe extract African 
oil and resources more quietly compared to Chinese investors, which could give the impression 
that Western countries are actually secretly trying to steal Africa’s resources.  
China, on the other hand, has openly announced its strategic-energy goals and Sub-Saharan 
African resource-rich nations play a crucial role in them. Beijing not only offers cost-effective 
infrastructure funding to support public projects that have been neglected by traditional Western 
investors for years but also loan conditions that are less harsh than traditional funding 
requirements. Additionally, China has been willing to invest in a region regarded as more risky 
and less profitable than other investment locations. Contrary to common assumptions, only a 
small number of Chinese investors are driven by market-seeking motives. Linking aid to 
investment is a smart Chinese strategy that has seen successful results. Even though African 
markets also provide test markets for Chinese products, local African consumers now benefit 
from the variety of cheap Chinese consumer goods and the establishment of public institutions, 
such as hospitals or schools.  
In conclusion, Chinese investments should perhaps be considered as a well-structured program 
of unconditional loans with favourable repayment terms rather than as a new form of 
colonialism. The power of positively-enhancing investment agreements ensuring that everyone is 
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benefitting lies mainly in the hands of African leaders, and not the Chinese investors. In absence 
of domestic capital, Chinese capital seems like a better option than having no capital at all. 
Hence, this is Africa’s opportunity to decide its own destiny and whether or not the outcome will 
be truly beneficial or a repetition of the dependency-creating deals during colonial times- and 
maybe the West could learn a great deal from China’s investment approach after all. 
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Figure A.1: Global FDI inflows between 1995 to 2011 grouped by economies, in $ billion 
 
Source: UNCTAD (2012: 3)   
 
 
Table A.1: Distribution shares and growth rates of FDI project values by sector/ industries in 
2011, in percent 
 
Source: UNCTAD (2012: 10)  
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Figure A.2: Total share of global FDI inflows to Africa between 2005 to 2011, in $ billion 
 
Source: UNCTAD (2012: 38) 
Figure A.3: Value of sectoral African Greenfield projects between 2003 to 2011, in $ billion 
 
Source: UNCTAD (2012: 41) 
 
Table A.2: African M&A’s between 2010 to 2011 grouped by industries, in $ million 
 
Source: UNCTAD (2012: 39) 
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Table A.3: African Greenfield FDI projects between 2010 to 2011 grouped by industries, in $ 
millions 
 
Source: UNCTAD (2012: 39) 
 
Figure A.4: Composition of global external financing flows to Africa in 2012, as percentage of 
GDP 
 
 
Source: African Economic Outlook (2012) 
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Table A.4: Global FDI flows to Africa between 2005 to 2010, in $ million 
Global FDI Inflows 2005-2010 (USD million)  
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
2005-
2010 
% 2005-
2010 
Algeria 1081 1795 1662 2594 2761 2291 12184 3.63% 
Angola 6794 9064 9796 16581 11672 9942 63848 19.02% 
Benin 53 53 255 171 135 111 778 0.23% 
Botswana 279 486 495 528 579 529 2896 0.86% 
Burkina Faso 34 34 344 137 171 37 757 0.23% 
Burundi 1 0 1 14 10 14 39 0.01% 
Cameroon 225 309 284 270 337 425 1850 0.55% 
Cape Verde 82 131 190 209 119 111 842 0.25% 
Central Afr. Rep. 32 35 57 117 42 72 355 0.11% 
Chad -99 -279 -69 234 462 781 1029 0.31% 
Comoros 1 1 8 8 9 9 35 0.01% 
Congo  1475 1925 2275 2483 2083 2816 13058 3.89% 
DRC  - 256 1808 1727 664 2939 7394 2.20% 
Cote d'Ivoire 312 319 427 1 381 418 1857 0.55% 
Djibouti 22 108 195 229 100 27 681 0.20% 
Egypt 5376 10043 11578 9495 6712 6386 49588 14.77% 
Equatorial Guinea 769 470 1243 -794 1636 695 4019 1.20% 
Eritrea -1 0 0 0 0 56 55 0.02% 
Ethiopia 265 545 222 109 221 184 1546 0.46% 
Gabon 242 268 269 209 33 170 1192 0.35% 
Gambia 45 71 76 70 47 37 347 0.10% 
Ghana 145 636 855 1220 1685 2527 7069 2.11% 
Guinea 105 125 386 382 141 303 1442 0.43% 
Guinea-Bissau 8 17 19 6 14 9 73 0.02% 
Kenya 21 51 729 96 141 133 1170 0.35% 
Lesotho 57 89 97 56 48 55 401 0.12% 
Liberia 83 108 132 395 218 248 1183 0.35% 
Libya 1038 2013 4689 4111 2674 3833 18358 5.47% 
Madagascar 86 295 773 1169 1066 860 4250 1.27% 
Malawi 52 72 92 9 60 140 426 0.13% 
Mali 225 82 65 180 109 148 809 0.24% 
Mauritania 814 106 138 338 -38 14 1372 0.41% 
Mauritius 42 105 339 383 257 430 1556 0.46% 
Morocco 1654 2449 2805 2487 1952 1304 12650 3.77% 
Mozambique 108 154 427 592 893 789 2962 0.88% 
Namibia 348 387 733 720 516 858 3562 1.06% 
Niger 30 51 129 566 739 947 2462 0.73% 
Nigeria 4978 4898 6087 8249 8650 6099 38960 11.60% 
Rwanda 14 31 82 103 119 42 392 0.12% 
São Tomé & Príncipe 16 38 35 33 14 3 138 0.04% 
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Senegal 52 210 273 272 208 237 1253 0.37% 
Seychelles 86 146 239 179 275 369 1293 0.39% 
Sierra Leone 83 59 97 53 33 36 361 0.11% 
Somalia 24 96 141 87 108 112 568 0.17% 
South Africa 6647 -527 5695 9006 5365 1553 27739 8.26% 
South Sudan - - - - - - 0 0.00% 
Sudan 2305 3534 2426 2601 2682 1600 15147 4.51% 
Swaziland -46 121 37 106 66 93 377 0.11% 
Tanzania 494 597 647 679 645 700 3762 1.12% 
Togo 77 77 49 24 50 41 319 0.09% 
Tunisia 783 3308 1616 2758 1688 1513 11665 3.47% 
Uganda 380 644 792 729 816 848 4209 1.25% 
Zambia 357 616 1324 939 695 1041 4971 1.48% 
Zimbabwe 103 40 69 52 105 105 474 0.14% 
TOTAL Africa 38155 46259 63131 73413 60167 55040 335719 100.00% 
 
Source: African Economic Outlook (2012) and author’s own calculations. Highlighted countries represent the 
Top Ten receiving countries in SSA of global FDI. 
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Table A.5: Sectoral distribution of Chinese global OFDI between 2004 to 2010, in $ million 
INDUSTRY   2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Total 2004-
2010 
Total % 2004-
2010 
Agriculture, Forestry, Husbandry, Fishing 288.66 105.36 185.04 271.71 171.83 342.79 533.98 1899.37 1% 
Mining 1800.21 1675.22 8539.51 4062.77 5823.51 13343.09 5714.86 40959.17 17% 
Manufacturing 755.55 2280.4 906.61 2126.5 1766.03 2240.97 4664.17 14740.23 6% 
Production and Supply of Electricity, Gas and Water 78.49 7.66 118.74 151.38 1313.49 468.07 1006.43 3144.26 1% 
Construction 47.95 81.86 33.23 329.43 732.99 360.22 1628.26 3213.94 1% 
Transport, Storage and Post 828.66 576.79 1376.39 4065.48 2655.74 2067.52 5655.45 17226.03 7% 
Wholesale and Retail Trade 799.69 2260.12 1113.91 6604.18 6514.13 6135.75 6728.78 30156.56 12% 
Banking 0 0 3529.99 1667.8 14048 8733.74 8627.39 36606.92 15% 
Real Estate 8.51 115.63 383.76 908.52 339.01 938.14 1613.08 4306.65 2% 
Leasing and Business Service 749.31 4941.59 4521.66 5607.34 21717.23 20473.78 30280.7 88291.61 36% 
Scientific Research, Technical Service and Geological 
Prospecting  18.06 129.42 281.61 303.9 166.81 775.73 1018.86 2694.39 1% 
Information Transmission, Computer Services and Software  30.5 14.79 48.02 303.84 298.75 278.13 506.12 1480.15 1% 
Lodging and Catering Services  2.03 7.58 2.51 9.55 29.5 74.87 218.2 344.24 0% 
Water Conservancy, Environment and Public Facilities 
Management  1.2 0.13 8.25 2.71 141.45 4.34 71.98 230.06 0% 
Services to Households and Other Services 88.14 62.79 111.51 76.21 165.36 267.73 321.05 1092.79 0% 
Education  0 0 2.28 8.92 1.54 2.45 2 17.19 0% 
Health, Social Scurity and Social Welfare 0.01 0 0.18 0.75 0 1.91 33.52 36.37 0% 
Culture, Sports and Entertainment  0.98 0.12 0.76 5.1 21.8 19.76 186.48 235 0% 
Public Management and Social Organisation 0.04 1.71 0 0 0 0 0 1.75 0% 
Total accumulated flows per year  5497.99 12261.17 21163.96 26506.09 55907.17 56528.99 68811.31 246676.68 100% 
 
Source: MOFCOM (2010: 95) and author's own calculations
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Table A.6: Chinese FDI by geographical regions between 2004 to 2010, in $ million 
 
Source: MOFCOM (2010) and author's own calculations  
 
 
 
Table A.7: Chinese FDI flows to Africa between 2004 to 2010, in $ million 
 
Country 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
2004-
2010  
%2004-
2010 
Algeria 11.21 84.87 98.93 145.92 42.25 228.76 186.00 797.94 6.74% 
Angola 0.18 0.47 22.39 41.19 -9.57 8.31 101.11 164.08 1.39% 
Benin 13.77 1.31 - 6.32 14.56 0.09 1.76 37.81 0.32% 
Botswana 0.27 3.69 2.76 1.87 14.06 18.44 43.85 84.94 0.72% 
Burundi - - - - -- 0.69 -- 0.69 0.01% 
Cameroon 0.37 0.19 0.73 2.05 1.69 0.82 14.88 20.73 0.18% 
Cape Verde -- 0.32 0.23 0.09 0.48 -- -0.46 0.66 0.01% 
CAR  - - - - -- -- 25.81 25.81 0.22% 
Chad -- 2.71 1.61 0.75 9.47 51.21 2.13 67.88 0.57% 
Comoros -- - - - -- -- -0.01 0.01 0.00% 
Congo DR 11.91 5.07 36.73 57.27 23.99 227.16 236.19 598.32 5.05% 
Congo 0.51 8.11 13.24 2.50 9.79 28.07 34.38 96.60 0.82% 
Cote D'lvoir 6.75 8.74 -2.91 1.74 -7.02 1.51 -5.02 3.79 0.03% 
Djibouti -- - - 1.00 -- 3.40 4.23 8.63 0.07% 
Egypt 5.72 13.31 8.85 24.98 14.57 133.86 51.65 252.94 2.14% 
Eq.Guinea 1.69 6.35 10.19 12.82 -4.86 20.88 22.08 69.15 0.58% 
Eritrea -- - 0.01 0.45 -0.49 0.23 2.94 3.14 0.03% 
Ethiopia 0.43 4.93 23.95 13.28 9.71 74.29 58.53 185.12 1.56% 
Gabon 5.60 2.08 5.53 3.31 32.05 11.88 23.44 83.89 0.71% 
Gambia -- -- -- -- - - - 0.00 0.00% 
Ghana 0.34 2.57 0.50 1.85 10.99 49.35 55.98 121.58 1.03% 
Guinea 14.44 16.34 0.75 13.20 8.32 26.98 9.74 89.77 0.76% 
Kenya 2.68 2.05 0.18 8.90 23.23 28.12 101.22 166.38 1.40% 
Lesotho 0.03 0.60 -- -- 0.62 0.10 0.56 1.91 0.02% 
Liberia 0.58 8.65 -7.03 -- 2.56 1.12 29.89 35.77 0.30% 
Libya  0.06 0.25 -8.51 42.26 10.54 -38.55 -10.50 4.45 -0.04% 
REGION 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Total 2004-2010 Total % 2004-2010 
Asia 3013.99 4484.17 7663.25 16593.15 43547.5 40407.59 44890.46 160600.11 65%
Africa 317.43 391.68 519.86 1574.31 5490.55 1438.87 2111.99 11844.69 5%
Europe 2046.77 2166.65 597.71 1540.43 875.79 3352.72 6760.19 17340.26 7%
Latin America 1762.72 6466.16 8468.74 4902.41 3677.25 7327.9 10538.27 43143.45 17%
North America 126.49 320.84 258.05 1125.71 364.21 1521.93 2621.44 6338.67 3%
Oceania 120.15 202.83 126.36 770.08 1951.87 2479.98 1888.96 7540.23 3%
TOTAL 7387.55 14032.33 17633.97 26506.09 55907.17 56528.99 68811.31 246807.41 100.00%
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Madagascar 13.64 0.14 1.17 13.24 61.16 42.56 33.58 165.49 1.40% 
Malawi -- -- -- 0.20 5.44 - 9.86 15.50 0.13% 
Mali - - 2.60 6.72 -1.28 7.99 3.05 19.08 0.16% 
Mauritania 0.09 0.36 4.78 -4.98 -0.65 6.53 5.77 11.90 0.10% 
Mauritius 0.44 2.04 16.59 15.58 34.44 14.12 22.01 105.22 0.89% 
Morocco 1.80 0.85 1.78 2.64 6.88 16.42 1.75 32.12 0.27% 
Mozambique 0.66 2.88 -- 10.03 5.85 15.85 0.28 35.55 0.30% 
Namibia -- 0.18 0.85 0.91 7.59 11.62 5.51 26.66 0.23% 
Niger 1.53 5.76 7.94 100.83 -0.01 39.87 196.25 352.17 2.97% 
Nigeria 45.52 53.30 67.79 390.35 162.56 171.86 184.89 1076.27 9.09% 
Rwanda -- 1.42 2.99 -0.41 12.88 8.62 12.72 38.22 0.32% 
Sao Tome  -- -- -- -- - - 0.02 0.02 0.00% 
Senegal -- -- -- 0.24 3.60 11.04 18.96 33.84 0.29% 
Seychelles -- 0.05 0.06 0.09 0.05 0.36 12.28 12.89 0.11% 
Sierra Leone 5.92 0.49 3.71 2.85 11.42 0.90 - 25.29 0.21% 
South Africa 17.81 47.47 40.74 454.41 4807.86 41.59 411.17 5821.05 49.14% 
Sudan 146.70 91.13 50.79 65.40 -63.14 19.30 30.96 341.14 2.88% 
Tanzania 1.62 0.96 12.54 -3.82 18.22 21.58 25.72 76.82 0.65% 
Togo 1.85 0.31 4.58 2.70 4.20 8.91 11.77 34.32 0.29% 
Tunisia 0.22 -- 1.73 -0.34 - -1.30 -0.29 0.02 0.00% 
Uganda 0.15 0.17 0.23 4.01 -6.70 1.29 26.50 25.65 0.22% 
Zambia 2.23 10.09 87.44 119.34 213.97 111.80 75.05 619.92 5.23% 
Zimbabwe 0.71 1.47 3.42 12.57 -0.72 11.24 33.80 62.49 0.53% 
Total Africa 317.43 391.68 519.86 1574.31 5490.56 1438.87 2111.99 11844.70 100.00% 
Total Top 9 224.82 172.94 298.38 809.80 421.90 723.27 1017.78 3668.89 30.97% 
Total Top 
10 
242.63 220.41 339.12 1264.21 5229.76 764.86 1428.95 9489.94 80.12% 
 
Source: Author’s own calculations and MOFCOM (2010: 83-84)  
Highlighted countries represent the 10 top receiving SSA countries of Chinese FDI.  
 
CAR= Central African Republic, 
Congo, DR= Democratic Republic of Congo   
EG= Equatorial Guinea 
Total Top 9= Sum of the 10 top receiving SSA countries of Chinese FDI excluding South Africa 
Total Top 10= Sum of the 10 top receiving SSA countries of Chinese FDI 
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Table A.8: Three main exports of African nations in 2010 with their share in total exports 
      
  
Table 7 - Exports, 2010 
  
 
Three main exports, with their share in total exports 
No of products 
accounting for more 
than 75 per cent of 
exports 
  
   
 Product I Product II Product III   
Algeria 
Petroleum oils and oils obtained from 
bituminous minerals, crude (45,0%) 
Natural gas, in gaseous state (20,0%) Natural gas, liquefied (8,7%) 4   
  
Angola 
Petroleum oils and oils obtained from 
bituminous minerals, crude (97,3%)   
1 
 
  
Benin 
Petroleum oils & oils obtained from 
bituminous minerals (other than crude) 
& preparations (35,3%) 
Gold (incl. gold plated with platinum), in 
unwrought forms (excl. powder) (15,5%) 
Light oils and preparations (9,3%) 6 
 
  
Botswana 
Diamonds non-industrial unworked or 
simply sawn, cleaved or bruted (43,7%) 
Nickel mattes (21,9%) 
Diamonds non-industrial nes excluding mounted or 
set diamonds (8,9%) 
4 
 
  
Burkina Faso Cotton, not carded or combed. (37,4%) 
Gold (incl. gold plated with platinum), non-
monetary, in semi-manufactured forms (15,8%) 
Gold (incl. gold plated with platinum), in 
unwrought forms (excl. powder) (10,8%) 
5   
  
Burundi 
Coffee, not roasted, not decaffeinated 
(70,2%) 
Black tea (fermented) and other partly fermented 
tea (13,1%)  
2  
  
Cameroon 
Petroleum oils and oils obtained from 
bituminous minerals, crude (42,1%) 
Cocoa beans, whole or broken, raw or roasted 
(15,8%) 
Tropical wood specified in Subheading (7,2%) 6 
 
  
Cape Verde 
Yellowfin tunas (Thunnus albacares) 
(20,2%) 
Fish, whole or in pieces, but not minced :-- Other 
(19,6%) 
Mackerel (12,0%) 6 
 
  
Central African Republic Wood in the rough, other (31,0%) 
Diamonds unsorted whether or not worked 
(22,3%) 
Tropical wood specified in Subheading (15,7%) 4  
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Chad 
Petroleum oils and oils obtained from 
bituminous minerals, crude (80,6%) 
Petroleum oils & oils obtained from bituminous 
minerals (other than crude) & preparations 
(8,6%) 
 
1  
  
Comoros 
Cloves (whole fruit, cloves and stems) 
(38,8%) 
Vessels for the transportof goods & for the 
transportof both persons & goods  (20,3%) 
Essential oils, nes (15,6%) 4   
  
Congo 
Petroleum oils and oils obtained from 
bituminous minerals, crude (85,1%)   
1 
 
  
Congo Democratic 
Republic 
Cathodes and sections of cathodes 
(24,7%) 
Cobalt ores and concentrates (17,8%) Copper ores and concentrates (11,9%) 6  
  
Cote d'Ivoire 
Cocoa beans, whole or broken, raw or 
roasted (32,3%) 
Petroleum oils and oils obtained from bituminous 
minerals, crude (12,5%) 
Cocoa paste, not defatted (8,8%) 10 
 
  
Djibouti Live animals, n.e.s. (49,7%) Coffee, not roasted, not decaffeinated  (12,3%) Sheep (8,5%) 4   
  
Egypt 
Petroleum oils and oils obtained from 
bituminous minerals, crude (18,3%) 
Natural gas, liquefied (9,5%) Light oils and preparations (5,5%) 76 
 
  
Equatorial Guinea 
Petroleum oils and oils obtained from 
bituminous minerals, crude (78,0%) 
Natural gas, liquefied (14,7%) 
 
1 
 
  
Eritrea Sheep (11,2%) Cardamoms (9,2%) Mens/boys's shirts, of cotton (8,6%) 19  
  
Ethiopia 
Coffee, not roasted, not decaffeinated 
(42,1%) 
Sesamum seeds (22,5%) Cut flowers fresh (10,7%) 3 
 
  
Gabon 
Petroleum oils and oils obtained from 
bituminous minerals, crude (75,8%) 
Manganese ores and concentrates (12,3%) 
 
1 
 
  
Gambia Cashew nuts, in shell (20,3%) Crude oil (14,9%) Titanium ores and concentrates. (11,2%) 9   
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Ghana 
Cocoa beans, whole or broken, raw or 
roasted (46,4%) 
Cocoa paste, not defatted (7,2%) Manganese ores and concentrates (5,7%) 9 
 
  
Guinea 
Aluminium ores and concentrates. 
(31,7%) 
Petroleum oils and oils obtained from bituminous 
minerals, crude (21,0%) 
Natural gas, liquefied (20,7%) 4 
 
  
Guinea Bissau 
Cashew nuts, in shell, fresh or dried 
(92,9%) 
Ferrous waste and scrap, iron or steel, nes (0,0%) Logs, non-coniferous nes (0,0%) 2  
  
Kenya 
Black tea (fermented) and other partly 
fermented tea (18,6%) 
Cut flowers fresh (13,1%) Coffee, not roasted, not decaffeinated (6,1%) 48   
  
Lesotho 
Diamonds non-industrial unworked or 
simply sawn, cleaved or bruted (37,0%) 
Mens/boys trousers and shorts, of cotton, not 
knitted (15,0%) 
Women's/girls', trousers & shorts, of cotton, not 
knitted (7,5%) 
6  
  
Liberia 
Technically specified natural rubber 
(19,4%) 
Petroleum oils and oils obtained from bituminous 
minerals, crude (15,4%) 
Vessels for the transportof goods & for the 
transportof both persons & goods (15,0%) 
6 
 
  
Libya 
Petroleum oils and oils obtained from 
bituminous minerals, crude (82,1%) 
Natural gas, in gaseous state (6,9%) 
Petroleum oils & oils obtained from bituminous 
minerals (other than crude) & preparations (4,5%) 
1 
 
  
Madagascar Shrimps and prawns (9,5%) Vanilla (6,6%) 
Jerseys, pullovers, cardigans, waist-coats & similar 
articles, knitted/crocheted, of wool (4,6%) 
32  
  
Malawi 
Tobacco, partly or wholly 
stemmed/stripped (53,0%) 
Black tea (fermented) and other partly fermented 
tea (6,9%) 
Natural uranium and its compounds;  (6,8%) 5 
 
  
Mali Cotton, not carded or combed. (35,7%) 
Petroleum oils & oils obtained from bituminous 
minerals (other than crude) & preparations 
(29,1%) 
Sesamum seeds (7,8%) 4   
  
Mauritania 
Iron ores & concentrates, non-
agglomerated (49,3%) 
Copper ores and concentrates. (13,6%) Octopus, other than live/fresh/chilled (7,0%) 4 
 
  
Mauritius Tunas, skipjack and bonito (11,3%) 
T-shirts, singlets and other vests, of cotton, knitted 
(11,0%) 
Cane/beet sugar & chemically pure sucrose, in solid 
form, not containing added flavouring/colouring 
matter (6,4%) 
43 
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Morocco 
Phosphoric acid and polyphosphoric 
acids (7,6%) 
Ignition wiring sets and other wiring sets of a kind 
used in vehicles, aircraft or ships (6,5%)  
69 
 
  
Mozambique 
Aluminium unwrought, not alloyed 
(48,0%) 
Electrical energy (7,5%) Natural gas, liquefied (5,0%) 8   
  
Namibia 
Natural uranium and its compounds;  
(26,8%) 
Diamonds non-industrial unworked or simply 
sawn, cleaved or bruted (16,1%) 
Unwrought Zinc, containing by weight 99.99 % or 
more of zinc (13,4%) 
6 
 
  
Niger 
Natural uranium and its compounds;  
(80,6%) 
Light oils and preparations (7,6%) 
 
1  
  
Nigeria 
Petroleum oils and oils obtained from 
bituminous minerals, crude (85,9%) 
Natural gas, liquefied (6,9%) 
 
1 
 
  
Rwanda 
Coffee, not roasted, not decaffeinated 
(30,4%) 
Niobium, tantalum and vanadium ores and 
concentrates (24,8%) 
Black tea (fermented) and other partly fermented 
tea (13,8%) 
4 
 
  
Sao Tome and Principe 
Cocoa beans, whole or broken, raw or 
roasted (36,3%) 
Wrist-watches other than automatic winding 
(17,4%) 
Articles of jewellery & parts thereof , of silver, 
whether/not plated/clad with other precious metal 
(9,7%) 
8 
 
  
Senegal 
Petroleum oils & oils obtained from 
bituminous minerals (other than crude) 
& preparations (26,4%) 
Portland cement (excl. white cement, whether/not 
artificially coloured), whether/not coloured 
(10,5%) 
Phosphoric acid and polyphosphoric acids  (9,8%) 18   
  
Seychelles Tunas, skipjack and bonito (49,6%) Bigeye tunas (Thunnus obesus) (8,3%) Yellowfin tunas (Thunnus albacares) (6,9%) 5  
  
Sierra Leone 
Diamonds non-industrial unworked or 
simply sawn, cleaved or bruted (26,9%) 
Aluminium ores and concentrates. (14,8%) 
Cocoa beans, whole or broken, raw or roasted 
(11,8%) 
11  
  
Somalia Goats (31,3%) Sheep (29,5%) 
Live bovine animals other than pure-bred breeding 
animals (13,1%) 
4 
 
  
South Africa 
Platinum unwrought or in powder form 
(7,6%) 
Gold (incl. gold plated with platinum), in 
unwrought forms (excl. powder) (6,9%) 
Iron ores & concentrates, non-agglomerated (6,6%) 92   
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South Sudan … … … …  
  
Sudan 
Petroleum oils and oils obtained from 
bituminous minerals, crude (90,3%) 
    1   
  
Swaziland Raw sugar, cane (16,5%) 
Mixtures of odoriferous substances, of a kind used 
in the food or drinkof industries (15,2%) 
Food preparations nes (10,7%) 20 
 
  
Tanzania 
Other Precious metal ores and 
concentrates, other than silver (14,5%) 
Tobacco, partly or wholly stemmed/stripped 
(8,7%) 
Coffee, not roasted, not decaffeinated (6,4%) 24 
 
  
Togo 
Cocoa beans, whole or broken, raw or 
roasted (26,7%) 
Gold (incl. gold plated with platinum), in 
unwrought forms (excl. powder) (12,8%) 
Cement clinkers (10,1%) 8  
  
Tunisia 
Petroleum oils and oils obtained from 
bituminous minerals, crude (11,7%) 
Ignition wiring sets and other wiring sets of a kind 
used in vehicles, aircraft or ships (6,8%) 
Mens/boys trousers and shorts, of cotton, not 
knitted (4,7%) 
94 
 
  
Uganda 
Coffee, not roasted, not decaffeinated 
(32,9%) 
Tobacco, partly or wholly stemmed/stripped 
(9,9%) 
Fish fillets and other fish meat (whether or not 
minced), fresh or chilled (9,3%) 
13   
  
Zambia 
Copper cathodes and sections of 
cathodes unwrought (48,0%) 
Unrefined copper; copper anodes for electrolytic 
refining (26,7%) 
  3   
  
Zimbabwe 
Tobacco, partly or wholly 
stemmed/stripped (20,5%) 
Ferro-chromium containing by weight more than 
4% of carbon  (15,3%) 
Nickel, not alloyed, unwrought (7,1%) 17 
 
  
Africa 
Petroleum oils and oils obtained from 
bituminous minerals, crude (46,6%) 
[46,6%] 
Natural gas, in gaseous state (3,2%) [10,2%] Natural gas, liquefied (3,1%) [16,3%] 34   
  
 
Source:   African Economic Outlook (2012)   
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Table A.9: Foreign stakes in African oil, Blocks 0-13 
  
Source: Zhao (2011b)  
Table A.10: Foreign stakes in African oil, Blocks 14-30 
  
Source: Zhao (2011b) 
Table A.11: Foreign stakes in African oil, Blocks 31-40 
  
Source: Zhao(2011b)
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